
RESTORING PEACE IN UKRAINE BY APPEASING RUSSIA? AN OPINION

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Abstract

On September 29–30, 1938 the leaderships of the British Empire, France, Italy and Germany signed the Munich Agreement to partition Czechoslovakia. This article considers the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia by England, France and Italy as a model for the intention of the upcoming Trump Administration to partition Ukraine. Chamberlain came home with the message ‘My good friends, for the second time in our history, a British Prime Minister has returned from Germany bringing peace with honor. I believe it is peace for our time. We thank you from the bottom of our hearts. Go home and get a nice quiet sleep’. Within a few days Germany occupied the area. Peace was maintained for a few months, except for Czechoslovak society. The Munich agreement paved the way for what would become the Second World War. The 2nd Trump Administration seems to me on the way to get America’s own ‘Munich Agreement’.

Key words: Ukraine, Russia, war, peace, opinion.

Introduction

Trump-Administration stated at several occasions that the Ukraine should be prepared to withdraw from the Donbas and Crimea. The author is aware that Putin’s Russia differs in kind from Nazi-Germany and Stalin’s Soviet Union. It should be recognized, however, that the objective of the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation is to achieve security through territorial control without a clear limit. Second, to institutionalize an authoritarian regime to govern Russian society, and thirdly Putin created for Russian youth a new perception of the Stalin era. By example:

- in 1989 the new Soviet parliament, the Congress of People’s Deputies, condemned the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact and its secret protocol as “legally deficient and invalid.” Now the pendulum has swung back, and the Pact is portrayed as a victory for diplomacy and for Stalin personally.
- In 2005, 31 percent of respondents in poll said they had “heard nothing” about the secret protocol to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, while in 2019 that number had increased to 40 percent. Only 16 percent of people knew that Stalin and Hitler had carved up Poland between them, while as many as 30 percent found it hard to answer the question. The 1940 Katyn-massacre of around 22.000 Polish officers, policemen, and intellectuals were executed by the Soviet secret police. It took the Soviet Union nearly fifty years to admit to the crime. State-run media are now rehashing the falsified Stalinist version of the event, accused that the Poles were massacred by the Germans.¹
- According to Levada Center survey data: “From opinions to understanding” (Levada survey data), just 3 percent of respondents believed that the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was justified.

¹ The Russians installed in divided Berlin a memorial for the Polish officers, telling observers that they were killed by the Nazi’s. During a state visit to Germany in November 1940, Molotov clashed with Hitler over spheres of influence in eastern Europe. It took to the fall of the wall to remove the Soviet memorial. How can Russian leaders ever be trusted?

Twenty-eight years later, in 2019, that number had increased to 22 percent, while the number of those who believed it was unjustified dropped from 88 to 55 percent.

- The Moscow Times of 14 November 2024, reports that high-ranking Kremlin officials and Russia's security services were behind the decision to shutter Moscow's award-winning Gulag History Museum.

In 2005, I visited the historical museum in Krasnoyarsk. The images on display at that time visualized the fate of Stalin's prisoners/workers on transit to the Kolyma labor camps to cut trees in the vast taiga and dig for gold along the Kolyma River (Varlam Shalamov, 2018) (Author – Shalamov reports that gold digging along the Kolyma River was far removed from the Gulag Camps. Gold diggers slept in open from half June to half September. At the end of the digging season all could be dead, except the leader of the group. Their bodies were often dumped in the river. Due to global warming, the banks of the river are collapsing, releasing their remains. The FSB secret service prevents visitors from taking pictures of the scene.). At that time works on Gulag were available in Moscow's bookstores alongside works of Stalin and Solzjenitsyn. Compared with official regime for political prisoners of the Czars in Sachalin Island, off the Tatar coast of Siberia, the inmates were treated relatively mild (Author – Anton Tsjechov. *De reis naar Sachalin*. Amsterdam. Atlas 2004. The author made an inspection tour to visit to Czarist prisoner camp on the Island.).

Putin builds upon Stalin's tradition of putting political prisoners in isolated prisons where they have to work for food. Not all survive in their concrete cells. Navalny died, or was killed, during his incarceration. Like Soviet Russia, Putin's secret service does not respect territorial borders to hunt for political opponents (Author – Like his predecessor, Putin consider political refugees as a threat and as an opportunity. Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan. *The Compatriots: The Brutal and Chaotic History of Russia's Exiles, Émigrés, and Agents Abroad*. New York: PublicAffairs, 2019. The work was published after Navalny died in prison or murdered by Putin's agents.).

Both the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation are nationalist empires. Instead of creating institutions for accumulating wealth at home, this class of political actors survives by domestic repression and territorial expansion. When pushing borders outwards is no longer possible, as during the bipolar, cold war nuclear paralysis, empires tend to fall apart. George Kennan in his *Long Telegram* anticipated the breakdown of the Soviet system.

His analysis deserves a quotation because Putin's leadership will due to aging come to an end. Kennan argued that if during a succession of leadership, which is only a matter of time, that if

disunity were ever to seize and paralyze the Party, the chaos and weakness of Russian society would be revealed in forms beyond description. For we have seen that Soviet power is only a crust concealing an amorphous mass of human beings among whom no independent organizational structure is tolerated. In Russia there is not even such a thing as local government. The present generation of Russians have never known spontaneity of collective action. If, consequently, anything were ever to occur to disrupt the unity and efficacy of the Party as a political instrument, Soviet Russia might be changed overnight from one of the strongest to one of the weakest and most pitiable of national societies (George Kennan 1948).

It should be noted that Kennan was an opponent of American support for Ukrainian statehood and membership of NATO (Kennan 1948). He may have overlooked the fierce resistance against Russian annexation. As I see it, Ukraine was more advanced than Soviet society at that time. Ukraine joined the trail of democratic movements that in course of the 19th century transformed monarchical states into democratizing nation states. In that century Czarist armies had failed to stop revolutions west of Poland.

After the Russian Revolution Stalin succeeded in taking over Lenin's leadership at the 12th Party Congress in 1922. Both rivals agreed that Russia had to close the power-wealth gap with Europe and America or death. Their methods to mobilize society differed. Under Stalin, mass mobilization came from the top, not from below.

When Yeltsin claimed state sovereignty for the Russian Soviet Republic on June 12, 1990, the Soviet-building crashed like house of cards. On August 24, 1991, Ukraine followed suit as did Belarus, Moldova Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan Uzbekistan.

On August 24, Yeltsin recognized the independence of the Russians Baltic states. He tried to limit the damage of Ukraine's independence by claiming prerogatives for Russia.: "There exists, the problem of borders. The Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic reserves the right the raise the question of the revision of boundaries." His press secretary clarified that Yeltsin had the following territories in mind: northern part of Kazakhstan, Crimea, the Donbas region, Abkhazia in Georgia. The conflicts between pre-Trump America and the E.U. concern these areas.

Historical background to the fate of Ukraine

At the 10th Party Congress in March 1921 Stalin, accepted Lenin's authority when he declared that "*Clearly the Ukrainian nation exists and the development of its culture is a duty of Communists. One cannot go against history*"; *These peoples would scarcely agree to enter straight into a federated bond with Soviet Russia*"

On September 27, 1922 Stalin accused Lenin in a letter of national liberalism.

At the 12th Party Congress (1922) Stalin succeeded to bring National minorities under Russian control:

Soviet Russia, that is the RCP, should also directly rule Ukraine, Belarus, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia.

"If the present decision is confirmed by the CC of the RCP, it should not be made public but communicated to the CC of the Republics...before the convocation of the All-Russian Congress of the Soviets, where it will be declared the wish of these Republics. [note: in 1939, the 3 Baltic Republics asked to be permitted to join the USSR] (Slavoj Zizek, May 8, 2014).

In 1922, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic in Kharkiv became one of the founding members of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Under the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact, the USSR took eastern Poland and joined it with Ukraine. At that time Lviv had Polish and Yiddish speaking inhabitants but surrounded by Ukrainian speaking countryside. Under Stalin Lviv turned into the seat of Ukrainian nationalism.

End august 1991, during the power struggle between Yeltsin-Gorbachev they disagree on everything except Ukraine: no independence

The just elected Trump Administration seems to be up for a repetition of the fatal Munich Agreement. At several occasions Trump declared that 'peace could be achieved in 24 hours' by dividing Ukrainian territory. In his compromise peace, Trump suggests that Russia could annex the Donbas and Crimea. He may have opened the gate for another period of civil strife in Ukraine. Is Trump also prepared to agree with Russia that the romp – Ukraine could not join Nato? If so, his government risks to divide the Eurasian landmass between a shrinking Russia and an expanding zone of Chinese influence on the Eurasian continent, with Ukraine as buffer state.

In 1942, Spykman (Dutch name as Spijckman) anticipated such a division, I quote from his *America's Strategy in World Politics. The United States and the balance of power*:

A Russian state from the Urals to the North Sea is no great improvement over a German state from the North Sea to the Urals. The present war effort is undoubtedly directed against the destruction of Hitler but this does not necessarily imply that it is directed against the destruction of Germany as a military power. Similar reasoning is applicable to the Far East. The danger of another Japanese conquest of Asia must be removed, but this does not inevitably mean the complete elimination of the military strength of Japan and the surrender of the Western Pacific to China or Russia". A modern, vitalized and militarized China...is going to be threat not only to Japan, but also to the position of the Western powers in the Asiatic Mediterranean. China will become a continental power of huge dimensions. The U.S. will be forced into an alliance with Japan (*America's Strategy in World Politics, 2008*).

Early warning indicators

Trump is changing America's post-war foreign policy role away from NATO and the Ukraine: Before the 27 September meeting between Trump and Zelenski had begun Trump said he had a "very good relationship" with the Ukrainian president and that he also has a "very good relationship" with Russian President Vladimir Putin.

Unlike the Biden administration, Trump seemed to be aware that the old order of American supremacy in Europe *and* in East Asia was had faded away by China's fast industrialization, the build-up of China's military might and the creation of the European Union. The U.S. has, as I see it, a surplus of interest over capabilities to defend those interests. America's share world resources as measured by the Correlates of War project, reached its top around early 1970's.

To defend U.S. interests in the South China Sea and the wider Pacific, American forces are currently training in Hawaiian Islands for great-power with China (Mauna Loa, November 12, 2024). Taiwan is about 9000 km or more away from continental America. Does the U.S. have the resources for defending its interests at such a distance? The loss of strength gradient over distance council precaution. The colonial powers had a similar problem on the eve of The Second World War: how to allocate resources to defend overseas interests on the other side of their world *and* the European homelands. None of them proved to be able to solve that puzzle peacefully. It was solved by the outcome of the Second War and Later that month, he suggested that Ukraine should have "given up a little bit" to Moscow, saying at a campaign event that "any deal, even the worst deal, would have been better than what we have right now". post-war de-colonization wars.

Trump wants to reduce America's commitment on the western side of the Eurasian continent by appeasing Russia to better prepare for conflict in West Asia with Iran and its proxies and with China in East Asia. In his September presidential debate with Vice President Kamala Harris, Trump refused to say that he was committed to Ukraine defeating Russia's violation of Ukraine's territorial integrity. Later that month, he suggested that Ukraine should have "given up a little bit" to Moscow, saying at a campaign event that "any deal, even the worst deal, would have been better than what we have right now" (Author – Unfortunately, that is not true. After defeat, the options of expulsion of people or extermination is on the table. Hobbes and Clausewitz hinted in their preference order 'being dispossessed' after defeat as the worst of all situations; Clausewitz saw after defeat 'Volksbewaffnung' as an option to prevent it.). His Vice-President Vance declared to have no interest in the fate of Ukraine. In Trump's scheme of priorities Ukraine, like Czechoslovakia, may pay the price of being divided.

Countries contending the post-cold war system, coalesce. China, Iran, North Korea and Russia cooperate to remove the American military overlay of East Asia. However, the interests among contender states do always coincide. China is not happy with North Korean troops in Ukraine. Iran cooperates with Armenia after it lost the war with Azerbaijan, despite Russia's protection. Armenia now has cordial relations with Israel. Whether or not the cooperation among contender states will become similar to the diplomatic alignment between Germany Italy and Japan of the early twentieth century, will depend on the level of escalation elsewhere in the global diplomatic network.

In April, the *Washington Post* reported that Trump would pressure Ukraine to cede the Crimean Peninsula, which Russia occupied in 2014, and the Donbas region. An unknown source told the paper that he believes both Moscow and Kyiv "want a way out". The source also claimed Trump believes that Ukrainians in Russian-occupied territories would be "okay" with being part of Russia. It should be noted that public opinion polls as well as the flight direction of refugees testify to the contrary. In June, two top advisors to Trump proposed cease military aid to Ukraine unless it agrees to hold peace negotiations with Russia, citing retired General Keith Kellogg and Fred Fleitz.

Why does the religious rightwing nationalists in Trump's America feel attracted to conservative Russia?

Putin's propaganda presents itself to religious conservatives as protector of family values, see pictures in the appendix.

The director of the World Conference of Families declared in 2013 that ‘the Russians might be the Christian saviors of the world’. The Russian Orthodox Church developed connections with powerful American businessmen with ties to Russia. In November 2010, Russia’s *Sanctity of Motherhood* organization promises to solve the family crisis. Trump aims to mobilize support from evangelicals to ban sex education from the curriculum. Mothers in the conservative South are reported to purge school libraries from works on sexuality.

Theoretical background

Trump’s approach in the conduct of foreign policy is known as transactional realism. In this approach everything is for sale for the right price. E.H. Carr. He opined in the first edition of his now classic work *The 20-Years Crisis* that

If the power relations of Europe in 1938 made it inevitable that Czecho-Slovakia should lose part of her territory, and eventually her independence, it was preferable (quite apart from any question of justice or injustice) that this should come about as the result of discussion round a table in Munich rather than as the result either of a war between the Great Powers or of a local war between Germany and Czecho-Slovakia (Fox, T.R., Carr, E.H. and *Political Realism*, 1985).

In the 2nd edition, Carr noted that the work had been reprinted unchanged, except a few minor changes that had become outdated. That was disingenuous. He had silently omitted his comment on the Munich Conference from the first edition. The 4th partitioning of Poland between Germany and the S.U. escalated into the Second World War.

Transactional realists do not have a guiderail to navigate a country beyond short-term bilateral success. They seem to be blind to the fact that in the course of a power-transition between major actors, interstate interactions work out in a multipolar setting. In such era’s, collective conflict management becomes impossible as each participant tries to improve his position (Houweling, H., & Siccama, J. G., 1988). Countries of a lower rank will try to profit from the paralysis of the major powers vis-à-vis the smaller guys. In the course of a transition, war tends to spread as an epidemic disease (Henk W. Houweling and Jan G. Siccama, Des., 1985).

We have again entered the danger zone of power transitions, of multilateral alignments and re-alignments. Paul Kennedy analyzed the spread of war during the power-transition in the Franco-German dyad and the upward mobility of America in the multilateral setting of the 1870-1914 era. He lists the relevant dyads as follows:

UK-US; UK-SU; UK-JAPAN; UK-ITALY; UK-FR; UK-GER

US-UK; US-JAPAN ;US-GER

FR-GERM; FR-UK; FR-SU;

GER-US; GER-UK; GERMANY-SU;

Germany, Italy and Japan were contending the overlay of the (declining) British in the Ottoman Empire, in oil-rich Middle East and North Africa (see below for a definition) of contender-states. Their confrontation had the unexpected outcome of global war. To gauge the complicated position of the imperial British government I quote below the historian Paul Kennedy:

“It was not simply ...that [for Great Britain] dealing with ‘the German problem’ involved a constant reference to France and that dealing with ‘the Japan problem’ involved equally close consultation with the United States. ... British attempts to improve relations with Tokyo would, it was argued, enable a stiffer line to be taken towards Berlin – which would gratify the French; but this appeasement of the Japanese would enrage the Americans, possibly with grave consequences, and that would alarm the Dominions. The stiffer tone in Europe might also lead the Germans to settle their difference with ...the Soviet Union. The whole thing worked in reverse too: if Japan threatened aggression in the Far East, the British would need to move closer to the United States;

but they would probably also have to ‘buy off Hitler in Europe, which would alarm France and its smaller allies’ (Paul Kennedy, May 28, 1982).

What are the politically – relevant countries today?

The EU?

The entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty on November 1, 1993 did not turn Europe into an actor in the geo-political and military world order (Henk Houweling and Jan Siccama (eds)). NRC-Handelsblad reported on November 14, 2024 that the formation of the European Commission had degenerated into a mud fight between factions of the leftwing Europeanists and nationalists-populists. However, since the introduction of the Euro as the common currency, the European Commission operated in the geo-economic world. It had to navigate between trade, finance, technology and security of its member states.

The emergence of the anti-establishment nationalist-populist wing in EU member states considers the E.U. as a colonizer of nations (Ivan Krastev, 1 August 2024). Victories of the nationalists and populist right prevent the transformation of the E.U. from a geo-economic actor into a geo-political entity. Hungary, France, the Netherlands, Germany and Slovakia, sympathizers of Russia, are active in divided nations.

Ten years ago, the Guardian journalist Simon Jenkins aptly commented that “The West’s do-somethings will do nothing for Ukraine. At least the West has agreed on the Ukraine crisis. It agrees that something must be done to stop Russia’s re-occupation of Crimea, and it agrees that nothing can be done to stop it. Paradox is the stuff of foreign policy. It produces summits, holds conferences, forms and reforms contact groups. Leaders make interminable phone calls and think tanks rush joyfully to club-class lounges. Everywhere, something must be done and nothing can be done” (Simon Jenkins, 12 March 2014).

Poland and Japan

The Polish government stands alone among the divided member states of the EU to play a role in global politics. The Tusk-government is active in both sides of the Eurasian landmass. In Europe the country is at frontline line of resistance against Russia’s territorial expansion. In East Asia, the Tusk government befriends Japan. Since early 20th century Japanese-Polish cooperation is directed against Russia. The Russian North-Korean partnership has revived the Polish – Japanese alignment. The North Korean security link with Russia has recently been upgraded to a formal security treaty. The presence of North Korean troops in the Ukraine is a threat for both Ukraine and Poland. Japan is within reach of missiles of the North. Japan has a territorial dispute with Russia about three small islands in the southern Kurils and with China about the Sengkaku/Diaoyu Dao Islands. Japan fears Chinese presence in waters used to supply Japan.

The Republic of Korea (South Korea)

How did South Korea emerge as an independent state actor? Why is the country on Trump’s watch-list and why does the south impact on external relations of EU member states?

America engineered the division of the Korean Peninsula between both atomic attacks on Japan on resp. August 6 and 9 1945. At that time, America was preparing negotiating with the Soviet Union on how to administer Japan-occupied Korea. The future U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk, then a colonel on General George Marshall’s staff, and a fellow Army staffer Col. Charles Bonesteel, were assigned to identifying a line of control that both the U.S. and the Soviets could agree to. The two Americans agreed to draw a line at the 38th parallel. The Soviet leaders consented to this line.

The Soviet Union violated the Japanese–Soviet Non-Aggression Pact by declaring war on Japan on August 8, 1945. Historians seem to agree that Japan surrendered when Soviet Russia declared war on Japan. Accordingly, a divided Korea stepped on the diplomatic stage at the eve of the cold war.

With the cold war over, the Trump Administration intends to demand a protection fee from South Korea. Its leaders fear that the 2nd Trump Administration will lure the North into nuclear compromise without full nuclear disarmament. As I see it, North Korea, under the present leadership, will not end its status as an atomic power. A possible nuclear compromise with the Trump-Administration may be limited to inter-continental missiles. It would leave the country with a residual force capable to threaten its neighbours. The South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol promised on October 24 to respond to North Korea's deployment of troops to Russia, including by potentially to supply offensive weapons to Ukraine. Most likely solution for South Korea's conundrum is to go nuclear itself.

South Korea is an important geo-geopolitical actor due to its advanced chips producing technology exports to amongst others to Europe. Due its location close to China, it risks to become involved in American-China dangerous relations. However, due to the military build-up of China, the US is relocating its military forces further away south to Guam, Singapore, Australia and Philippines. Hopefully, it may bring a relief to the tortured population of Jeju Island, located close to China.

Contender states

Iran, North Korea, and Russia and China are 'contender-states'. Contender states manage to remain beyond the limit of U.S. reach. They coalesce to create an authoritarian led world order beyond the purview of the liberal Bretton Woods institutions. The digital revolution, the shift to the right and weak governments in the EU provides opportunities for Russian influence within Europe.

The upshot is that great power politics has created at the world level a unified whole of geo-political linkages and feedback loops. It is beyond control of any of the major power participants in the circular flows of influence between the U.S., Canada, China, Russia, Japan, the Koreas, Philippines, NATO-Europe, and Australia. Accordingly, if one major-power dyad in circular flow of influence goes to war, one could expect rapid escalation of the war to other actors.

May be that the threat of Trump to exit from NATO, the war of Russia in Ukraine and the violation of Paris Agreement on limiting emissions, shock EU-member state from their post-cold war slumber. Mid-19th century political commentators and pamphleteers as Edmund Jorg; Constantin Franz, Julius Frobel, Alex de Alexis de Tocqueville, and others, considered European countries to be in the vice between the expanding Russia and America. They tried in vain to stir Bismarck into action to create a unified European Federation to govern the European economy.

Conclusions

1) Ukraine risks to be victimized by the Trump Administration in its effort to appease Russia, as the U.S. prepares for economic and possibly military conflict with China about Taiwan and control over the South China Sea and Pacific.

2) The governments of EU members, with exception of Poland, are unwilling, and may be unable, to create a European unified Political and Military Union alongside an Economic Union.

3) After the disintegration of the SU, EU leaders failed to forge a new post-cold war pan-European security framework anchoring Russia to Europe.

4) Member states seem to have forgotten that Russia since the Versailles Conference participated in the European power structure.

5) The EU could not stop the fighting in Ukraine. Its member states were not prepared to arm Ukraine enough to enable it to push Russia's military out of the country. EU leaders are now confronted with the prospect of America's disengagement of the Atlantic Alliance.

6) The EU should discuss among themselves and with Ukraine's leaders how to go forward.

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The authors declare that they have no competing interests.

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Appendix

Yushenko reenactment of the past: teaching Russia a lesson Commemoration

victims of Collectivization: politics of using history in 2005 COMMENORATING FAMINE DEATHS, 2008; *Excavating the bodies of victims* ; *YUSHCHENKO: ACT OF GENOCIDE; the past is alive and well in Western Ukraine* April 26, 2005



Famine occurred after collectivization had been completed in 1932 kulaks were gone already; in 1933, Stalin took the food from Ukraine to feed Russian cities, starving 3 million people in Ukraine to death ; 1937/1938 Great terror in Russia; collective farm workers were starving [Timothy Snyder . *Bloodlands*]. **Putin: falling apart of the SU is** "The biggest geopolitical disaster of the 20th century".



Born 1952:: too late to share Soviet ideals
;too soon not to see chaos;
August 1999 Yeltsin appoints him as Prime Minister
1st presidency 2000-2003; reelected
Sees journalists as paid agents of oligarchs
Why did he break with US on Iraq:
1) Oil interests
2) He had tolerated NATO expansion and acquisition bases in CEA but US had maintained cold war economic status of Russia
R. Sakwa. *Putin, Russia's choice* LRB 20-5-004
praising the church, but deploring fall of SU and overseeing revival Stalin;
The conservative-patriarchal conception of life, featuring a strong leader and state, still dominates the consciousness of the overwhelming majority of Russians - much to the chagrin of the nation's liberals.
US Tea Party movement seems to admire Putin for adherence to Chr values | anti-homo |



NYRB Jan 13, 2010, Amy Knight 'the concealed battle to run Russia'


Review of [The New Nobility: The Restoration of Russia's Security State and the Enduring Legacy of the KGB](#)

by Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan
PublicAffairs, 301 pp., \$26.95


explains how the FSB has evolved over the past decade into an organization with enormous political and economic influence, is such an important and timely book. The authors, Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan, who wrote the book in English, are a husband-and-wife team in their mid-thirties, with a well-established reputation as Russian investigative journalists, specializing in security and intelligence, a dangerous subject in Russia. (They told me when I met them in Moscow in 2008 that they had been summoned to the FSB on more than one occasion and threatened with reprisals because of their reporting.) They also have a website, www.agentura.ru
Putin, a former FSB chief, became president in 2000, he made changes that substantially expanded the authority and the resources of this agency. Putin's predecessor, Boris Yeltsin, in a gesture to the democrats who voted him into power, had dismantled the KGB into several different agencies and curtailed their powers

Orthodox church propagates traditional Russian values, impact on history writing in Russia
Minister of Culture Medvedev "we are not Europe, nor Asia, we are a civilization, own identity; own traditions; Russia as savior of Europe's Christian civilization
Dostoevski: decay of the west in egocentric materialism inevitable, Russia will be its savior; Putin is inspired by his state ideology; state centric individual happiness

People are isolated in Russia and miss cultural change in Europe
Reality: orthodox attack homosexuals in trains and busses, even though many cities have homo bars; Patriarch Kirill is part of state structure



Machiavelli. The Prince, quote " Thus it is well to seem merciful, faithful, humane, sincere, religious, and also to be so; but you must have the mind so disposed that when it is needful to be otherwise you may be able to change to the opposite qualities.



Source: INYT October 5, 2015

KGB Lieutenant - colonel in KGB, stationed on Dresden DDR; witnessed the peaceful take over of the Stasi headquarters by an angry crowd; "It felt alike a fault of may own; in his view SU was struck by a "paralysis of power", resulting in chaos; The specter of mass protest is his lens: the strong hand of the state should avoid it. He noted that "The Russian people are backward. They cannot adapt to democracy as they have in your countries. They need time" "Putin in 2005 in discussion with foreign academics "source: Marie Mendras, "Russian politics: the paradox of a weak state"
See also : vitali manski , next page

Sees US support for color revolution s` Georgia 2002+ Ukraine 2004, Kyrgyzstan 2005

Popular uprisings as a weapon of US a new approach to warfare aimed internal destabilization
` Nations should not be all conform the same development model that somebody has declared the only appropriate one
`UNSpeech 2015*

President Vladimir Putin arrives for a meeting at the Kremlin, in Moscow.

Photograph: Alexey Druzhinin/AFP/Getty Images; Guardian Friday 29 August 2014



"The moment that the mines of the Urals and the Altai opened up, in the early years of the 19th century,, the tsars of Russia reached out to fill their places with jasper, and malachite . Time and distance meant nothing. A single block took 11 years to prize from the mountainside. One hundred and fifty-four horses would drag l to the nearest river, so as the start a journey of 3000 miles to Petersburg. Carved according to the designs of approved by the Imperial cabinet, ..." The NYRB December 18,2014 'the purple stone of emperors"; In the middle of the 14th century, Russian pilgrims from distant Novgorod knelt for Roman Emperors of the East and kissed their statues made from Porphyry