
OPERATIONALIZATION OF SECURITY AND DEFENCE GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA: A HISTORICAL PROFILE

René Ngek Monteh

PhD, Department of History, e-mail: montehrene@gmail.com

University of Yaounde1, Cameroon

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Abstract

Africa, before the advent of independence, had its own model of security governance that was purposely based on domestic defence. However, armed conflict, peace, and security in Africa have raised serious concern and attention both on the domestic and international scales in recent moments. The study of defence and security governance lies at the heart of international relations. In this sphere, aspects of defence and security governance have undergone significant changes, though with intense debate. The end of some historical conflicts has taken place in a context of a slight decrease in the number of armed conflicts and the consolidation of post-conflict reconstruction processes. Moreover, African regional and sub-regional organisations have staged an increasingly more active internal shift in matters related to defence and security governance, encouraged by the idea of promoting African solutions to African problems. Thus, the aim of this paper is to examine the role of history in the understanding of defence and security governance in Africa during different historical moments. Methodologically, the data for the paper was sourced through secondary means of data collection, and the historical descriptive and analytic approach was adopted. The study reveals that post-colonial conflicts in Africa, which have gained more ground in nature and magnitude, remain a major concern for African stakeholders. The paper contends that while defence and security governance has changed significantly, it still faces numerous challenges. The paper recommends a pragmatic change and refocusing on security issues in Africa in order to arrest the bottlenecks militating against defence and security governance in Africa.

Key words: Africa, conflict, defence, governance, security.

Introduction

The issue of defence and security governance in Africa has been something that has existed at different historical moments for a long time. But today, it has remained a major challenge on the continent up until the 21st century in view of the various forms of carnage, brutality, pogroms, genocide, civil wars, and acts of terrorism in various parts of the continent. Security governance has to do with the multifaceted approaches undertaken to address and improve various aspects of security in Africa. Security governance emphasises greatly that the human or physical security of the citizens should not be compromised by state or regime security. Historically, African defence and security governance placed a high value on a militarised state. It used to be the boundless ambition of an African leader to utilise every instrumentality of the state's power to sustain himself in office for as long as he desired. Similarly, under the guise of defence and security governance, some African governments succeeded in building up enormous official bureaucracies through devoted secrecy, intelligence gathering and spying, surveillance, repression, and behind-the-scenes operations. The influence of the bureaucracy on other aspects of government and the lives of the

population was enormous in view of the “shadowy figures” it attracted. They could kill, maim, torture, kidnap, and destroy property without being called to account.

The defence and security sector in Africa has passed through several epochs. That is, from the precolonial and colonial phases through the military and the current constitutional phase. However, each of these phases has shown both similarities and differences in operational structure, politics, and implementation method. With the advent of democracy in Africa, especially in the 21st century, the constitution has basically become the main source of power and the framework for defence and security governance. The constitution is structured in such a way that each level of government exercises powers conferred by the constitution. Irrespective of the minor differences that exist among African countries, there has remained a careful balance between the powers of the executive and those of the legislative organs of the government. In Africa, the end of the cold war marked a major innovation in the redefinition of defence and security sector governance. Putting a good number of factors into consideration, some African countries have come up with different defence and security sectors with some variations to improve security governance.

It wouldn't sound utopian to ask, “Why should African governments and their partners be concerned about the quality of defence and security sector governance”? Although “good governance” has increasingly been recognised as central to consolidating democracy and promoting good development outcomes, very little attention has been given until quite recently to the question of how the security sector is governed. In fact, sound governance of the defence and security sectors is crucial for the success of democratic consolidation and sustainable economic and social development. It is also essential for the quality of security, which means creating a safe and secure environment for the state and its entire population. If people and states are not secure from the fear of random, capricious, systemic, or unsanctioned violence at the local, national, regional, and international levels, development will not become sustainable.

Thus, the main objective of this paper is to examine the place of defence and security governance in the African context through various historical moments. In this light, this paper shall be segmented into four major sections so as to ease understanding. The first section will focus on conceptual clarifications of major key words used throughout this work. The second section will deal with the origins and evolution of African security and defence governance. The third section on his part treats the comparative perspectives on regional defence and security cooperation in Africa. And the last section concentrates on the challenges faced in security and defence governance in Africa, coupled with recommendations.

Result

I. Conceptual analysis of the study

Conceptualizing a study is necessary for clarifying different shades of meaning. Without clear concepts, however, scholars are likely to talk past each other, and policymakers may find it difficult to strike a balance in their understanding of the concepts. In keeping with this, we attempt to explain key concepts as used in the study in view of reducing ambiguities and inconsistencies they may generate. The concepts in question include security, defence and governance.

1. Security

It is unusual to think that defining the term “security” already makes the implicit assumption that such a thing as “security” actually exists. Security is a fragile and significant issue that conveys different meanings to scholars, analysts, policymakers, and organisations across the globe. This section considers the diverse perspectives from which scholars understand the concept. It equally covers the notions of national security, international security, and the concept of human security, which is the basis of all other forms of security.

From the Collins English Dictionary and Thesaurus, “security” may be considered as assured freedom from poverty or want, precautions taken to ensure against theft or espionage, or a person or thing that secures or guarantees (Collins English Dictionary and Thesaurus, 1992). According to D. Brooks, the term “security” may be expanded to include national security and the defence of a nation through armed force or the use of force to control a state’s citizens. He further views it as public policing, with state employed public servants (Brooks David J., 2010, p. 1-15). Others may consider security as crime prevention, security technology, risk management, or loss prevention. Security may be considered all of these, but this diversity of definition results in a divergence of interests among many stakeholders (Brooks David J., 2010). Nevertheless, security may have very different meanings to different people, given the time, place, and context (Davidson, M. A., 2005).

According to Von Boemcken et al., “security” would refer to an actual condition of existence that is independent of its enunciation in day-to-day discourse. To him, this ontological condition of security has been imagined in quite different ways. For example, between realism and idealism in international relations theory, it was either thought of as a relative condition in the present or as an absolute condition in the future. However, in both cases, the reference to security sought to imply objectivity. This has two implications for our understanding. First, security is conceived as something that can be objectively known and thus needs to be diligently measured, monitored, and improved upon by means of reason and scientific inquiry. Second, security attains a normative quality: it appears as a “good thing” we ought to actively aspire to (Boemcken Marc Von and Schetter Conrad, 2001). From such a perspective, the general definition of security is usually thought to be encountered in the absence, or at least unlikelihood, of threats to a certain object.

According to Bamidele Afolabi, security is about freedom from threat and the ability of states to maintain independent identities and functional integrity in the face of forces of change that they perceive as hostile, while their bottom line is survival (Bamidele Afolabi M., 2015, p. 2). This entails being safe from harm, fear, anxiety, oppression, danger, poverty, defence, protection, and threats to one’s core values. In the same line, William equally submits that security is most commonly associated with the alleviation of threats to cherished values, especially those that threaten the survival of a particular reference object. It could therefore be inferred that security, be it classical, state-centric, traditionalist, or non-traditionalist, is all about protecting assets, including living and non-living resources, against loss or damage. Bamidele further enlightens the concept of national and international security. In this regard, security embodies: human security; the seven dimensions of human security (economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security, and political security); national security; and international security (Bamidele Afolabi M., 2015).

Baldwin defined security as “a low probability of damage to acquired values” (Baldwin David, 1997). Similarly, to L. Krause and J. Nye, it is “the absence of acute threats to the minimally acceptable levels of the basic values that a people consider essential to its survival” (Krause Lawrence & Nye Joseph, 1995). To progress from the essence to the concept of security in the context of a specific academic or political project, the most important question to address is, “Whose security?”. In most cases, the answer would either refer to some or all individuals or to some or all states. It needs to be remembered, however, that security may be equally applied to such diverse objects as, for example, animal life, the biosphere, or physical infrastructure.

Two schools of thought can be derived from the approach to security: The traditional school of thought favours the maintenance of the Cold War conception of security. This school of thought defines security in this sense to mean safety from danger and from external attack or infiltration. The traditional security paradigm is a realist construct of security, in which the referent object is the state (Abolurin, A., 2010). It equates security with peace and the prevention of conflict through military means such as deterrence policies and non-offensive defence. This is why Walt defines

security as a study of the threat, use, and control of military force (Walt, S. M., 1991). This school of thought associated with Barry Buzan regards security as underdeveloped and in need of rehabilitation.

The second school of thought is non-traditional. It argues that other issues like the environment and political, economic, and social threats endanger the lives and properties of individuals rather than focusing on the survival of the state. It implies that a predominantly military definition does not appreciate the fact that the greatest threat to state survival may not be military but environmental, health, political, social, and economic.

With regard to the various definitions, the elastic nature of the concept of security attracts different meanings and interpretations. Security is an important concept that every human person desires. This paper considers the above definitions in the experimented area of Africa, and has implications for defence.

2. Defence/Defense

The word “defence” has to do with protecting something or fighting against an opponent, whether it’s national defence, a football team’s defence, or a defence lawyer. In the military, defence is about protecting a country from attack and may have various connotations in different fields or situations. For example, wearing garlic around your neck might be your *defence* against vampires. Defence can be verbal as well as physical. If you are in court charged with a crime, you (and your lawyer, if you have one) are called “the defence”. If your only defence is that you were sleepwalking when you robbed a gas station, you might be going away for a while. If you play defence in a team sport, your main job is to keep the other team from scoring (so stay wide awake). A moat protecting your castle is an example of the first line of defence. When someone attacks your actions and decisions and says you did everything wrong, the way in which you argue that this is not true is an example of defending your actions (Oxford Dictionaries, 2022).

A defence *attaché* (DA) is a member of the armed forces who serves in an embassy as a representative of his or her country’s defence establishment abroad and, in this capacity, enjoys diplomatic status and immunity. DA is a generic term that covers personnel from all branches of the armed services, although some larger countries may appoint an attaché to represent an individual service branch, such as an air force attaché or a naval attaché. The DA is usually responsible for all aspects of bilateral military and defence relations. Some countries also deploy attachés to work on other security issues, such as migration or police and justice matters. Members of a country’s armed forces may also serve as part of a military mission to a regional organisation such as NATO, the EU, ECOWAS, or the UN. These persons are usually designated “military advisors” or “heads of mission”. Such assignments are mainly multilateral in nature, whereas the DA system centres on the bilateral relationship between military establishments (Russell Howard D., 1999).

National defence has evolved from historical reliance on private or feudal forces towards the more professional state militaries of today. The expectations placed on national defence organisations to deliver social value have evolved considerably over decades and centuries. For much of mediaeval and early modern history, both European and Chinese writers regarded the concept of a government-run defence with suspicion and contempt. Standing forces were often associated with high economic costs (both direct and indirect; examples include taking able-bodied agricultural workers away from the harvest), as well as oppression and tyrannical tendencies. Feudal levees called up in times of crisis, by contrast, were typically little more than a ramshackle mix of amateurs pressed reluctantly into service by a local lord. Private security companies and mercenaries provided a more disciplined force and access to the latest military equipment, but they also had a problematic tendency to switch allegiances as employers’ funds ran out (Black James & Flint Richard et al., 2021).

In this African context, the National Defence is responsible for the preservation and continuity of the democratic state of law as it is known today. This includes combating drug trafficking both inside and outside the country, combating organised crime, protecting borders, combating trafficking in persons, and preserving the country's interests within the international arena, which is becoming increasingly competitive, whether these are economic, political, or even environmental interests. Political support from society is required for national defence to be truly effective, as the population has the ability to influence much of the formation and development of public policies. On the other hand, collective defence is an official arrangement among nation-states to offer some defence support to other member states if they are attacked. It is the basis of classic defence alliances like the Triple Entente among the United Kingdom, the French Third Republic, and the Russian Empire before World War I and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization today (Kim Holmes R., 2015). It is distinguished not only by geographical limitation but also by its focus on military commitments.

In this work, defence encompasses both the traditional, military, and state-centric notion of the use of the armed forces of the state to protect its national sovereignty and territorial integrity as well as the less traditional, non-military aspects that relate to the protection of the people's political, cultural, social, and economic values and ways of life. In terms of the linkage between defence at the national level and that at the regional and continental levels, it is also understood that each African country's defence is inextricably linked to that of other African countries, as well as to that of other regions and, by the same token, to that of the African continent as a whole. This clarification then gives rise to the notion of governance discussed subsequently.

3. Governance

Governance is a concept that has been around for years and is commonly used by many people. There is almost no consensus on the official definition of "governance", because its use often depends on the intended purpose, the people involved, and the socio-political environment of the term. It had also begun to take on a range of meanings, from the act or manner of governing its office or power, which made it synonymous with government, to being virtuous or wise in one's general behaviour.

The word "governance" came from the Latin verb "gubernare", or more originally from the Greek word "kubernaein", which means "to steer". Basing on its etymology, "governance" refers to the manner of steering or governing, or of directing and controlling, a group of people or a state (Yap Kioe Sheng, 2022).

According to the United Nations (UN), "governance" refers to the activities of all political and administrative authorities to govern their country. Meanwhile, as stated by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), "governance" is a concept in which a country is managed, including economic, policy, and legal aspects. Thus, in general, "governance" has the meaning of the decision-making process and the process of determining which policies will be implemented and which will not. In this light, the World Bank in the 1990s became the first international institution to adopt the concept of good governance into lending arrangements for developing countries and introduce the idea to the general public. In its 1992 report entitled "Governance and Development", the notion of good governance was described as the way in which power is used to regulate the economic and social resources of a country for development (World Bank, 1997). Now, the term "good governance" has often been used by national and international organisations. Good governance aims to minimise corruption, consider the opinions of minorities, listen to the voices of oppressed people in the decision-making process, and respond actively to the needs of the community now and in the future. According to the World Bank and UN, good governance has the following eight principles: participation, rule of law, transparency, responsiveness, consensus-orientedness, equity and

inclusiveness, effectiveness and efficiency, and Accountability (UNESCAP, the concept of good governance has eight principles, 18 November 2021).

Today, governance includes three sectors: the public sector (state actors and institutions), the private sector (households and companies), and the civil society (non-governmental organizations). These three sectors are said to collaborate in the governance process. This new use of the term focuses on the role of “networks” in the achievement of the common good, whether these networks are intergovernmental, transnational, or international. In other words, governance is broader than government in that other sectors are included in it (UNESCAP, the concept of good governance has eight principles, 18 November 2021, p. 4).

In 1997, UNESCO defined “governance” as the process whereby citizens’ desires and interests are articulated for the positive social and economic development of the entire society and in the light of the perceived common good. Governance means more than government. It refers to a political process that includes the whole society and contributes to the making of citizens who are active contributors to the social contract that binds them together (UNESCO, 1997). Their sense of political efficacy is one of the indicators of democratic governance. Many authors, such as Pierre, J., & Peters, B., also distinguish the two by associating government with “control and dominance”, and governance with “decentralization and relational management” (Pierre, J. & Peters, B.G., 2000). On the one hand, government refers to a central institution that wields power over its subjects. It is the instrument modelled after the “command and control” model, with the government in command of the people’s affairs. In this regard, the word “governance” is closely associated with the concept of decentralisation of power and the need for inter-sectoral management. Governance is based on the realisation that the government cannot do everything for the people, so in order to survive, the state should not only rely on the government but also on the other sectors of society (Rhodes R.A.W., 1997). Thus, under the current trend, there is a need to move from the “traditional hierarchical exercise of power by the government” to the new notion of “distributed and relational power in governance” from government to governance. To govern should now mean to *facilitate or regulate*, not to dominate or command.

Historically, during the late 1980s and early 1990s, the concept of governance gained increased importance in the hands of multilateral and bilateral aid-giving agencies, which used it as a precondition for providing aid, particularly to developing countries. In this context, in 1989, the World Bank took the lead, followed by the OECD, UNDP, and UNESCO. The concept of “governance” as defined by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) denotes the use of political authority and the exercise of control in a society in relation to the management of its resources for social and economic development. The organisation lays down the key components of governance as follows: legitimacy of government, accountability of political and official elements of government; competence of governments to make policy and deliver services, and respect for human rights and the rule of law (Grindle, M.S., 2007).

According to Rosenau & Czempiel, “government” is a group of people who rule or run the administration of a country. It is the body of representatives that governs and controls the state at a given time. It is the medium through which the power of the state is employed. Governance, on the other hand, is the act of governing or ruling. It is the set of rules and laws framed by the government that are to be implemented through the representatives of the state. Simply put, governance is what governments do. Governance is the physical exercise of the polity, while the government is the body through which this is done (Rosenau, J. N. & Czempiel E. O. (eds.), 1997).

Government includes the regularised body of people who run the administration of a country. While there can be various forms of government, like, democracy and autocracy, out of many, they all serve the same purpose, which is to drive the national wheel. Governance can be defined as the ruling’s effective implementation of the rules. A government is a body entrusted with

the power to make and enforce laws to govern a country. Governance includes features such as efficiency, accountability, transparency, responsiveness, and equity (Leftwich, A., 1993). This then explains the existence of various forms of governance, the most important of which are political, economic, and social. This study pays attention to the political aspect of governance – the security and defence forces in their various missions in Africa.

II. Origin and Evolution of Security and Defence Governance in Africa

Africa is more than just the world's second-largest continent; the shared history of its billion-plus citizens, who live in any of the continent's 54 states and ten non-sovereign entities, has transformed it, like Europe, into a political construct. Over the last century alone, Africa has seen both political turmoil and unprecedented economic and human development, which have affected not only its citizens but also its neighbours and indeed the globe. Today, 23 international and regional peace missions are deployed on the continent, highlighting the enmeshment of African security with global security (Chuter David & Gaub, April 2016). African armed forces are often at the centre of these developments; sometimes they are seen as saviours, sometimes as a source of instability, but whether productive or destructive, no African solution can ignore the relevant military institutions involved. These are often described as simple products of the colonial era. While partly true, this is too simplistic, for African forces are the result of several historical developments, even if, of course, colonialism is one.

1. Security and defence governance: an old experience in Africa

Already during pre-colonial times, warfare was far from unknown in Africa, although it was often highly ritualised with limited objectives and comparatively few casualties. The Zulu regiments of the late nineteenth century were very much the exception, although many societies did have regimental structures, designed for the waging of war. The Maasai, for example, had specific terms describing various forms of combat, many of them small-scale cattle raids and quarrels. Other countries had low levels of militarization and used alternative approaches to warfare. Warfare was an occupation of young males, and in most African societies, professional soldiers were unknown. Almost all combat was on foot, with the exception of the two most militarily successful states: in the Ethiopian region, where horses were used, and on Lake Victoria, where the Ganda used canoes (Chuter David & Gaub, April 2016, p. 12).

Although firearms were present in northeast Africa for centuries, weapons used in sub-Saharan Africa were much more basic, consisting of spears, swords, bows and arrows, shields, and clubs; firearms did not start to appear until the 1820s and 1830s. The raising of the stakes in regional warfare can be attributed to the "destructive modernity" of the firearm. In Eastern Africa, especially, the institutionalisation of violence played a major role in state-building and the construction of identities. War facilitated internal control and discipline, binding the governed and the governing together in a social contract. Likewise, the "colonial" period should not be identified purely with the West or only with the colonial conquests of the period 1880–1960 (Ogot Bethwell A. (ed), 2001). The Arabs had carved out a huge colonial empire in North Africa, extending as far as present-day Morocco. By the end of the seventh century, Arab culture, as well as Islamic law, had spread progressively south. Sudan, for example, accepted Islam through negotiation rather than conflict. Likewise, there has always been extensive trade between the states of the Gulf and East Africa, and this has promoted, over time, a strong Arabic and Islamic influence that continues even today. Trade routes from West Africa across the Sahel and the Sahara have existed since ancient times, especially for slaves. Finally, Europeans arrived on the Bight of Benin as early as the sixteenth century to take advantage of the well-developed slave markets, and on the Gold and Ivory Coasts at around the same time (Reno, William, 1999).

Similarly, there was no single military model during the colonial period. In countries where there was a sizeable European settler population, ranging from Rhodesia in the East to Senegal in

the West to Sudan in the North, substantial military or paramilitary forces were often raised and led by white officers; some were incorporated into the colonial powers' own armies and fought in the wars of the twentieth century. For example, Sierra Leone's military culture is still heavily influenced by the memory of its involvement in World War II; the *Tirailleurs sénégalais* (actually Malian and Burkinabé soldiers) are a well-known Francophone equivalent. Such forces did not always treat the populace well, and they were not expected to. In every colony, there were locally recruited forces of some kind to keep order, including the notoriously brutal *Force Publique*, which enforced King Leopold II's personal rule over the Congo. In Sierra Leone, for example, the local forces were used to repress social movements and were poorly paid when paid at all, consequently behaving badly. On the other angle, Senegalese and Algerian-Moroccan troops were sent by the French to brutally repress the Madagascar rebellion in 1947 (Myron Echenberg, Joel, 2009). Yet these same forces often became the heart of the new independent states' armies and police forces. Donors were then surprised to find that these repressive traditions and public suspicion of the security forces lingered in some cases after independence.

Independence was also a very different phenomenon in different countries. The bulk of African states achieved independence in the 1960s, but not all in the same way. In some places, it came about peacefully (in most of Francophone Africa, for example). In countries where the white population was small or closely attached to the colonial power, independence was relatively unproblematic. But in countries where there was a large settler population, and sometimes a Creole population as well, violence occurred more often, albeit as a result of a broader combination of factors. Long colonial wars were fought in Algeria (1954-62), and in Mozambique, Angola, and Guinea-Bissau (1960-74) by colonial powers wishing to keep these colonies part of their own national territory (indeed, white immigration there was strongly encouraged). Settler colonies themselves rebelled against independence in what is today Zimbabwe (leading to the war of 1965-80) and in the last days of the war in Algeria. Lower-level violence was a feature of a number of transitions to independence, notably in Kenya. These independence conflicts were not necessarily the end of the matter either. In Angola, for example, the 1975 Portuguese withdrawal was followed by a civil war that lasted almost thirty years, in which different foreign governments supported different factions (Cramer, Christopher, 2006).

2. The situation after Independence

Foreign involvement in African militaries since independence has been almost continuous. It has followed several models, from the lingering influence of France over most of its former colonies to the Cold War involvement by the Soviet Union (and even China), up to the many iterations of training teams and capacity-building initiatives carried out by the international community as a whole. These very different paths to (and experiences after) independence produced varying degrees of stability. With very few exceptions, African states were created from former colonial territories, and the Cairo Declaration of 1964 enshrined the often arbitrary borders that resulted as necessary if conflict was to be avoided. Nonetheless, the new political classes of the independent states did not universally accept these borders, and this has led to conflicts of both secession and aggression (Benchenane, Mustapha, 1984).

Yet for all their arbitrariness, borders in Africa have become pragmatically important, especially for economic reasons. In some countries (the Côte d'Ivoire, for example), they have contributed to a sense of national identity. Moreover, most African militaries are given the constitutional role of defending these borders, even if, for practical reasons of geography and resources, few if any are fully capable of doing so. Indeed, the actual missions of African armies have evolved mainly by trial and error and include, in different places, public order, gendarmerie-style operations, border policing, and even development and infrastructure tasks. They have become involved in anti-terrorist operations and control intelligence in many countries. Finally, some have

taken on roles not necessarily by design in peace operations in Africa and elsewhere. African military forces today are therefore the result of more processes than just colonialism alone; in the four to five decades since independence, they have been shaped and structured by the kinds of factors described above, in different combinations at different times. Some have maintained good relations with the former colonial powers, while others have been at odds all the time (Guy, Arnold, 2009). Some have never actually been involved in conflict, whereas others have fought many internal and external wars. There is therefore no single model of African militaries, any more than there is a single model of the political systems that they serve and which have dictated, to a large extent, how they have evolved. The next section handles the current nature of conflicts in Africa, which calls for good governance in the defence and security sectors.

3. Current trends and nature of conflicts in Africa

Although the number of conflicts on the continent has declined compared to the 1990s, the post-colonial African state continues to be prone to violent clashes, which in turn result in complex emergency situations. During the past decade, many countries, including the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Liberia, the Central African Republic, Uganda, Burundi, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Somalia, Angola, Mali, Niger, Guinea-Bissau, Senegal, Congo Brazzaville, and the Comoros, have been subjected to long-standing conflicts, and new violent conflicts have erupted in many others (including Côte d'Ivoire, Sudan (Darfur), Chad, Nigeria, and Kenya). As Richard Jackson noted, "many other African states face instability, high levels of domestic political violence, or burgeoning secessionist or rebel movements" (Dersso Solomon A., 2010).

In the 21st century, conflicts, particularly of the internal kind, continue to pose as serious a threat as disease and drought to the life, security, and property of people and the survival of the post-colonial African state. There are several factors that suggest that Africa will continue to witness violent conflicts and serious political upheavals. The first is the continued fragility or weakness of many states in Africa. This relates to the illegitimate origin of the African state, its corrupt and authoritarian systems of governance, the alienation of state structures and processes from the public, and the failure of state institutions to provide for the needs of citizens in any meaningful way. Other related factors are the failure of the consolidation of democratic forms of governance in many parts of Africa and the decline of constitutionalism. Related to these two is the rise of political instability in many countries, as manifested in post-election conflicts in countries such as Cameroon, Senegal, Mali, the Congo DR, Kenya, Zimbabwe, Nigeria, Lesotho, and Ethiopia, just to name a few (Richard Jackson, 2009).

The persistently high level of poverty and the rise in the susceptibility of many parts of Africa to drought as a result of climate change add to the vulnerability of many African states to conflict. Other factors that shape the trend and dynamics of conflicts in Africa include struggles over scarce resources and the exploitation of natural resources, inequalities among members of different groups and regions, ethnic domination as well as ethnic or ethno-regional rivalry and manipulation, uneven progress in economic development, and involvement of external actors either from within the region or outside. Most of these conflicts are and will continue to be intra-state conflicts, albeit with admittedly significant regional dimensions. These conflicts have certain features that have to be considered when striving to develop an effective response. One of the characteristics of these conflicts in Africa is their persistence. Another characteristic is the multiplicity of actors involved in these conflicts (Clapham C., 1999).

According to Jackson, African wars are characterised by the involvement of a multiplicity and diversity of military and non-military actors. These include government military groups (formal and informal, internal and external), rebels, insurgents, private militias, warlords, mercenaries, private security providers, multinational corporations, and other business interest groups. Those involved in the actual fighting are amply supplied with arms, obsessively secretive, inexperienced in

negotiations, lacking transparent lines of authority, undisciplined, unfamiliar with the norms of international behaviour (including humanitarian law), and violent (Dersso Solomon A., 2010).

Many of these parties pursue or are mainly motivated by non-political objectives. Studies of several of the conflicts in, for example, Liberia, Angola, Sierra Leone, the DRC, and Somalia show that, for many of these participants, warfare is a smokescreen for the pursuit of accumulation in the form of direct exploitation of valuable commodities such as diamonds, the monopolisation of trade and taxation, the establishment of protection rackets, the diversion of emergency aid, or sanctions busting, among others (Davidson, B., 1992). These situations are exacerbated by the proliferation of weapons and the resultant militarization of the population in the affected areas.

The conflicts are also not conducted by means of traditional warfare but employ various unconventional methods of combat, including terror tactics such as deliberate mutilation, terrorism, rape, and forcible conscription that target civilians, women, and children. In a number of these conflicts, children have been recruited as combatants. In fact, civilians become the deliberate targets of warfare and suffer more casualties than combatants. Serious violations of human rights and humanitarian law are committed, and there is a large-scale displacement of people as refugees try to escape the violence. In many of these conflicts, the state machinery has collapsed or is very weak. The parliamentary process, the security apparatus, the justice system, prison administration, public administration, and local structures are all dysfunctional or non-existent. In other cases, these conflicts themselves lead to the collapse of state institutions and law and order (Rachel Stohl, 2002).

Although it is true that these conflicts are mainly intra-state in nature, they often have an external dimension due to the involvement of regional actors. The three major conflict situations currently occurring in Africa, namely in Darfur, Somalia, and the DRC, aptly illustrate how neighbouring states become involved in intra-state conflicts with a resultant spill-over effect on regional stability. This is partly attributable to the security problems arising from the artificial borders of many post-colonial African states. This emphasises that the regional dimensions of conflicts should receive attention as part of an effective process for peace-making (Dersso Solomon A., 2010). Africa will, in the short to medium term, continue to experience violent conflicts, which tend to be complicated and give rise to complex emergency situations. In this context, conflict prevention and resolution should go beyond silencing the guns and also involve peace-building and reconstruction activities covering the whole range of political, economic, humanitarian, human rights, and security issues that led to and were occasioned by the conflict. Conflict management in this context should therefore go beyond negotiating a peace agreement between the leaders of the warring factions and also involve state or nation-building initiatives. The next section thus handles a comparative study of defence and security dynamism in Africa.

III. Comparative Perspectives on Regional Defence and Security Co-operation in Africa

Africa appears at first glance to be far more developed than Asia or the Americas in terms of defence and security co-operation, and far more logically organised, with an overarching regional organisation and at least at present a fairly neat division of sub-regional organisations with security functions more or less organised according to Africa's five geographical divisions (North, Southern, East, West, and Central). As in the Arab world, there is a strong inclination towards an inclusive African identity despite the vast cultural, ethnic, and other diversities of the continent.

But on closer inspection, it becomes clear that Africa's ruling regimes are just as wedded to the concept of national sovereignty as regimes anywhere else in the world, that many regional organisations are weak or even empty shells, and that more than 30 attempts have been made at constructing regional organisations, often through grandiose plans, most of which have failed. Many of these have been overlapping, and development has been haphazard. Furthermore, a pattern of intervention by individual states or ad hoc coalitions has been established. Most of the civil wars that have plagued African states since independence have actually involved other states (Furley, O.

and May, R., 2001). Seldom has a formal commitment to non-interference in internal affairs been more honoured in the breach than in the observance, and yet this fiction has been one of the longest-standing principles of African unity and has only recently been revised.

Nevertheless, commitment to regionalism remains probably stronger in Africa than anywhere else, except Europe, and it is the intention of Africa's leaders that the new AU should rest on five or possibly more strong sub-regional organisations, each with a security management system that to some extent mirrors that of the AU itself, and which in turn is based on and integrated with the UN system. The most obvious candidates for these "building blocks" of continental security are the AMU, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Economic and Monetary Community of Central African States (ECCAS/CEMAC), the Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the East African Community (EAC), and SADC. It is to these seven organisations (with the exception of SADC) that the chapter now turns its attention. Other overlapping organisations will continue to exist, but as time goes on, they are likely to become less important in security management terms (Cawthra, G., 1997). It should be noted that other sub-regional organisations, notably the Manu River Union, have taken on security functions and developed institutions for defence and security management.

1. Arab Maghreb Union (AMU)

The AMU, the weakest of all the putative sub-regional building blocks of the AU's defence and security system, is moribund, and its presidential council has not met since 1994. Established in 1989 by all five Maghreb States—Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia—the AMU is a multifunctional organisation that deals with issues as diverse as sanitary standards and taxation, but the "trigger" for its formation, and one of its chief preoccupations, was the need to engage with the EU. It was also seen as a building block for Arab unity, a cause then being espoused by President Gadhafi of Libya, of blessed memory (Cox Richard, 1964).

The AMU has no functional security structures, although, as in many regional organisations, member states have entered into a mutual defence pact. Political and security co-operation has been hampered by the dyadic conflict between Algeria and Morocco over Western Sahara. Some analysts argue that the problem with the AMU is that it is too small (whereas the Arab League is too big): when two member states disagree, the other three are too weak to intervene collectively. Whatever the case, it is clear that considerably more will need to be done if the AMU is to become one of the building blocks of the AU's Peace and Security Council (Cox Richard, 1964). But this will depend on the resolution of political divisions and on the mercurial will of Gadhafi.

2. Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)

In contrast, ECOWAS has the most sophisticated security management system in Africa and the most experience in terms of peacekeeping and peace-making. From the outset, ECOWAS and what has come to be its security arm, the ECOWAS Cease-Fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), have been driven by the dominant sub-regional power, Nigeria. In some ways, like the OAS, ECOWAS/ECOMOG has been a fig leaf for what would otherwise be unilateral Nigerian intervention in neighbouring conflicts, but in other ways it has emerged as a genuinely regional initiative.

As in many other regional organisations, ECOWAS member states have signed both a non-aggression treaty and a mutual military assistance treaty whereby an attack on one is deemed to be an attack on all, but the principal objective is described as regional economic integration. Since 1998, ECOMOG has been recognised as the peacekeeping arm of ECOWAS, and an elaborate security architecture has been erected to support it. ECOWAS has evolved a sophisticated but functional security management system through a somewhat haphazard succession of military interventions, combined with ex ante formalisation and institutionalization, always led by Nigeria. However, its strength that it has been activated by a regional hegemon is also its weakness: if Nigeria is unable or unwilling to act, then ECOWAS is fatally weakened, and this is compounded by

Anglophone and francophone divisions. Furthermore, it is deeply ironic that ECOWAS has intervened to restore democracy in war-torn states when the leading power, Nigeria, itself is not a democracy. ECOWAS's limitations have been made clear by its inability to act over the civil war in Côte d'Ivoire, when Nigeria felt unable to help out. This may increasingly be the case, given the growing political tensions within Nigeria (Berman, E. G., 2002).

3. ECCAS/CEMAC

Primarily an economic grouping, the 11 members of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) have recently taken on security functions and are envisaged as part of the AU's security architecture. In 1999, the ECCAS summit decided to set up a Council for Peace and Security in Central Africa (*Conseil de Paix et de Sécurité en Afrique Centrale*), which includes a conflict monitoring unit as well as a putative Central African Multinational Force, a standby peacekeeping arrangement consisting of earmarked military and civilian contingents. The apparently mandatory mutual military assistance pact has also been signed. With assistance from external powers, some joint military exercises aimed at developing the regional peacekeeping capacity have been carried out (Berman, E. G. & Sams, K. E. 2000).

However, ECCAS is a weak organisation, and formal structures seldom have any significant content. Member states do not agree on the relationship between the security and economic functions of the organisation, and a number of countries retain membership in other regional organisations as well (IPA 2002: 36). Considerable work will have to be done if ECCAS is to be a substantive building block for continental security, and this will require political will (IPA, 2002).

4. IGAD, EAC, and COMESA

Originally a functional co-operation agreement focusing on drought and development issues, IGAD began to take on conflict resolution activities in the mid-1990s (notably the Sudan peace process) and is now developing more elaborate security arrangements. Bringing together Sudan, Somalia, Uganda, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Kenya, IGAD not only involves countries facing internal conflict but also states that have been at war with each other. IGAD intends to establish a conflict early warning and response mechanism, but its capacities remain very limited. It has been unable to intervene significantly in the Eritrean-Ethiopian conflict or the Sudan conflict, for example, and commentators have remarked that "IGAD member states seem more willing to devote significant scarce resources to actively undermine their neighbours than to help bring about a sustainable peace" (Berman E. G. & Sams, K. E., 2000).

The potential status of these two organisations as sub-regional building blocks within the AU's emerging security architecture is somewhat unclear, as most of their member states are also members of other sub-regional organisations (mostly IGAD and SADC), and there is thus a high degree of overlap. The EAC is a resurrection of the earlier community of the same name and involves the same three countries: Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda. It has economic as well as security functions, and a memorandum of agreement has been signed among the defence forces of the three countries, which, among other things, provides for joint training, joint operations, and the sharing of intelligence; the organisation also aims to conclude a defence pact (Furley, O. and May, R., 2001).

COMESA, the largest sub-regional organisation with 20 member states, was originally formed to promote economic co-operation through trade, and grew out of the Preferential Trade Area. But like so many such organisations, it has also taken on security functions in the belief that peace and security are essential for investment, trade, and development. COMESA member states have made a series of commitments to non-aggression, respect for human rights, the rule of law and democracy, the peaceful settlement of disputes, and so on. It has managed to establish a number of semi-autonomous and ad hoc arrangements to deal with regional conflicts. However, its main achievements have been in reducing trade barriers, and tensions have arisen among member states over trade imbalances and other issues, as well as the overlap with SADC, with some members

leaving in order to concentrate scarce resources on SADC instead (IPA., 2002). As a result, its future as a sub-regional pillar of African security remains uncertain.

Far more research will have to be done if the complex questions posed at the beginning of this section are to be satisfactorily answered. In many cases, no clear patterns have emerged, and it appears that answers may have to be context-specific. Nevertheless, a few general points may be made on the basis of this brief and selective survey, and we thus return to the key issues posed at the beginning of this section. As a result of the above analysis, it will sound utopian to say that defence and security management in Africa are devoid of challenges. In this regard, some of these challenges are stated as follows: Proliferation of small arms and light weapons; drug trafficking; money laundering; piracy; terrorism; religious extremism; socio-economic inequalities; overcrowding in urban and rural areas; gender inequality; exclusion of sections of the population; manipulation of elections; manipulation of a constitution or a constitutional review process; unconstitutional changes of government (both by military forces and civilian incumbents); a lack of political competition and viable alternation in the exercise of power; and environmental degradation. Thus, the next section handles these.

IV. Challenges faced in Security and Defence Governance in Africa

As stated in the introduction, governance is principally concerned with the efficient use of resources in order to achieve desired outcomes. In the case of defence and security, the required outcomes or outputs are: defence capabilities or mission-ready military forces; successfully conducted operations; and administrative inputs to the government in the form of policy advice, planning inputs, and reports. However, there have been numerous challenges to African security governance in recent times. This section of the study shall examine some of the following and the way forward.

1. Poor Conception of security and illegal proliferation of arms and ammunition

Several years after most African states' political independence, there has been a persistent hangover from the traditional concept of security inherited from the colonial state and military eras. Hitherto, the state understood the issue of security to be limited to the mere defence of the state against external and internal threats, neglecting the vital aspect of human security. With the entrenchment of democratic rule in the 21st century, some African states are yet to embrace the democratic culture of welfare, human security, justice, rule of law, and equity. Experience in most parts of Africa has shown that instead of taking pro-active steps in addressing the underlying causes of conflict in order to forestall the explosion of such conflicts, the state often adopts a "hit for hit" approach. This has created a culture of militarization in Africa, with the consequence of exacerbating the tendency to rely on arms and armed confrontations to achieve goals rather than dialogue and consensus building. In the 21st century, in Africa, issues such as political exclusion, economic marginalization, and social discrimination have risen to threaten the security of the citizens to the extent that they now regard the state as the primary threat to their survival (Nwizu G. C. & Cyprian C. Alozie, December, 2018).

For various reasons, Africa has continued to witness the illegal proliferation of arms and ammunition, which has made security governance a problematic and thorny issue. Often, this is perpetrated by desperate armed robbers, kidnappers, assassins, and terrorists with the collaboration of corrupt border or security agents. This development has subjected the entire populace to live in fear and apprehension of possible attacks or other forms of aggression from unsuspecting criminals, robbers, or terrorists. Most of the arms and ammunition used by criminals, militants, or terrorist groups in Africa are often smuggled through the borders, which is a real act of un-patriotism and economic sabotage. A good number of weapons, such as AK-47s, light automatic rifles, pistols, bazookas, charms, and other dangerous and system-destabilising weapons, illegally get into the hands of criminals and merchants of death. Besides, many of the weapons used by

terrorists in Africa or by rebels across Africa, as well as those used during inter- and intra-ethnic or religious conflicts and wars, were acquired illegally through illicit arms trafficking. The control of these weapons and ammunition across Africa has been quite difficult and challenging. This ugly development has worsened the problem of security in Africa, more so given the guerrilla nature of the terrorist operations (Adedoyin, A., 2014).

2. Governance and Collaborative security

Good defence management and healthy civil-military relations are premised on the existence of good governance in the state as a whole. All too often in Africa, the problem with defence is not that the militaries are “out of control”, but rather that governments are misusing their militaries for regime security, party political goals, or the entrenchment of personal power. This frequently results in an over politicized military, with the result that the military, having been invited in, ends up running the government. As a result, it is critical that the roles and functions of militaries, as well as the rules and procedures for their employment, be clearly established in law and that parliaments have clear authority to veto military employment. The employment of the military by the “commander-in-chief” or president should be constitutionally subjected to parliamentary approval (Nnoli, O., 2006).

The challenge that faces Africa is to move away from a competitive or national self-dependent approach to defence and security to a sub-regional and regional collaborative approach to security. This entails developing defence policies based on the principles of non-provocative and confidence-building defence. The challenge is to establish defence establishments that can effectively defend their countries without posing a threat to neighbours; to establish regional confidence- and security-building measures, such as sub-regional arms registers and support for arms control regimes; to improve the capacity of regional and sub-regional organisations to manage the diverse security challenges and to strengthen their mechanisms for conflict prevention, management, and resolution; and to strengthen their mechanisms for conflict prevention, management, and resolution (Okechukwu G. P., 2016).

However, state security is not just a function of military sophistication and superiority alone. Effective security governance requires the collaborative efforts of the various security agencies to volunteer necessary information and work together to fight crimes. The hoarding of intelligence information and misinformation does a great disservice to security management. In Africa, the level of sabotage and corruption among some security agencies and officers has remained a major setback to security governance. Appropriate and timely information management usually helps to forestall security challenges, especially the identification of criminals’ hideouts and the circulation or proliferation of small arms and light weapons. Unfortunately, the plight of Africa is made worse in view of the absence of the needed modern gadgets and sophisticated intelligence and technological equipment, such as electronic communication facilities, scanners, digital fingerprint machines, radios, computerised gadgets, and vehicles (Okechukwu G. P., 2016). Proper intelligence gathering enables security agencies to be proactive in identifying and preventing potential causes of crime. It also helps in raising awareness or providing information about security.

3. Professionalism and Efficiency

One of the main objectives of management should be to entrench good principles and practise them within the organisation to ensure durability and sustainability into the future. Management should strive to create a learning organisation that will correct itself and continually adapt to changing circumstances and new best practices. The challenge is to build professional defence establishments supportive of the norms, values, and needs of the African people. This entails incorporating robust civic education programmes into defence sector education, training, and development programmes. This includes developing an understanding and acceptance of international humanitarian law, constitutional provisions, defence and other related security

legislation, the principles of civil–military relations, and the rule of law; developing modern command, leadership, and management practises in defence establishments to ensure effectiveness, efficiency, high morale, and good discipline; and ensuring equitable gender and population group representation within defence establishments. This is crucial for creating defence forces that are truly representative of the people and are non-partisan and non-discriminatory. If the defence forces are not representative of the people, they will lack credibility and general acceptance by the voting public (Bryman, A., 1992).

Africa, more than any other region in the world, needs to ensure maximum efficiency in defence management and practice. The requirements for defence and security are high, but equally important are the requirements for social uplift and economic development. On the other hand, resources are very scarce. It is therefore crucial that every cent spent on defence be spent as efficiently as possible. Areas that need special attention to contribute to efficiency include: sustainability in defence planning; the funding of operations; tooth-to-tail ratios; direct client–supplier relationships; and reserve or part-time forces (Bryman, A., 1992).

The problem of border porosity and extensiveness has remained a security threat to many nations of the world, especially developing countries, whose border problems partly worsened following the arbitrary boundary demarcation during the Berlin Conference of 1884–1885. The problems generated by the arbitrary boundary demarcation by the European powers have continued to affect efforts being made towards effective border management and control in Africa. The porosity of many borders, combined with the ethno-religious diversity of border community members, cannot be overstated in terms of how borders function. The division of the same ethnic group into two or more countries along the borders makes it difficult to know who is a citizen of a particular country. This situation makes trans-border communities composed of the same kin very difficult to identify. The level of conspiracy among most members of border communities often makes it difficult for them to volunteer necessary information to security agents as they themselves often collaborate or collude with the criminals at the borders in aiding or abating crime (Adedoyin A., 2014).

4. Persistence of armed political movements and sectarian groups

State violence in Africa, which has a historical character, has continued to manifest up until the 21st century. From every consideration, “the colonial origin of the African state ensured that power was the defining attribute of statehood”. The unalloyed power of the African colonial state was targeted at holding down a conquered people. Unfortunately, the post-colonial state of Africa merely inherited the authoritarian, antidemocratic, domineering, and repressive structure of the colonial state. In almost all cases, the colonial powers used their expeditionary forces to crush dissident groups physically and violently (Nnoli, O. National security in Africa). The rule of law, justice, equity, transparency, and fair play were compromised in a bid for the colonialists to actualize their mission in Africa.

The colonial legacy of a very powerful and violent state (often a leviathan) has ended up making African politics a do-or-die affair and sometimes insensitive to the basic needs of the masses. The inability of the state to make peaceful changes possible has therefore made revolutionary changes inevitable. The exclusive and elitist nature of African politics has led to a situation where the state has developed a lacklustre attitude towards addressing the citizens’ socio-economic contradictions. In several states in Africa, this has resulted in armed violence. Frustrated individuals and victims of injustice arising from certain state actions are no longer left with any other option but to fight for their survival and demands. The Horn of Africa has demonstrated a typical case of confrontation between political movements, ethnic militias, social classes, and the state (Samson, S. W., 2002).

Many groups have also arisen in the African sub-region. In Nigeria, for instance, the Boko Haram terrorist group emerged in 2009 and radicalised its activities in 2002 following the murder of its founder, Mohammed Yusuf, by state security agents. Apart from a series of violent attacks against the Nigerian state and its institutions, the insurgents have also been carrying out cross-border attacks and recruiting in Nigeria's neighbouring countries. Despite Nigeria's internal efforts and assistance from foreign countries, the sect has, till date, continued changing tactics in its violent attacks, abductions, and kidnappings against the state, persons, and institutions. The latest of Boko Haram's abductions on February 19, 2018 was the abduction of 110 female students from the Government Girls Technical Science College, Dapchi, Yobe State. Boko Haram has facilitated the emergence of the Islamic State of West Africa (ISWA). Similar groups also exist in Syria, Libya, and Iraq, among others. Other sectarian groups that are making agitations in Nigeria for genuine democracy, equity, restructuring, justice, and the rule of law include the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), both situated in south-east Nigeria, the Shirks (a Moslem Islamic sect), the Arewa Youths (Northern Nigeria), the Egbesu Boys, and the Afenifere (Yoruba based) (Okechukwu, G. P., 2016).

To meet professional demand, it will be necessary to provide proposed solutions for better defence and security governance in Africa based on these.

5. Some Proposed Solutions

The increasing threat posed to human security in Africa, which has reduced citizens' confidence in the state, should be concretely addressed. In most African states, the government has failed to address the problems related to hunger, youth unemployment, malnutrition, diseases, inflation, food shortages, environmental pollution, and climate change, which has continued to exacerbate the likelihood of civil unrest, sectarian uprisings, armed revolts, and civil wars.

As democracy has gained global currency as a form of government (which has also been embraced in Africa), its basic tenets should be allowed to thrive in the African environment. Every anti-democratic culture inherited from the colonial state that still persists in Africa, such as the quick resort to using force in resolving civil matters, the suppression of the opposition, and the politics of violence and exclusionism (do or die), which have become part of African governance, should be discarded in view of the negative consequences.

The porous and improperly demarcated nature of African boundaries has continued to encourage cross-border crimes, proliferation, and the trafficking of arms and ammunition. However, there is now a dire need to properly demarcate, computerize, and enforce strict surveillance on African borders to checkmate the persistence of criminal activities and smuggling across the borders.

A greater awareness of threats to African security and an overall security consciousness need to be pursued by the African state. Peace-building which prevents internal and external security threats, has to be intensified. Security awareness, consciousness, and alertness must be seen as the business of every member of society. As insecurity is an ill wind that blows no one any good, every citizen must develop a sense of patriotism, eschew sabotage, and report people of dubious character or their hideouts to the appropriate government agencies.

There has to be genuine government policy and strategies to drastically restrict or limit to the bare minimum the circulation of weapons across the African continent. The unlawful and unregulated illicit circulation of arms and ammunition in Africa has made such weapons fall into the wrong hands. At the slightest provocation, these weapons are usually used either against the state or during communal conflicts and civil wars.

Conclusions

This paper has attempted to examine the operationalization of the defence and security governance during different historical moments in Africa, with more emphasis on the 21st century. The

increasing threats posed by insecurity globally and on the African continent in particular have made defence and security governance major issues of state, national, and continental discourse. Defence and security have therefore become essential components of governance, as no meaningful development can take place in an atmosphere of insecurity. To a reasonable degree, insecurity frustrates developmental efforts and has adverse consequences for state or national development. In the re-defining of African defence and security governance nowadays, the traditional or institutionalised form of defence and security has been found defective and short-sighted as it essentially focuses on the fundamental military protection of territory and the sovereign independence of a state. The neglect or minimal attention given to human security in Africa has resulted in severe consequences, despite the creation of regional and sub-regional security alliances. People's apparent loss of trust in the state has resulted in political and armed violence against the African state by some disgruntled groups. Other consequences have been the rise of sectarian and militant groups and civil wars. Africa can only be saved from its current predicament if its leaders pursue inclusive, not exclusive, responsive, and accountable governance. At the end, it would seem that regional circumstances necessitated the reversal of the natural process of moving from economic to defence and security co-operation.

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