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# THE STRUCTURE OF THE IRAQI POLITICAL SYSTEM IN THE FACE OF REGIONAL CRISES AFTER 2003

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## **Abstract**

The research aims to shed light on the Iraqi political structure in the face of regional crises after 2003 and to identify the methods of managing the crisis of Iraqi regional relations. The research used more than one method. It used the historical method, the descriptive analytical method, and the systematic analysis method. Given the aforementioned considerations, the study employed an integrated method that integrates the previously mentioned methods, as dictated by the requirements of scientific research. The political structure, the nature of the regional crisis since 2003, and the methods and tools used by both the Iraqi and regional sides shape the research problem. The study concluded that the diverse political forces and parties in Iraq have varying stances on regional issues due to consensus democracy, political quotas, and a diverse range of intellectual and ideological concepts. To secure support from regional and international stakeholders and secure future assistance, it is crucial to consolidate the domestic front and adapt the state's strategy.

**Key words:** political system in Iraq, regional crises, the structure of the Iraqi political system

## **Introduction**

Crisis study is one of the modern branches of political science in general and international relations in particular. Interest in this branch has increased in the modern era as a result of the extremely complex changes and events witnessed by the contemporary international system. Crisis is defined as the science of managing balances of power, monitoring their movements and trends, and anticipating their results. It is also the science of adapting to variables, moving constants, and forces of action in all human fields: political, economic, military, social, cultural, and other.

Lipsky (2020, 2) A crisis is defined as a circumstance that poses a substantial danger to the people or fundamental principles of a nation, and requires a political reaction under a time constraint and characterised by uncertainty. While the challenges of the early 21st century are characterized by the distinct features of threat, urgency, and uncertainty, these features are not synchronous in a chronological sense, nor do they exhibit the same level of intensity in all three dimensions. Furthermore, the objectives of the agency's intervention are not clearly defined. This paper examines the characteristics of uncertainty, unpredictability, and dynamics of unintended effects., challenge the objectives stated by Young (1977, 6) Within the first phase of the research topic on crisis in International Relations (IR), the main objective is to enhance our combined capacity to predict both domestic and international crises. This will enable the development of efficient strategies to prevent and handle such crises. Drawing upon Hoffmann's (2016, 55) perspective, it becomes evident that another challenge in predicting the global crisis lies in the fact that the classification of an occurrence as a crisis is primarily a political procedure. In recent years, the research agenda has shifted its focus from developing tools to avoid or predict crises to gaining a

deeper knowledge of the factors that influence the effect of a crisis, which are ultimately shaped by politics calls the “politics of crisis”.

Therefore, the issue of the crisis is of utmost importance. Given the rapid developments in this era, the economic, political, and social turmoil, and the latent desire of some to resolve the crisis through military means, the crisis has become an inescapable phenomenon, arising from multiple patterns of international political interactions. It is present among the units of the international community and in human societies whenever indicators of disparity and difference appear, and when the intensity of competition and degrees of conflict escalate. The crisis is an endemic state in the international community, and its occurrence can be expected as a natural phenomenon among members of the international family, even if it is undesirable, due to the high risk it entails. Since the crisis represents a latent and endemic state in the international community, this calls for the innovation of means and methods, as well as the adoption of behavioral patterns, with the aim of reducing the severity of its risks and preventing its course from turning into a state of war and armed confrontations.

Despite the acknowledged lack of sufficient guarantees to avert wars due to their diverse origins and driving forces, political literature recognizes the existence of fundamental principles and technical techniques that can lessen the likelihood of their occurrence, albeit without completely eliminating them. This concept is known as crisis management. If the crisis signifies a sudden shift in the normal relationship between two countries or a sharp break in their relationship, it exposes Iraqi-regional relations to such a shift. It’s worth noting that the subject of Iraqi-regional relations is among the most complex and ambiguous, given the security concerns, extreme caution, and weak mutual trust between the two parties involved. In light of the above, the research came to study the manifestations of the crisis witnessed by Iraqi relations with its regional surroundings from 2003 until 2023 and the extent of the political system’s ability to stand up to and repel it.

### ***Research question***

How did the sectarian political system, which was implemented after 2003, contribute to deepening sectarian divisions and hindering the building of a strong state capable of confronting external challenges? What is the relationship between the depth of sectarian divisions and the fragility of the Iraqi state in the face of regional interventions?

### **The importance of the research**

The significance of the research lies in attempting to determine the future of Iraqi-regional relations beyond 2003, given the Iraqi decision-maker’s recognition of the significance of his interactions with the regionals environment, particularly in light of the challenges Iraq faced.

### **Hypotheses**

The research posits a hypothesis that emphasizes the role of a robust political and governmental system in addressing regional crises, attempting to curb external conflict, and upholding the unity and sovereignty of a significant state within the regional system.

### ***Result and Discussion***

#### **The first topic: The structure of the political system in Iraq after 2003**

Conflicts pose significant challenges in the construction of political systems within countries. These conflicts, at the internal level, are the result of seizing power by ascending to the highest hierarchy of power.

#### **1. The concept of political system structure**

Biology uses the term “structure” to describe the anatomical and histological structure, while sociology uses it to describe the social structure, which represents the distribution of the population into social classes, their interactions, and their role in the broader society. If the movement of politics is rooted in political institutions and activities, it typically rests on organizational foundations that guarantee its survival and continuity in carrying out its functions, thereby establishing an organizational structure (Al-Aswad, 1990). Therefore, we can define the structure as everything that consists of components, each of which maintains a relationship at a particular time and location; it’s the arrangement of these components to form a whole through their respective functions; or it’s the arrangement of individuals who share specific relationships in a fundamental way. In this manner, the structure embodies a system of internal, comprehensive relationships, where any modification or change in these relationships triggers a corresponding change or alteration in the entire system (Kirozel, 1985).

The introduction of the concept of structure into political science is methodologically significant, as it underscores the significance of the relationships between the various components of the political system. This approach extends beyond the legal relationships suggested by the concepts of system, form, and institution, and instead focuses on the fateful or authoritarian relationships that exist between these components. Some scholars even go so far as to estimate the importance of the structural approach, characterizing the entire political system as a political structure, composed of smaller structures (Alsaeb, 1977).

From this perspective, we can assert that the political structure comprises a network of internal connections, encompassing the characteristics of active political entities like political parties, the constitution and political system, political legitimacy, rights, and freedoms. Any alteration, whether favorable or unfavorable, in one of these connections will impact the remaining relationships within the structure (Al-Harbi, 2008).

The political structure is defined as a system of relationships that includes the active forces of democratic political parties, the democratic constitution, political legitimacy, rights, and freedoms. In other words, the democratic political structure relies on institutions and political participation to prevent the absolute rule of an individual or the dominance of a single party, which could interfere with people’s lives, desires, and aspirations, while also promoting a particular ideology across all aspects of life. Accordingly, the democratic political structure represents pluralistic content – politically and intellectually – that guarantees the coexistence of opinions and ideas without one dominating the other.

## **2. A descriptive overview of the political structure of Iraq after 2003**

The fall of Baghdad in 2003 led to the collapse of Iraq’s security, military, and other sectors, resulting in chaos and the fall of the ruling system. The regime, which had built all state institutions on its presence, lasted for 35 years, based on oppression and wars abroad. To topple the regime, American imperialism used the excuse that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction. Iraq was once a country of racial discrimination, but after the American invasion, it became a context for sectarian war. The imperialist state supported or ignored these entrenchments, emphasizing discrimination and polarization based on government components. They divided the country into sects and components, aiming for division rather than unity. This division of power led to conflicts over power and the spoils of the sectarian war.

### **1) Form of state and nature of government system after war**

Iraq has faced daily terrorist incidents since the 2003 regime change, culminating in June 2014 with the ISIS occupation of large areas of the country. The current political system, post-2003, is a federal parliamentary republic with multi-party parliamentary democracy. The Prime Minister,

as the head of the Council of Ministers and the official head of state, now exercises executive powers, while the Council of Representatives holds legislative and oversight powers. After decades of dictatorship, Iraqis have held four general elections, one referendum, and three provincial elections across the country since 2003. However, the current situation is characterized by inconsistency and slow decision-making. Despite the commitment of the majority of political groups to constitutional procedures that help defuse political tensions and reach constructive decisions on vital issues after a long delay, political bickering has become a feature of the country's new democracy. Some have described the current regime in Iraq as a hybrid between flawed democracy and a transition from authoritarianism (Al-Fili, 2019, 17).

## **2) The legitimacy of the political system in Iraq after the occupation**

If United Nations Resolution No. 1483 declares its recognition of the American and British occupation of Iraq, it means that they are temporarily administering the government. Upon its formation, the Governing Council mirrored the military model of World War II, overseeing numerous occupied territories in a similar fashion. This implies that the decisions made by these auxiliary civil administrations will mirror those made by the occupation authorities themselves. Therefore, the Security Council issued Resolution No. 1500, which included welcoming the establishment of the Transitional Governing Council in August 2003. This is in addition to the Security Council's adoption of Resolution No. 1483, which is based on the letter of the two occupying states on May 8, 2003. Its preamble clarified the occupying authority's responsibilities, stating that it is a temporary administrative responsibility. Paragraph (9) of Resolution 1483 affirms that it does not confer any authority. The interim administration, or Governing Council, has "sovereignty powers", but sovereignty is for an independent and legitimate Iraqi government alone and no others (Shaban, 2004). This is what encouraged liberal and religious demands to insist that "there is no legitimacy except for a national council (Paul Braymer)". Paragraph (b) of Article (2) of the State Law of Administration for the Transitional Period was applied. Article 6(1) of the Law of Administration of the State for the Transitional Period outlines the process of dissolving "the government headed by Iyad Allawi" and forming a new interim elected government. This new government is tasked with preparing a constitution that will gain legitimacy from society by presenting it to the people of Iraq for a vote. The next step involves preparing for new parliamentary elections, which will gain legitimacy for a period of "four years". Additionally, the previous elected interim government will be dissolved to allow the new government to carry out its duties (Abullatef, 2006).

## **3) Party structure, social and intellectual dimension**

Among the outcomes of adopting the democratic system was the emergence of political pluralism and the freedom to establish associations and political parties according to the law (Fayyad, 2009). Therefore, political life witnessed the emergence of a large number of political forces, movements, and parties, some of which were in the opposition and practicing political work outside Iraq, some of which took power after the fall of the ruling regime in 2003, and some of which were established after the change. However, the social nature of these new parties was heavily influenced by the social composition of the opposition parties that came before them in the political sphere. Despite distinguishing political trends from the extreme right to the extreme left, political parties struggled to transcend the boundaries of ethnic and sectarian nationalisms and engage with the wider national judiciary system. Early ideas based on fanaticism were dominant in forming parties. This led to rigid intellectual patterns that were dominant in political work. These patterns couldn't adapt to the changes and renewals that happen in society because of the many factors that

affect life in general. The ideas of political parties, especially Islamic ones that employed religion to serve their goals, or parties that employed minority rights, or nationalism, were no longer useful to gain The electorate, as it quickly became clear that the intellectual structure of these parties was weak in absorbing the cultural pluralism in Iraqi society, was working to find mechanisms for their integration in a way that would establish a national political identity. Even the democratic, liberal, leftist, and secular political trends in Iraq were somewhat affected by the ideas presented, and they turned inward in a way that made them no different from others in terms of not accepting the other and not interacting to renew the political structure. This is what sparked the phenomenon of party division and the struggle for power.

#### **4) Institutional structure**

The system of government in Iraq consists of three basic authorities that are interconnected according to the principle of separation of powers, namely the legislative authority, the executive authority, and the judicial authority. The equation, known as the quota system in Iraq, shapes them based on the principle of consensual democracy and electoral entitlement (Barakat,2001).

**First, the legislative authority** is comprised of two councils: the House of Representatives and the Federal Council. The Federal Council includes representatives from the region and the governorates not organized in a region. However, this council remains inactivated and non-existent on the ground, even in the absence of a special law regulating it. Therefore, the House of Representatives practically constitutes the sole legislative authority in Iraq. In order to implement political consensus, the Iraqi legislator has accounted for and followed constitutional custom that there be seats allocated to some components through the minority quota system. Christians from the governorates of Baghdad, Nineveh, Kirkuk, Dohuk, and Erbil, where they are present, received five seats. The Nineveh Governorate allocated one seat to the Yazidi component, the Baghdad Governorate to the Mandaean component, and the Nineveh Governorate to the Shabak component (Matar, 2008).

**Second: The executive authority:** The President of the Republic and the Prime Minister divide the executive authority as follows: (Al-Janabi,2004):

1. The President of the Republic: The members of the House of Representatives elect him. Traditionally, Kurdish lists, particularly the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, nominate him. Recently, due to the power imbalance between the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, the Democratic Party has made efforts to secure this position. The President of the Republic has a set of powers, most of which are honorary, granted to him constitutionally, including issuing a special pardon upon the recommendation of the Prime Minister regarding private rights and those convicted of committing international crimes and terrorism, financial and administrative corruption, and ratifying international treaties and agreements after their approval by the House of Representatives. In addition, he ratifies and issues the laws enacted by the House of Representatives, calls the elected House of Representatives to convene, grants medals and decorations, accepts ambassadors, issues republican decrees, ratifies death sentences, and is the supreme command of the armed forces. He utilizes his position for honorary and ceremonial functions, as well as to wield any other presidential power.

2. Presidency of the Council of Ministers: This position is bestowed upon the leader of the largest parliamentary bloc, or any individual nominated by the bloc in accordance with agreements between the blocs, and subsequently receives the votes of the House of Representatives. It is customary for him to be an Arab Shiite, and among the most important tasks assigned to him are the following: He is tasked with preparing the draft general budget, final accounts, and development plans, issuing regulations, instructions, and decisions to implement laws, appointing members to his ministry, and presenting the ministry's program to the House of Representatives. He is responsible for the state's general policy and is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. He manages the

Council of Ministers, chairs its meetings, and has the right to dismiss ministers with the approval of the House of Representatives. As the highest administrative official of the Council of Ministers, he can intervene in all ministry affairs (Hassan,1986).

**Third: The Judicial Authority:** Despite being non-political individuals, judges collaborate with legislators, executives, and heads of administrative departments to wield political power, which entails the responsibility of shaping or constructing the political system in Iraq. The state's general policy-making process has also given importance to the social components of Iraqi society, as the courts use their judicial authority to allocate positions among them. Judicial review is usually one of the authorities of the courts that decide through the constitutionality and legitimacy of texts and their non-contradiction with the laws in force, those laws that affect the daily lives of citizens belonging to different social classes or components that have their own needs in terms of religion, sect, denomination, nationality, and so on (Al-Hindawi,2006).

### **The second topic: Regional crises that occurred after 2003 and their impact on Iraq**

#### **1. The Arab-Israeli conflict and its impact on Iraq**

Israel saw the occupation of Iraq as a chance to put into action its long-standing theories, plans, and projects, as well as to conclude an experiment it had been carrying out since its inception: supporting the Kurds of Iraq in their quest for independence and separation from Iraq. This is in addition to its direct presence in one of the most important Arab arenas that had been a thorn in the eyes of Israel due to its hostile positions towards it throughout the years of conflict and its support for the Palestinian cause, which it made the central cause of the Arabs. It was Israel's beneficial fortune to be close to the events in this country, which it views as part of Greater Israel (Khattab, 2017).

We aim to establish direct contact with numerous non-Arab or non-Muslim Iraqi factions, implementing their ideas and theories, and assisting them in forming independent entities, regardless of their size. Once again, we assert that the United States' support for the project of dividing Iraq, despite occasional lukewarmness in its implementation, aligns with Israel's desired goals in the region and even contributes to their achievement. Therefore, we look at Iraq as the cornerstone in starting to build a new and large Middle East in which there are many components that strip power from this entity and divide it into states and sects and that it will be the gateway to the other countries in the region in order to change their ruling systems and strike their unity and spread chaos in them and then begin dividing them, because the Middle East project will require integrated work that includes the entire region. This is the Israeli vision of Iraq in terms of its availability of factors of destruction and devastation in it after the occupation entered it and its being a gateway for the spread of the fire occurring in it to other countries or vice versa in the case of its availability of factors of stability and strength; it is a major influential player in its region and a motivating factor for mobilizing its strength (Shihab,2008).

#### **2. Arab spring protests**

These successive protests were the result of the sectarian-ethnic identity politics that defined the post-2003 political system, the dysfunction of state institutions, weak governance, rampant corruption, and the rise of regional and international interference. Over the past 18 years, Iraqi politics has become more divided, with competing and divided political aspirations and differences within identity-based blocs (Al-Faqih, 2019). This has led to more factions and conflicts in order to reach consensus on key issues and reduce Iraqi politics to the lowest common denominator – protecting the quota system based on favoritism that preserves parties' power and privileges. There is no shared vision among political elites on the best way to protect the status quo and respond to demands. The impact The Arab Spring's impact was not limited to that; it was followed by several ethnic and sectarian effects and repercussions, as the level of ethnic fanaticism rose at all levels and the value of national identity declined in contra Redefining oneself and others

based on one's national sub-identity placed these groups in conflict with the state, particularly when crises arose within the state structure. These crises appeared in tandem with each other, creating the impression that the revolutions were the root cause of these crises. example of this is the severe tension witnessed in the relations between the Kurdistan Region of Iraq and the federal government in September 2017, after the region took a unilateral step to hold a referendum on the fate of the region, which prompted the Iraqi government to impose a number of punitive measures on the region. Furthermore, there has been a noticeable and explicit increase in the impact of Iranian and American politics on Iraqi decision-making centers. Iraq becomes a prisoner of these regional and international interventions, balances, and conflicts (Naanaa, 2017).

### **3. The effects of the Syrian dimension on the political system in Iraq**

On the eve of the outbreak of the Syrian revolution, the Maliki government, which was holding power in Iraq, tried to take a cautious and watchful stance, claiming fear of the repercussions of the conflict in Syria on the complex Iraqi situation, and thus affecting the structure of the political system that resulted from the American invasion of Iraq in 2003, in the event of the fall of the Syrian regime. However, what is strange in Maliki's position is his fear of a reversal of the regional balances existing between the Arabs and Iran, and that this would serve the interests of Turkey, Iran's most prominent regional competitor, as he stated during his visit to Moscow, "Turkey is adopting an impudent policy", stressing NATO's lack of right to intervene in the Syrian crisis, under the pretext of protecting Turkey, despite the fact that Turkey did not intervene until four years after the date of his statement, and that the Secretary-General of NATO at the time reiterated the alliance's lack of intention to intervene in the emerging conflict in Syria. Obama had already decided the American and Western position with his decision that there was no military solution to the conflict in Syria. So what were Maliki's motives at the time? It is true that Maliki did not hide his sectarian choices in his statements, whether when he was in power or after leaving it a decade ago, but his statement was clearly revealing his Iranian choices. Therefore, after he had advised Assad on the necessity of carrying out political reforms, forming a national unity government, involving the opposition in power, preparing for real elections, and abandoning the Baath Party and one-party rule, after the formation of the Syrian National Council, in early October 2011, he allowed the flow of Iraqi militias and the passage of Iranian militias to participate in the fighting alongside the Syrian regime, and he had reservations about the decision of the Arab League that suspended Syria's membership in the League on November 12, 2011. He did not sever his relations with Damascus, nor did he abide by the Arab or international sanctions imposed on the regime, against the backdrop of its excessive use of violence (Harmon Center, 2023).

### **4. The war with ISIS and the political implications**

When ISIS took control of nearly a third of Iraq shortly after entering Mosul, the Iraqi political situation was incoherent for many reasons, the most influential of which were the policies of the then Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, which resulted in the spread of administrative corruption and the consolidation of sectarianism. Therefore, the negative effects of ISIS's entry into Iraq were significant for the political scene. The first effect was the absence of the concept of the Iraqi state, which contrasted with the strengthening of ISIS's image as an invincible force. ISIS exerted significant political control over the course of events in the country, to the extent that the Iraqi political scene appeared susceptible to complete deviation. The second of these effects was the re-configuration of the Iraqi arena for more foreign interventions by many countries, including the United States of America, Iran, and all armed jihadist factions, in addition to the Syrian window, whose negative influences began to affect the Iraqi political reality since the beginning of the Syrian war, against the backdrop of ISIS's presence on both stages at the same time (White, 2019). The third of these effects was the intruder organization's exploitation of the data of the flabby Iraqi reality in terms of the corruption of some political parties in Iraqi institutions in its favor. This includes his

mutual dealings with some members of the military establishment and the Sunni and Shiite parties who facilitated the organization's entry into the Iraqi provinces and control over them and their weapons stores, which led to all of them exploiting the deteriorating Iraqi situation for their own benefit at the expense of the country's overall political reality (Saywan, 2016).

### **The third topic: Political development and the ability of the political system to confront crises**

The political situation in Iraq is plagued by a lack of political development, leading to the exacerbation and emergence of crises that have negatively impacted the performance and effectiveness of the political system. There are numerous political strategies that can effectively address these crises and foster genuine political development within them, with the following being the most crucial ones (Saber & Bilal, 2003).

#### **1. Applying correct consensual democracy and abolishing the principle of quotas**

The United States' policy of quotas and division of political power based on sectarian and ethnic grounds has led to a weakening of the government and political system in Iraq. This has resulted in a lack of harmony among parties within parliament and narrow affiliations, hindering democratic values representation. Implementing consensual democracy, which aims for political equality without discrimination based on class, ethnicity, or other factors, is crucial for resolving Iraq's political development crises. This approach eliminates sectarian and ethnic quotas and enables the successful establishment of genuine Iraqi citizenship. Consensus democracy, unlike representative democracy, lacks fair competition due to the ruling majority and opposing minority in voting or election processes. If these crises are not resolved, greater participation of political parties and civil society institutions is needed to address these issues (Salman, 2018).

#### **2. Expanding political participation**

Political participation in Iraq is weakened due to societal fanaticism, leading to cultural orientation towards exceptions. Despite the deteriorating security situation, elections were generally good and broad, but more expansion is needed. Political parties play a crucial role in promoting political participation, encouraging public voting and facilitating reform. Expanding political participation with a democratic model and involving more community members in policy-making and decision-making is essential for achieving political development and resolving participation crises. Political participation represents the Iraqi people's general will, contributes to security and internal stability, and allows the government to learn about opinions, desires, and trends (Al-Dajjah, 2019).

#### **3. Application of transitional justice**

Transitional justice is a response to providing rights to all members of society and enhancing the potential for peace and democracy. It is an adaptation of justice that suits societies undergoing transformation and reconstruction after war. Despite the presence of transitional justice tools in the Iraqi Constitution of 2005, there is a lack of specialized law to implement them. It guides social and political forces towards achieving justice and equal opportunities, fostering community dialogue, enhancing democratic values, and fostering peace. It serves as a fundamental pillar in national reconciliation, aiming for a consensual democratic approach between society and state institutions. It aligns with the fundamental objective of political development, promoting democracy. The primary goal is to implement this system in Iraq, particularly after the terrorist organization ISIS's actions and subsequent human rights violations (Hamza, 2016).

#### **4. Eliminate corruption**

Corruption is a perilous phenomenon that coexists with the political process and system. Corruption is a perilous phenomenon that erodes both the foundation of society and the political system (Saleh, 2016). The phenomenon of corruption in Iraq has significantly impacted the country's development trajectory in all its forms, as well as its overall wealth. The existence of an environment

that fosters corruption has made it one of the most dangerous phenomena facing the political system in Iraq. Fighting corruption fosters support and political will, which in turn provides a greater push towards achieving political development in all executive, legislative, and judicial bodies. As a result, it is necessary to commit to combating corruption in all matters relating to public office performance. Combating and eliminating corruption is a necessity for the availability of good government in Iraq, as it raises the awareness of decision-makers and citizens alike, and organizes the effectiveness and performance of the political system. In this context, the Iraqi government announced the National Strategy for Combating Corruption for the years 2010-2014 (Nouri,2010). This was implemented to fulfill all the necessary requirements for combating, fighting, and eradicating corruption in all its manifestations. There are three oversight institutions in Iraq whose mission is to eliminate corruption in all its forms. The Iraqi government has taken measures to combat corruption. In 2016, the Integrity Commission developed a serious, comprehensive vision to complement the national strategy based on first diagnosing this phenomenon, then determining the reasons for its emergence, and issuing a roadmap to combat corruption in the near and future.

### **5. Achieving political stability**

The state of political stability is one of the basic components of political development. Achieving political stability leads to political development in the country through the development activities or reform projects provided by the political system during its role in governing the country, which is reflected in the achievements made by the state itself. Political stability represents a state of balance between individuals and society, and this balance must exist in both the political system and society as a whole. Therefore, three elements contribute to its continuation: the conflicts of the ruling elite, the state-society relationship, and mutual trust between the political system and citizens (Al-Khrisha, 2017). Therefore, the achievement of political stability in Iraq through its previous indicators necessitates the resolution of political development crises, as political stability and political development are inextricably linked. Without political stability, development cannot reach its objectives, and real political development cannot lead to political stability.

### **Conclusions**

The diverse political forces and parties in Iraq have varying stances on regional issues due to consensus democracy, political quotas, and a diverse range of intellectual and ideological concepts. To secure support from regional and international stakeholders and secure future assistance, it is crucial to consolidate the domestic front and adapt the state's strategy.

The regional situation is a geopolitical arena where international powers compete to create a post-Sykes-Picot world. The dynamics reflect the US and Russian approaches, as well as Iranian and Saudi philosophical interests. This convergence results in conflict, crisis, and proxy war between these actors, with causes varying from extending influence to sectarian ideology.

The current international situation is marked by extreme polarization between the US and its allies, particularly Russia, negatively impacting the internal situations of countries like Iraq. To address this, Iraqi foreign policy makers should adopt a moderate approach, focusing on commonalities rather than differences, to expand common areas and mutual benefits, and resolve future differences.

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