

ANALYSIS OF FINANCIAL AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO UKRAINE FROM PARTNER COUNTRIES IN 2022 – FIRST HALF OF 2024

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Abstract

The purpose of the article is to analyze the financial and technical assistance to Ukraine from partner countries during the relevant period of repelling Russia's military aggression against Ukraine, its dynamics and structure in the context of the impact of this assistance on stabilizing the economy and strengthening Ukraine's defense capabilities, necessary for the strategic planning of military actions aimed at Ukraine's victory in the war against Russia.

The result of the research in the article is the generalization of analytical data necessary for the development of specific recommendations for governments, international organizations and other stakeholders that may be involved in overcoming the regional crisis in Ukraine by maximizing efforts to pressure the Russian Federation on the battlefield.

The study will help to deepen the understanding of the impact of military conflicts on the economies of countries, in particular, on their macroeconomic indicators related to the development of the defense industry and other areas.

The results of the study can help government institutions and international organizations in developing and adapting economic policies and strategies aimed at military-technical development to maximize military-political and economic pressure on the Russian Federation, and as a result, reduce its capabilities on the battlefield and in the global political arena.

The value of the study lies in providing analytical material and recommendations that can be applied by various stakeholders to maximize military-political pressure on the Russian Federation on the battlefield, in order to reduce its capabilities on the battlefield and in the global political arena.

Key words: financial and technical assistance, partner countries, nomenclature of weapons, weapons and military equipment.

Introduction

Following the onset of the large-scale invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation in 2022, the international community intensified its efforts to support the Ukrainian state. Immediately after the invasion, Ukraine found itself in a situation where external assistance was critically necessary. Financial and technical aid from partner countries has played and continues to play a vital role in strengthening the country's defense capabilities, stabilizing the economy, and ensuring the livelihoods of the population under wartime conditions.

From 2022 to early 2024, Ukraine received an unprecedented volume of assistance, including grants and loans for budgetary needs, as well as the provision of modern military equipment, technologies, and other critically important resources. Partner countries, including the European Union, the United States, Canada, and Japan, provided comprehensive support encompassing all aspects of Ukraine's recovery and development in the context of ongoing conflict.

Theoretical Foundations of the Research

The theoretical foundations of the study encompass several key aspects that aid in understanding and analyzing the impact of military-technical assistance on the stabilization of Ukraine's economy and the enhancement of its defense capabilities. These are essential for strategic planning of military actions aimed at securing Ukraine's victory in the ongoing conflict with Russia. The following are some of the main theoretical concepts employed within the framework of this research:

Theory of Industrial Mobilization, which involves the maximal mobilization of all national resources to support military efforts. This includes re-profiling industrial enterprises towards the production of weapons and military equipment, as well as providing the army with necessary resources.

Theory of Innovative Development, emphasizing the continuous integration of cutting-edge technologies and innovations into the defense industry to ensure competitiveness and the effectiveness of military efforts.

Theory of National Security Strategy, which adopts a comprehensive approach to ensuring state security, with the defense-industrial complex (DIC) playing a central role. This theory advocates for a balance between developing defense capabilities and maintaining economic stability.

Theory of Network-Centric Warfare, focusing on the integration of information and communication technologies into the defense sector, creating highly efficient systems for managing military operations.

Theory of "Dual-Use" Technologies, oriented towards the development of technologies capable of being utilized for both civilian and military purposes.

Problem Statement

The full-scale invasion of Ukraine by Russia has triggered a large-scale humanitarian catastrophe, caused significant damage to the Ukrainian economy, and precipitated an existential crisis for Ukrainian statehood. This represents an unprecedented phenomenon in contemporary human history: on the European continent, a state that positions itself as a democratic country with close economic, technological, and socio-cultural ties to the Euro-Atlantic community is transformed into a predator capable of unpredictable military actions, utilizing hybrid warfare methods, with the ability to influence the situation in Ukraine through its openly allied partners via impulsive actions across various regions of the world. This has led to the gradual accumulation of regional conflicts of diverse natures (economic, trade, sociocultural, political, religious, etc.).

In response to Russian aggression and hybrid actions that undermine global stability, the international community has provided Ukraine with unprecedented financial and military-technical assistance, and has imposed sanctions against the Russian Federation aimed at weakening it, and consequently reducing its economic and military capabilities. A pertinent task is a comprehensive analysis of this assistance—including its volumes, structure, dynamics, and impact on Ukraine's economy and defense capabilities. The research aims to determine how international aid contributes to stabilizing the financial system, restoring critical infrastructure, and strengthening Ukraine's defense capacity. Furthermore, it is essential to assess the factors influencing the effectiveness of the utilization of the aid provided and to explore ways in which international support can be optimized to achieve the maximum effect in weakening Kremlin's position, especially regarding long-term plans that could destabilize the global balance and lead to unpredictable crises.

The objective of this article is to analyze the financial and technical assistance provided to Ukraine by partner countries during the period of Russia's full-scale military aggression, examining its dynamics and structure within the context of its influence on stabilizing the economy and reinforcing Ukraine's defense capabilities, which are necessary for strategic planning of military actions aimed at securing Ukraine's victory in the ongoing war against Russia.

Research Methodology

To achieve the research objectives, the study was decomposed into specific components, and the following scientific methods were employed:

Empirical Analysis — utilizing official statistics, reports from government and international organizations, and financial statements;

Statistical Analysis — applying statistical methods to analyze data;

Qualitative Analysis — examining textual materials such as official documents, press releases, and media publications to identify trends, themes, or patterns;

Case Study — conducting detailed analysis of specific cases or events relevant to the research topic;

Theoretical Analysis — reviewing scientific articles and theoretical works related to the subject to establish the theoretical foundation and identify gaps in existing knowledge;

Systemic Analysis — analyzing the interconnections among different components of the economic system and assessing the influence of external and internal factors;

Scenario Analysis — developing and evaluating various scenarios of future developments based on current trends and potential changes in external and internal environments.

Results

Since the onset of the full-scale military aggression by the Russian Federation against Ukraine, defense expenditures in Ukraine have increased by 700%. Such a situation is entirely understandable, as the adversary we face possesses incomparable access to various resources. To counter such an enemy, it is crucial to at least maintain parity in the utilization of financial, material, and human capital resources.

Currently, the war consumes the entire revenue portion of Ukraine's budget, making it impossible to finance other state obligations and ensure the functioning of society. Recognizing the severity of Ukraine's predicament, our partners, starting from 2022, have committed to financing other parts of the budget expenses not related to the war.

It is also apparent that even with a colossal increase in the defense budget, Ukraine cannot effectively oppose Russia, as we lack the necessary technological weapons and military equipment (WME), ammunition reserves, and other facilities of the defense-industrial complex. Based on this, several partner countries of Ukraine consistently provide technical support. Today, a significant portion of the nomenclature of WME, which is in the arms of our partners, is supplied to Ukraine in the form of technical assistance (TA) on a gratuitous basis.

The United States is the largest donor to Ukraine in actual terms. During the war, the U.S. Congress has passed five aid packages for Ukraine, with the most recent vote taking place in April 2024 (see Fig. 1) [1].

The total aid package from the United States amounts to \$175 billion. The aid exclusively allocated to Ukraine is \$107 billion, comprising \$34.2 billion in budget support, \$69.8 billion in military assistance, including weapons systems and other military support, and \$3 billion allocated for humanitarian aid. The remaining \$68 billion finances other activities directly within the United States related to the war in Ukraine, as well as support provided to other countries (see Fig. 2).

Almost 90% of the aid allocated to Ukraine is directed towards defense procurement within the United States for the production of weapons for Ukraine and the replenishment of U.S. stockpiles. In total, 31 states, encompassing 71 cities with defense industrial enterprises, are involved in these defense acquisitions [2].




Figure 1 – U.S. Assistance to Ukraine, (billion USD)

Source: compiled with the assistance of [1].

Additionally, other enterprises engaged in the supply of raw materials and components for weapon systems, medical equipment, night vision devices, thermal imagers, rifle cartridges, and others are also part of the manufacturing process (see Fig. 2).




Figure 2 – Distribution of U.S. Assistance to Ukraine

Source: compiled with the assistance of [1, 8].

Currently, U.S. defense enterprises are capable of producing up to 15,000 shells of 155 mm caliber per month. Therefore, part of the funds—specifically \$1.5 billion—is allocated to increase production capacities, which are expected to grow to 100,000 shells per month. Plans also include expanding missile production for systems such as the Stinger, GLSDB small-diameter bombs for HIMARS, developing phased-array radar for the MIM-104 Patriot system, and other weapon systems. Thus, the United States is encouraging its defense industry to develop further, persuading NATO allies to transfer older American weapons to Ukraine and to enter into contracts for new weapons supplies.




Figure 3 – U.S. Cities Hosting Enterprises Manufacturing Weapons for Ukraine

Source: compiled with the assistance of [2].

For example, Poland delivered 250 Soviet and German tanks to Ukraine and subsequently signed a contract to supply 250 M1A2 Abrams tanks, totaling \$4.75 billion. After dispatching Mi-24 helicopters from Poland to Ukraine, a contract was signed for the purchase of 96 Apache helicopters, with a total value of \$12 billion.

Other European countries, such as Finland, plan to transfer older F/A-18 Hornet aircraft to Ukraine and are also purchasing 64 F-35 aircraft at an estimated cost of \$9.4 billion. Norway, after transferring F-16 fighters to Ukraine, is purchasing 52 F-35 fighters. Denmark and the Netherlands are transferring 61 F-16 aircraft to Ukraine and plan to replace them with F-35 jets as well.

The existing situation indicates that the United States, by investing a significant portion of aid funds into its own defense industrial complex (DIC), not only assists Ukraine but also revitalizes defense enterprises and increases supplies of new weaponry to allies. These allies, in turn, transfer American-made arms to Ukraine.

The United States has provided and continues to supply Ukraine with an extraordinarily broad array of weapons and military equipment. The aid packages include air defense systems, rockets, armored vehicles, artillery, coastal defense systems, radar stations and communications, satellite services, transportation vehicles, combat drones, piloted aircraft, and others (see Table 1) [1].

Table 1 – Nomenclature of weapons supplied to Ukraine by the United States from January 20, 2020, to April 26, 2024

Category	Armaments and Other Equipment
Infantry Weapons and Equipment	10,000 Javelin anti-tank systems 90,000 other anti-tank systems and munitions 2,000 Stinger air-defense systems 9,000 TOW missiles 40,000 grenade launchers and small arms 400 million rounds of small arms ammunition and grenades 100,000 sets of body armor and helmets Night vision devices, surveillance systems, thermal imaging systems, optics, and laser rangefinders C-4 and other explosives Explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) equipment Counter-drone trucks and munitions M18A1 Claymore mines Anti-tank mines Demining equipment Obstacle emplacement equipment Medical supplies Field equipment, cold-weather gear, generators, and spare parts Radiological, chemical, and biological protection equipment 18 armored bridge systems Rocket launchers and munitions 25 mm caliber ammunition
Air Defense Systems	1 Patriot air defense battery and munitions 12 NASAMS systems Avenger air defense systems HAWK air defense systems and munitions Laser-guided rocket systems AIM-7 missiles RIM-7 missiles AIM-9M missiles Anti-aircraft guns and ammunition Equipment for system integration and support for Ukraine's air defense and protection of critical infrastructure VAMPIRE counter-drone systems and munitions Laser-guided counter-drone missile systems Air defense system components Other anti-drone equipment
Air-to-Surface Missiles	High-Speed Anti-Radiation Missiles (HARMs) Precision-guided aerial munitions 6,000 Zuni aircraft rockets (can also be used for air defense) 20,000 Hydra-70 aircraft rockets
Manned Aircraft	20 Mi-17 helicopters
Artillery	198 155 mm howitzers and 3 million rounds, including 7,000 precision-guided projectiles and 40,000 anti-tank mine shells 72 105 mm howitzers and 800,000 rounds

Category	Armaments and Other Equipment
	10,000 rounds of 203 mm caliber, 400,000 rounds of 152 mm caliber 40,000 rounds of 130 mm caliber and 40,000 rounds of 122 mm caliber 47 units of 120 mm mortar systems 10 units of 82 mm mortar systems 112 units of 81 mm mortar systems 58 units of 60 mm mortar systems 400,000 mortar rounds 39 HIMARS systems 60,000 122 mm Grad rockets Ground-Launched Small Diameter Bomb (GLSDB) Launchers and munitions Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS)
Combat Drones	Switchblade drones Phoenix Ghost drones ALTIUS-600 drones (can also be used for surveillance) Munitions
Surveillance Drones	ScanEagle drones Puma drones JUMP 20 drones CyberLux K8 drones Penguin drone (can also be used as a combat drone) Black Hornet drones
Tanks and Armored Personnel Carriers (APCs)	200 Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicles (IFVs) 4 Bradley Fire Support Team (BFIST) vehicles 31 Abrams tanks 45 T-72B tanks (via the Czech Republic) 189 Stryker armored personnel carriers (APCs) 300 M113 armored personnel carriers (APCs) 250 M1117 armored security vehicles 300 infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) 1,000 MRAP vehicles (Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected) Tank ammunition of 125 mm, 120 mm, and 105 mm calibers
Coastal Defense	2 Harpoon coastal defense systems Unmanned coastal defense vessels 62 coastal and riverine patrol boats Port and harbor security equipment
Radar and Communications	4 satellite communication antennas 2 drone detection radars 21 air surveillance radars 50 multifunctional radars Tactical secure communication systems 100 counter-artillery and counter-mortar radars Electronic warfare (EW) and counter-electronic warfare systems 4 SATCOM antennas SATCOM terminals and services
Ground Vehicles	3,000 Humvees (HMMWVs) 1,131 tactical vehicles 200 light tactical vehicles 80 trucks 124 trailers 10 command and staff vehicles 30 ammunition transport vehicles 6 armored light trucks 20 logistics support vehicles Satellite services 239 fuel trucks and 105 fuel trailers 58 flatbed trailers
Satellite Services	Commercial satellite imagery services Satellite communications

A comparison of certain U.S. budget expenditures with aid provided to Ukraine demonstrates that Ukraine is a priority, as the funding for Ukraine's needs is allocated at the level of individual U.S. states (see Fig. 4).

European countries are among the largest donors, both financially and in terms of technical assistance. Naturally, aid to Ukraine is not limited solely to U.S. states and Europe; other countries worldwide that identify with Western culture are also involved.




Figure 4 – Aid to Ukraine compared to some other US budget expenditures (USD billions)

Source: compiled using [1].

The formation of assistance also involves international financial organizations. Since February 2022, the World Bank Group has mobilized over \$42 billion in financial support for Ukraine, of which nearly \$36 billion has been transferred to Ukraine as of June 2, 2024. Over 95 % of this funding has been provided by development partners, including European countries, the United States, New Zealand, and others [3].

To date, European countries have allocated a total of €102 billion in aid to Ukraine, with an additional €75.8 billion planned for future funding. Assistance is received both from the European Union and separately from individual countries (see Fig. 5).




Figure 5 – Volumes of financial, military-technical, and humanitarian aid provided to Ukraine by the EU and other countries worldwide

Source: compiled using [4, 14].

The largest financial donors to Ukraine are the United States (€34.2 billion) and the European Union (€33.7 billion), followed by Japan (€6.2 billion), the United Kingdom (€3.27 billion), Canada (€4.79 billion), and Germany (€1.41 billion).

Financial assistance is directed towards covering the deficit of Ukraine's state budget, specifically for public order, security and judiciary, social protection and social security, salaries, pensions, benefits, scholarships, debt servicing, payments related to government derivatives, economic activities, healthcare, environmental protection, housing and communal services, cultural and physical development, education, as well as subsidies from the state budget for the functions of local self-government bodies, subventions to local budgets to mitigate the effects of armed aggression, the basic subsidy to ensure the fiscal capacity of local budgets, and other areas [7].

In addition to the United States, Germany (€10.2 billion), the United Kingdom (€8.8 billion), the Netherlands (€4.35 billion), Denmark (€5.6 billion), Poland (€3 billion), France (€2.69 billion), Sweden (€2.69 billion), Canada (€1.97 billion), Finland (€2.03 billion), Belgium (€1.53 billion), the Czech Republic (€1.2 billion), and Italy (€1 billion) are the leading providers of technical assistance.

Actual figures, such as the total amount of aid, do not fully capture the extent of some countries' commitment to supporting Ukraine. Each country has its own individual economic size, and consequently, specific capabilities for providing such support. An informative indicator is the share of the GDP allocated by friendly governments for aid. Conducting such an analysis reveals a somewhat different picture of support (see Fig. 7).




Figure 7 – Volume of aid to Ukraine from partner countries from February 24, 2022, to April 30, 2024, as a percentage of the national GDP

Source: compiled using [4, 5, 14].

In percentage terms relative to their national economies, the countries providing the greatest assistance are as follows: Estonia (1.8% of GDP); Denmark (1.8% of GDP); Lithuania (1.6% of GDP); Latvia (1.5% of GDP); Finland (1.0% of GDP); Poland (0.9% of GDP); Slovakia (0.9% of GDP);

the Netherlands (0.8% of GDP); Sweden (0.7% of GDP); Czechia (0.7% of GDP); Croatia (0.6% of GDP); Belgium (0.6% of GDP); Germany (0.6% of GDP); Bulgaria (0.5% of GDP); Norway (0.5% of GDP); and the United States (0.3% of GDP). Member states of the European Union allocate part of their financial assistance through EU institutions, with the volume of such aid generally ranging from 0.2% to 0.3% of GDP.

It should also be noted that a significant portion of financial and humanitarian support is directed towards meeting the primary needs of refugees from Ukraine. The countries that have received the largest number of displaced persons have provided the most assistance to refugees (see Fig. 8).

The countries that received the largest influx of refugees provided the most significant assistance. Primarily, this includes Germany (€25.95 billion) and Poland (€23.62 billion). Substantial support was also directed to the Czech Republic (€6.15 billion), Spain (€5.88 billion), France (€3.47 billion), the United Kingdom (€2.46 billion), the Netherlands (€2.33 billion), Italy (€2.69 billion), Belgium (€2.32 billion), Switzerland (€2.64 billion), Slovakia (€2.17 billion), Romania (€2.69 billion), Austria (€2.01 billion), and others.

One of the largest categories of expenditure among Ukraine's partner countries is, of course, technical assistance. Without this form of aid, Ukraine would be unable to ensure the procurement of the full range of weapons systems, ammunition, and munitions necessary for its defense. This type of assistance is arguably the most critical compared to other forms of support. It enables Ukrainian defense forces to eliminate enemy personnel and weapon systems daily on the battlefield, conduct rearmament, obtain up-to-date intelligence, effectively defend Ukrainian territory from air strikes, train military personnel at partner training centers, and much more.




Figure 8 – Expenditure of partner countries on assistance to refugees from Ukraine from February 2022 to April 30, 2024, in billion euros.

Source: compiled using [4-6].

Already, data has been provided on the financing of technical aid from partner countries and on the tangible aid supplied by the United States. The following section proposes to examine which specific types of weaponry have been supplied and their associated costs (see Tables 2-6) [4].

Table 2 – Tanks supplied to Ukraine by partner countries (February 2022 – April 2024)

Country	Quantity (units)	Cost (million USD)	Name
Poland	324	599	T-72 (270) PT-91 Twardy (40) Leopard -2A4 (14)

Netherlands	104	106	Overhauled T-72 (45) Leopard -2A4 (7) T-72 (15) Leopard -1A5 (37)
Czechia	90	145	T-72 (90)
United States	76	634	Overhauled T-72 (31) M1A1 Abrams (31)
Denmark	69	77	Leopard -2A4 (7) T-72 (25) Leopard -1A5 (37)
Germany	55	201	Leopard -2A4 (18) Leopard -1A5 (37)
Spain	29	62	Leopard -2A4 (29)
Slovakia	28	27	M-55S (28)
United Kingdom	14	191	Challenger 2 (14)
Sweden	10	100	Leopard -2A6 (10)
Canada	8	17	Leopard -2A4 (8)
Norway	8	17	Leopard -2A4 (8)
Portugal	3	30	Leopard -2A6 (3)
Total	818	2206	

Table 3 – Infantry Fighting Vehicles supplied to Ukraine by partner countries (February 2022 – April 2024)

Country	Quantity (units)	Cost (million USD)	Name
United States	252	479	M-2 Bradley
Netherlands	207	69	YPR-765
Germany	140	214	Marder
Czechia	131	33	BVP-1
Denmark	80	81	BMP-2
Greece	60	34	BMP-1
Sweden	50	341	CV-90
Poland	42	24	BMP-1
Slovakia	35	25	M-80
Slovenia	30	17	BMP-1
Total	1027	1317	

Table 4 – Artillery systems supplied to Ukraine by partner countries (February 2022 – April 2024)

Country	Quantity (units)	Cost (million USD)	Name
United States	198	962	M-777 (142), M-109 (18), unspecified 155mm (38)
United Kingdom	78	713	M-109 (28), AS-90 (50)
Italy	76	196	FH-70 (10), PzH-2000 (6), M-109 (60)
Germany	73	919	PzH-2000 (32), Zusana-2 (5), RCH-155 (36)
France	57	344	CAESAR (42), TR-F-1 (15)
Norway	27	84	M-109 (22), Zusana-2 (5)
Denmark	24	167	Zusana-2 (5), CAESAR (19)
Estonia	24	21	FH-70 (24)
Poland	18	230	Krab (18)
Netherlands	17	188	PzH-2000 (8), DITA howitzer (9)
Czechia	13	20	DANA (13)
Sweden	8	32	Archer (8)
Australia	6	31	M-777 (6)
Latvia	6	10	M-109 (6)
Canada	4	21	M-777 (4)
Total	629	3938	

Table 5 – Rocket artillery systems supplied to Ukraine by partner countries (February 2022 – April 2024)


Country	Quantity (units)	Cost (million USD)	Name
United States	39	588	HIMARS
United Kingdom	11	35	M-270
Italy	2	27	M-270
Germany	5	104	Mars II
France	4	54	M-270
Norway	11	35	M-270
Czechia	12	20	RM-70
Total	84	863	

Table 6 – Air defense systems supplied to Ukraine by partner countries (February 2022 – April 2024)

Country	Quantity (units)	Cost (million USD)	Name
Germany	26	4400	Iris-T SML system (2), Patriot system (2), Iris-T SMS system (12)
Czechia	16	400	2K12 Kub system (16)
United States	16	1051	NASAMA (13), Patriot System (1), HAWK system (2)
Spain	7	71	HAWK system (6), Aspide system (1)
Slovakia	3	259	S-300 system (1), 2K12 Kub system (2)
France	2	21	Crotale system (2)
Canada	1	50	NASAMA (1)
Italy	1	342	SAMP/T system (1)
Total	72	6594	

To date, our partners have already transferred 818 tanks (€2.206 billion), 1,027 infantry fighting vehicles (€1.317 billion), 629 artillery systems (€3.938 billion), 84 multiple launch rocket systems (€0.863 billion), and 72 air defense systems (€6.594 billion). From the data presented, it is evident that the most valuable are the air defense systems, rocket systems, and artillery systems (see Fig. 9) [8]. The total value of these weapons systems amounts to approximately \$14.918 billion USD.

The listed nomenclature of weaponry is not exhaustive; some samples are not included in the list but are extremely costly, such as ammunition for various systems, small arms, communication equipment, electronic warfare and electronic countermeasure systems, uncrewed systems, explosives, satellite communications, portable missile and anti-tank systems, reconnaissance information, confidentially transferred weapons, personnel training, and many other types of equipment and ammunition.

**Picture 9 – The value of weapon systems supplied to Ukraine by partner countries from February 2022 to May 2024, in billion USD.**

Source: compiled using [4-6].

As previously noted, Ukraine's economy is incapable of ensuring both sustainable socio-economic development and maintaining pre-war indicators without the assistance of partner countries. Therefore, financial, technical, and humanitarian aid enables Ukraine to avoid crises of both production and social nature. It should be emphasized that nearly the entire revenue part of Ukraine's budget is allocated to defense needs, meaning that funding for healthcare, social protection, education, and other sectors is carried out through aid from partner countries.

For 2023, external financing was planned; however, this was not available in the first year of total war. As a result, in 2022, Ukraine had to finance its expenditures using issued funds. Inflation in Ukraine in 2022 amounted to 26.6% [9], which was not solely due to money issuance. The main factors included: destruction of industrial capacity, logistical problems, increased demand for certain goods, rising energy prices, increased costs for producers, and expectations of further price growth. By the end of 2022, the National Bank of Ukraine had printed 400 billion UAH, which at that time was equivalent to approximately \$12.5 billion USD [10]. Inflation could have been higher if aid had not begun to arrive.

Overall, the assistance from partner countries has enabled Ukraine, under extremely challenging conditions, to achieve: stabilization of the financial system (support for the hryvnia exchange rate, bank refinancing); support for business (loans, grants, export support programs); economic recovery (investment in various sectors); and reduction of the budget deficit (funding for state programs).

Given the inadequate objectives of the adversary's efforts to destroy Ukraine's energy system—aimed at increasing civilian suffering—international support has also helped: diversify energy sources (increase in energy imports from other countries); initiate modernization of the energy system (repair and construction of new power plants and transmission lines); and safeguard energy infrastructure (restoration of damaged facilities and enhanced protection).

According to Ukraine's Energy Strategy until 2050 [11], plans are underway to construct nine nuclear power units based on the AR1000 technology developed by the American company Westinghouse, with an agreement signed on June 2, 2022 [12]. These units will be commissioned not only at existing nuclear power plants but also at the site of an unfinished project near the city of Orbita in Cherkasy Oblast, where four additional units are planned. According to the Minister of Energy, construction is set to commence this fall, with two units to be imported from Bulgaria and two to be built by Westinghouse. The commissioning is expected in 2025. (For reference: all Ukrainian nuclear power plants currently supply approximately 55% of the country's total energy needs) [13].

Ensuring Ukraine's stability during the war with the support of partner countries is a necessary condition for deterring the ambitious plans of regional leaders such as Russia, China, Iran (hereinafter referred to as the "Triad"), and their proxies, including North Korea, to expand their spheres of influence globally through hybrid tools of active engagement. These countries are at the forefront of a broader struggle to alter the existing world order, with other nations openly or tacitly supporting them. The strategic plans of unions like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and BRICS provide insight into the member states' desire to change the current geopolitical landscape.

Key issues continuously discussed within the Triad include:

Weakening U.S. influence: all three states aim to reduce the dominant role of the United States in global politics and economy. This involves creating alternative centers of power, undermining Western alliances, and increasing their influence in various regions;

Reforming international organizations: the Triad advocates for reform or the creation of new international organizations that reflect the new realities of global politics and ensure greater representation of countries in the Global South;

Promoting own development models: each of these states proposes its own development model, which they consider to be more just and effective compared to Western alternatives;

Supporting authoritarian regimes: all three countries provide support to authoritarian regimes worldwide, viewing them as allies in the fight against Western influence.

The war in Ukraine serves as a tool to achieve several strategic objectives:

Weakening NATO and the EU: the conflict creates serious challenges to the unity and effectiveness of Western alliances;

Demonstrating strength: Russia's aggressive actions in Ukraine showcase the power and determination of these states to defend their interests;

Expanding spheres of influence: success in the Ukrainian conflict could enable Russia to broaden its influence across the post-Soviet space and other regions;

Undermining the global economy: the war causes a global energy and food crisis, threatening the stability of the world economy.

The Role of Individual States

PRC: China aims to achieve the status of a global superpower, displacing the United States from this role. The war in Ukraine allows China to strengthen its position worldwide by acting as a mediator in the conflict and proposing alternative solutions [15].

Iran: Iran sees the war in Ukraine as an opportunity to weaken U.S. influence in the Middle East and expand its sphere of influence. Additionally, Iran provides military assistance to Russia, which helps to solidify its regional positions [16, 17].

Russia: Russia seeks to restore its status as a great power and establish a new sphere of influence in the post-Soviet space. The war in Ukraine is a central element of this strategy [18].

In a broader sense, Ukraine functions as a component in the confrontation between the Triad (the U.S., China, and Russia) and developed countries. Therefore, calls by Western leaders not to let Russia prevail do not fully align with Ukraine's national interests. The Ukrainian Armed Forces' intervention within Russian territory demonstrates Ukraine's aspiration to play a more significant role in decision-making by partner countries within the scenario of resolving the conflict in favor of Ukraine.

Conclusions

Assistance to Ukraine plays a crucial role in deterring the aggressive ambitions of countries such as Russia, China, and Iran, which seek to overturn the existing global order. Support for Ukraine is a key component of the broader strategic framework of Western countries aimed at countering authoritarian regimes and defending democratic values. To resolve the conflict in Ukraine and prevent these countries from implementing plans to destabilize global stability, it is necessary to strengthen coordination among donor countries and international organizations to ensure the timely and targeted use of aid, taking into account the existing risks both within Ukraine and externally.

It is also essential to develop a long-term support strategy for Ukraine that encompasses not only military aspects but also economic, humanitarian, and political dimensions. This strategy should serve as a single comprehensive document – sometimes referred to as a collective agreement—that compels all signatory countries to act in a synchronized manner, regardless of their political orientations.

Meanwhile, Ukraine must actively utilize the received aid to strengthen its own defense capabilities and foster the development of innovative technologies in the defense industry. The integration of innovative approaches and technologies could become a critical factor in ensuring victory in the war and in advancing the country's future economic development.

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