

Political Science and
Security Studies
Journal

Dziennik Nauk
Politycznych i Studiów
Bezpieczeństwa

ISSN 2719-6410 (Online)



*POLITICAL SCIENCE AND
SECURITY STUDIES
JOURNAL*

Volume 6, Issue 2, June 2025



The editorial board***Editor of the publication***

BRITCHENKO Igor – Prof., Dr. of Sciences, Bulgaria;

Deputy Editor-in-Chief

TKACH Ivan – Prof, Dr of Sciences, Ukraine;

Members of the editorial board

CHERNIAVSKA Tetiana – Dr. Sc. (Economics), Poland;

CHUMAK Oleksandr – Ph.D, Assist. Prof., Ukraine;

DYULGEROVA Nina – Prof. Dr. hab., Bulgaria;

DIO CAISAR Darma – Ph.D, Assist. Prof., Indonesia;

GAWLICZEK Piotr – Ph.D, Assoc. Prof., Poland;

GUMENNYKOVA Tamara – Prof., Dr. of Sciences (Pedagogical), Ukraine;

KHARABARA Violetta – Assoc. Prof., PhD, Ukraine;

KRUPSKYI Oleksandr – Assoc. Prof., Candidate of Psychological Sciences, Ukraine;

LEWANDOWSKI Arkadiusz – Dr., Poland;

MELLER Arkadiusz – Dr, Poland;

MONOLATII Ivan – Dr. hab. Ukraine;

NIZIAIEVA Viktoriia – USA;

POLAKOWSKI Marcin – Dr., Poland;

RÓŻYCKI Bartłomiej – Dr., Poland;

SAMBERG Andre – Prof. of Practice, D.Sc., Ph.D., Belgium;

TOMASZEWSKI Patryk – Dr., Poland;

ZHELJAZKOVA Virginia – Prof. PhD, VUZF University, Bulgaria;

e-mail: tkachivan9@gmail.com

<https://psssj.eu/index.php/ojsdata/index>, тел. +38(093) 752-81-56

The authors of articles are responsible for the authenticity of facts, quotes, their own names, geographical names, names of enterprises, organizations, institutions and other information. Opinions expressed in these articles may not coincide with the point of view of the editorial board and do not impose any obligations on it.

CONTENT

1	The Nigeria Police Force and Law Enforcement: The Troubled Trinity of Class, Ethnicity, and Religion	
	Gbeke Adenuga, Ojiezele, Oriabure Monday	1
2	Manipulation Strategy in Political Discourse Within the Framework of ESP Teaching at Higher Military Education Institutions	
	Inna Semeniko	14
3	The Origin and Evolution of Military Drone (UAVs) Technology in Warfare Equipment in Africa	
	Rene Ngek Monteh	20
4	Politics of Security and the Anglophone Crisis in Cameroon: Politicization, Militarization, and Pathways to Sustainable Peace and Stability in Africa	
	Gabriel Cyrille Ngujoi, Wilfred Gabsa Nyogbet, Saron Obia Messembe	37
5	The U.S. Intelligence Community's Experience in Assessing National Security Threats for Enhancing the Efficiency of Ukraine's National Threat and Risk Assessment System	51
	Andrii Stroiev	
6	India's Experience in Attracting Foreign Investment in Military Equipment and Weapons Manufacturing: Lessons for Ukraine	
	Mykola Khomik, Mykola Tkach	59
7	Peculiarities of the Modern Migration Policy of the Russian Federation on Adaptation and Integration of Migrants as Components of Migration Security	
	Olha Parkhomchuk	63

THE NIGERIA POLICE FORCE AND LAW ENFORCEMENT: THE TROUBLED TRINITY OF CLASS, ETHNICITY, AND RELIGION

Ojiezele, Oriabure Monday ¹; Gbeke Adebawale ADENUGA ²

¹ Department of Criminology Security Studies, e-mail: monday.ojiezele@fuoye.edu.ng

² PhD, Department of Political Science, e-mail: gbekeadenuga@gmail.com, ORCID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1900-0532>

Federal University Oye-Ekiti, Nigeria

Received: April 17, 2025 | Revised: June 08, 2025 | Accepted: June 30, 2025

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.33445/psssj.2025.6.2.1>

Abstract

The Nigeria Police Force functions within a socio-political framework significantly influenced by class hierarchies, ethnic identities, and religious affiliations, collectively referred to as the “troubled trinity”. These structural components profoundly affect policing methodologies, community trust, and the efficacy of law enforcement activities. This research examines the ways in which these socio-political factors shape the operations of the Nigeria Police Force, utilizing the primordial and class theories articulated by Shils (1951) and McKay (1982) as analytical frameworks. The investigation employs a qualitative exploratory methodology, incorporating in-depth interviews and focus group discussions to gather intricate viewpoints from both law enforcement officials and community members within the Ife Police Area Command and adjacent areas in Osun State, Nigeria. The results indicate that class inequalities engender selective enforcement of the law, whereby economic and political elites are afforded preferential treatment, while marginalized populations endure systemic oppression. Furthermore, ethnic and religious prejudices infiltrate recruitment, deployment, and operational decision-making processes, further diminishing public trust in law enforcement agencies. The research emphasizes the urgent necessity for institutional reforms that prioritize professionalism, merit-based recruitment, and equitable representation across diverse ethnic and religious groups. Addressing these underlying structural challenges is crucial for the development of an impartial and community-oriented policing paradigm in Nigeria.

Key words: Nigeria Police Force, law enforcement, class stratifications, ethnic identities, religious affiliations, public trust.

Introduction

The Nigeria Police Force (NPF) occupies a crucial position in the realm of law enforcement, particularly within a socio-political framework profoundly influenced by class stratifications, ethnic affiliations, and religious identities elements collectively referred to in this study as the “troubled trinity”. These factors not only affect the efficacy of policing but also mold public perceptions regarding law enforcement. Historically, the NPF, which has its foundations in colonial control mechanisms, has encountered significant challenges in evolving into a community-centric service, thereby perpetuating a profound distrust between the police and the citizenry (Johnson, 2013). This distrust is further intensified by systemic inequities, ethnic prejudices, and religious frictions that inhibit the force’s objectivity and operational effectiveness.

Notwithstanding constitutional mandates that advocate for professionalism, ethical conduct, and community engagement, the NPF grapples with structural impediments that undermine its operational capacity (Adegboyega, 2021). Class disparities frequently engender preferential treatment for affluent individuals, consequently placing marginalized communities at a

disadvantage in their pursuit of justice (Olaniyan & Adebayo, 2023). Furthermore, ethnic loyalties within the police force serve to further erode impartiality, culminating in regionally biased law enforcement practices (Iwara & Abiodun, 2022). Moreover, the presence of religious pluralism constitutes a substantial impediment to the dynamics of police-community interactions, necessitating that law enforcement officials meticulously navigate the interplay between their occupational duties and their individual faith convictions (Edebor, 2021). Likewise, the entrenchment of ethnic loyalties and the practice of nepotism have intensified the existing state of insecurity that plagues the Nigerian polity (Ojiezele & Ojo, 2024).

Negative public perceptions of the NPF endure, characterized by profound distrust, apathy, and skepticism (Okogie, 2020; Ehindero, 1998). These sentiments are further reinforced by class-based inequalities, ethnic favoritism, and religious influences that dictate police operations (Iheriohanma et al., 2020). Nepotistic recruitment practices that emphasize affiliations over qualifications have additionally undermined the professionalism of the force, thereby eroding public confidence (Amundsen, 1977; Commonwealth Association for Public Administration and Management, 2010). Moreover, the centralization of police authority has markedly impeded the rapid deployment of officers, rendering law enforcement efforts ineffective, especially in a nation as expansive and diverse as Nigeria (Egunjobi, 2016).

Ethnic chauvinism prevalent within Nigerian society complicates policing further, adversely affecting the equitable application of the law across various regions. In light of this context, this study rigorously examines the interplay of class, ethnicity, and religion in shaping law enforcement practices in Nigeria, providing empirical insights into their effects on policing efficacy and public trust. The escalating incidence of criminal activities and the enduring state of insecurity in Nigeria, combined with the ineffectiveness of the NPF in upholding law and order, has emerged as an urgent issue. While Durkheim (1950) asserted that crime constitutes an unavoidable social phenomenon, the magnitude of criminality in Nigeria has surged to distressing proportions. The widespread public discontent regarding police effectiveness is significantly attributed to corruption, nepotism, and an excessively centralized structure that obstructs prompt law enforcement responses (Ojo, 2022). Furthermore, ethnic and religious biases permeating the NPF compromise impartial policing, thereby exacerbating public distrust (Egunjobi, 2019).

This study investigates how class, ethnicity, and religion collectively influence the operational mechanisms of the NPF. It critically analyzes their ramifications on policing efficacy, public trust, and the overarching quest for justice in Nigeria, thereby providing insights into the entrenched impediments to equitable law enforcement. The study is structured into eight sections with the introduction as the first. The second section gives the historical development and legal framework of the Nigeria Police Force. The third section examines the interplay between ethnicity and law enforcement in Nigeria while the fourth looks at the intersections between religion and law enforcement in the country. The fifth section provides the theoretical framework of the study, and the sixth section is devoted to the methodology employed for the research. The seventh section presents the findings of the study and their discussions while the eighth concludes and makes recommendations tailored to free the Nigeria Police Force from the entanglements of class, ethnicity and religion in order to become more effective in law enforcement.

Literature Review

Historical Development and Legal Framework of the Nigeria Police Force

Before colonial rule in the various kingdoms, empires and tribes making up modern Nigeria, traditional law enforcement mechanisms, such as chieftaincy systems and age-grade associations, were tasked with maintaining law and societal order. However, the advent of colonialism brought about the establishment of the NPF as the formal policing institution for the country (Okedele & Adenuga, 2020a).

To safeguard its interests in the country and suppress local oppositions, the British colonial government formed a consular guard in Lagos in 1861, marking the advent of formal policing in Nigeria. This consular guard was later renamed the Hausa Constabulary in 1879, exemplify. In 1888, the Royal Niger Company Constabulary was established with its administrative base in Lokoja. In 1894, the Niger Coast Constabulary was established in Calabar under the auspices of the Niger Coast Protectorate. These Constabularies were established to safeguard commercial routes and implement the decisions of the British colonial government.

The amalgamation of Northern Protectorate and Southern Protectorate to form the Nigerian state in 1914 led to a reorganization of various administrative institutions to reflect the new political structure. Despite the amalgam of administration between the two Protectorates, Northern and Southern Nigeria Police Forces continued to operate as distinct entities until April 1, 1930, when they were unified to form the Nigeria Police Force, with its administrative headquarters located in Lagos.

At independence in 1960, the NPF was retained as a federal institution tasked with the overarching responsibility of maintaining law and order across the country. The 1960 independence constitution granted the three regional authorities (the Northern, Western and Eastern regions) the latitude to establish local police forces, however, the fear that local police forces can be misused to achieve sectional and narrow political interests led to the NPF being placed on the Exclusive Legislate list with the Federal Government as the only level of government constitutionally empowered to take decisions on policing issues. Section 214(1) of the 1999 Constitution abolished local police forces, thereby designating the NPF as the exclusive policing authority within Nigeria.

The Interplay of Class, Ethnicity, and Religion in Law Enforcement: An Analytical Discourse

The concept of class is a global phenomenon and it is fundamentally a function of socio-economic factors including income, occupation, status and political connections. The notion of class indicates that the society is stratified based on perceived socio-economic status and it accords with the Marxian perspective that the history of every society is the history of the struggle between the classes in the society. Societies, including Nigeria, are systematically structured according to class hierarchies, predominantly shaped by production modalities inherent in capitalist systems. Marx (1950) argued that societies are intrinsically subject to class conflicts, with social consciousness acting as a driving force in the evolution of class structures. A social class comprises individuals who share a common status, rank, and lifestyle, often delineated by wealth, education, occupation, income, and social networks (Haralambos & Holborn, 2008).

Class structures profoundly influence law enforcement practices. According to Weber (2021), class stratifications affect access to justice, with affluent individuals enjoying privileges that are unavailable to lower-income groups. In Nigeria, the elite's influence on police operations is evident in selective law enforcement, wherein wealthy individuals evade accountability while marginalized communities endure excessive policing (Akinyemi, 2022). Marxist analyses elucidate how law enforcement institutions perpetuate class-based disparities by catering to the interests of the ruling class (Gramsci, 2019). The historical role of the NPF in suppressing dissent, from colonial resistance movements to modern protests, highlights its alignment with elite interests (Odinkalu, 2021). This inquiry investigates how class dynamics persistently shape policing outcomes in Nigeria.

Class distinctions profoundly impact the dynamics of law enforcement, particularly within the Nigerian milieu. The ruling class, which maintains dominion over economic reproduction, political authority, and cultural institutions, dictates the operational modalities of law enforcement. This phenomenon was historically evident during the colonial era when the NPF predominantly served colonial interests rather than the public good (Odikalu, 2004). Contemporary policing in Nigeria continues to reflect class disparities, with law enforcement apparatus disproportionately favoring the elite, thereby exacerbating socio-economic inequalities.

Ethnicity and Law Enforcement in Nigeria

Ethnicity signifies collective belonging shaped by shared cultural traditions (Eriksen, 2010). Cultural markers such as language, religion, ancestry, and customs play a pivotal role in the formation of ethnic identity, influencing social integration and intergroup relations (Adenuga, 2022a; Adenuga et al., 2023). In Nigeria, ethnicity is a significant factor shaping socio-political and institutional frameworks, carrying substantial implications for governance and public administration (Adenuga, 2022a; Mudasiru, 2015). While it brings about communal solidarity, ethnicity is a major causal factor of intergroup conflicts in multi-ethnic states (Adenuga et al., 2023; Adenuga, 2020b).

Law enforcement in Nigeria is significantly influenced by ethnic affiliations, which affect recruitment, deployment, and policing methodologies. Empirical research indicates that ethnic biases within the NPF manifest through preferential treatment of officers and communities based on shared ethnic identity, resulting in regional disparities in law enforcement (Ikelegbe, 2023; Edebor, 2021). Furthermore, ethnic profiling and discrimination exacerbate strained police-community relations and foster public mistrust (Iwara & Abiodun, 2022).

Institutionalized ethnic favoritism within law enforcement undermines bureaucratic efficiency and the equitable distribution of security resources (Amaeshi, 2017). The persistence of ethnic allegiances within the NPF influences perceptions of police legitimacy, often reinforcing the dichotomy of “us versus them” that Huntington (as cited in Haralambos & Holborn, 2008) associates with the formation of ethnic identity (Adenuga, 2022a).

Religion and Law Enforcement in Nigeria.

Religion is a belief in a or some supernatural entities worthy of adoration veneration and who profoundly influence moral conducts (Adenuga et al., 2023; Okedele & Adenuga, 2020b). Religious belief systems regulate human conduct, thereby establishing a basis for social order and unity. However, religion has been subject to critique as an ideological mechanism that perpetuates class stratifications and legitimizes social disparities (Marx, as cited in Bottomore & Rubel, 1963). In the context of Nigeria, religion assumes a pivotal role in governance, notwithstanding constitutional provisions that advocate for secularism. Religious affiliations substantially dictate political appointments and exert considerable influence over public policy determinations (Obiefuna, 2018; Okedele & Adenuga, 2020b, Umeanolue, 2020).

The presence of religious diversity introduces further complexities within the realm of policing in Nigeria. The religious convictions of officers may affect their discretionary powers, subsequently influencing their interactions with suspects and communities (Ajayi, 2022). In certain circumstances, religious affiliations can affect recruitment processes, promotions, and assignments within the NPF (Olaniyan & Adebayo, 2023). Religious tensions may on occasion escalate into conflicts, necessitating law enforcement intervention that is frequently perceived as biased (Egunjobi, 2019).

The relationship between religion and law enforcement is markedly pronounced in Nigeria’s multi-religious context, wherein law enforcement agencies, including the NPF, operate amidst a spectrum of diverse religious environments. Religious considerations significantly influence policing strategies, with officers frequently modifying enforcement tactics to resonate with prevailing religious sentiments. Oladeji (2022) observes that the dominant religions—Islam in the northern region and Christianity in the southern region—considerably shape law enforcement methodologies. While religious institutions contribute to moral regulation, their intersection with law enforcement raises critical issues concerning impartiality and sectarian bias. As a result, the entanglement of religion with law enforcement complicates endeavors to uphold neutrality and adhere to the principles of justice.

The intersection of class, ethnicity, and religion profoundly shapes law enforcement dynamics in Nigeria. Class structures delineate avenues for access to power and influence policing

methodologies, while religious affiliations inform institutional biases and operational practices. The NPF, historically rooted in colonial class dynamics, continues to mirror socio-economic inequalities, ethnic prejudices, and religious influences in its enforcement of law and order. Addressing these intricate challenges necessitates institutional reforms aimed at promoting impartiality, enhancing accountability, and fostering inclusivity within enforcement practices. A comprehensive strategy that mitigates the impacts of class, ethnicity, and religion on policing will be essential in bolstering public trust and ensuring effective law enforcement in Nigeria.

Theoretical background

This investigation is grounded in two interconnected theoretical paradigms: primordial theory and class theory. Primordial theory, as articulated by Shils (1951) and McKay (1982), posits that individuals cultivate profound attachments to their places of origin, religious convictions, and kinship networks. These affiliations engender robust loyalties and group solidarity, frequently shaping social interactions by reinforcing distinctions between “insiders” and “outsiders”. In Nigeria, ethnic and religious identities often supersede national unity, significantly influencing governance and law enforcement. Within the NPF, these affiliations compromise meritocratic ideals, thereby impacting recruitment, training, and operational determinations. This dynamic engenders an “us versus them” mentality, which ultimately undermines the efficacy of crime prevention initiatives.

Class theory, firmly anchored in Karl Marx’s (1867) critique of authority and disparity, elucidates the systemic impediments inherent within the Nigeria Police Force (NPF). Marx posited that class stratifications arise when societies exceed mere subsistence production, thereby allowing the dominant elite to fortify their economic and political supremacy. The bourgeoisie, possessing control over wealth and resources, significantly influence institutional frameworks including law enforcement so as to align them with their vested interests. Consequently, the NPF frequently operates as a mechanism of the ruling class, selectively applying legal statutes while neglecting the protection of marginalized communities. Offenses committed by political elites often evade accountability, thereby exacerbating public skepticism towards law enforcement and augmenting prevailing insecurity.

Political meddling further compromises the efficacy of policing. Ikenyei (2017) observes that governmental authorities routinely hinder police operations, leveraging informal channels to facilitate the release of suspects. In a similar vein, Ibrahim (2003) and Kirk-Greene (1975) underscore the manner in which economic power and resource control inform governance, thereby perpetuating systemic disparities. These elements, in conjunction with ethnic and socio-economic affiliations, persistently shape the functionalities of pivotal institutions, encompassing the police, judiciary, and military. As a result, the NPF encounters significant challenges in operating as an unbiased security apparatus, thereby perpetuating cycles of injustice and insecurity.

Methodology

This study adopts an exploratory qualitative research framework, employing in-depth interviews (IDIs) and Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) to gather rich, contextually nuanced data. The exploratory paradigm is particularly adept at elucidating the intricate socio-political interactions between law enforcement and local communities, facilitating a thorough exploration of perceptions, interactions, and institutional reactions. Given the delicate nature surrounding policing and community relations in Nigeria, qualitative methodologies were adjudged suitable for encapsulating the lived experiences and nuanced viewpoints of both police personnel and community constituents.

Study Area and Rationale for Selection

The research was conducted within the Ife Police Area Command and its adjacent communities, which include the Modakeke “B” Division, Agun “C” Division, and “A” Division Moore.

These divisions are situated within the Ife North, Ife South, and Ife East Local Government Areas, along with the Ife North East Council Development Authority (LCDA) in Modakeke, Osun State. This specific geographical focus was selected due to the region's historical incidence of crime, youth agitation, and communal discord. The study sought to investigate how these social tensions influence policing methodologies and the trust of communities in law enforcement agencies.

Sampling Strategy and Participants. A purposive sampling approach was employed to guarantee that the participants were directly pertinent to the study's aims. The selection process comprised two principal components:

Police Personnel: Three police divisional headquarters, including the Area Command office, were intentionally selected from a total of seven divisions under the Ife Area Command of the Nigeria Police Force. This selection was guided by the necessity to examine diverse operational contexts within the region. The sample encompassed police officers of various ranks to capture a multitude of perspectives on policing strategies and community interaction.

Community Members: The inquiry also incorporated participants from the Ile-Ife and Modakeke communities, which have historically encountered ethno-communal strife. Participants were recruited from diverse social strata, including youth leaders, market women leaders, village heads, and chiefs, to ensure a comprehensive representation of community voices.

In total, forty-five comprehensive interviews were executed with law enforcement officers and members of the community. Furthermore, two FGDs were convened, each consisting of seven participants, with one group representing Ile-Ife and the other Modakeke.

Gender Representation

In recognition of gender dynamics within policing and community engagement, a methodical approach was implemented in the selection of the sample. Among the law enforcement personnel, a gender ratio of ten males to five females was preserved, mirroring the predominantly male composition of the Nigeria Police Force. This ratio is consistent with the findings articulated by Alemika and Agugua (2001), who indicated that as of July 2010, only 4% of the total police demographic and 8% of all officers were female, a trend that continues to be evident in contemporary policing frameworks. For the community participants, equitable gender representation was assured with fifteen males and fifteen females to facilitate a range of perspectives.

Data Collection Process

The process of data collection was executed utilizing semi-structured interview guides that were specifically designed for both law enforcement officers and community participants. The comprehensive interviews aimed to extract insights into police-community interactions, operational barriers, and perceptions surrounding the provision of security. The FGDs enabled collective dialogues that served to triangulate individual interview findings and offered broader community perspectives regarding policing and social order.

The interviews and discussions were conducted in English, Yoruba, and Pidgin English, contingent upon the language preferences of participants. Trained research assistants, proficient in these languages, facilitated the data collection process, ensuring the accuracy of responses and cultural sensitivity during discussions. Each session was audio-recorded with the consent of participants, followed by the production of verbatim transcriptions for subsequent analysis.

Data Analysis

The qualitative data acquired were subjected to analysis employing a synthesis of thematic and content analysis methodologies. The thematic analysis encompassed the identification of recurring themes and patterns within participants' responses, while content analysis was utilized to systematically categorize and interpret the data. The analytical framework adhered to an inductive approach, permitting themes to organically emerge from the data rather than being preordained.

To augment reliability and validity, data triangulation was engaged, juxtaposing findings across various participant categories (law enforcement officers, community leaders, and youth representatives). Additionally, peer debriefing sessions were orchestrated among researchers to cross-validate interpretations and mitigate researcher bias.

Ethical Considerations

Ethical approval for this research endeavor was procured from the pertinent institutional review board. Informed consent was obtained from all participants prior to their engagement in the study. Confidentiality and anonymity were rigorously upheld by assigning pseudonyms to participants and ensuring that identifiable information was excluded from the final analysis and reporting.

Discussion and Findings

The outcomes and discourse emanating from the extensive interviews and focus group discussions for this study are systematically categorized thematically below:

Socio-demographic information of participants

The socio-demographic characteristics of participants involved in this study are outlined as follows: Ten (10) male and five (5) female officers were selected based on their tenure in law enforcement, which must encompass ten years or more, with their ages ranging from 30 to 65 years, and a residency in the study areas of five years or more. The community members and leaders, representing diverse ethnic groups, consisted of fifteen (15) males and fifteen (15) females, the selection of participants was predicated upon their length of residency in the designated study areas, which necessitated a minimum duration of ten years, in addition to being aged 25 years or older. Access to the community leaders was enabled through the mediation of gatekeepers.

The ramifications of socioeconomic class on the NPF law enforcement

The revised Federal Constitution of 1999 designates the NPF as the foremost law enforcement institution, charged with the critical duties of upholding law and order while ensuring the protection of life and property among its extensive responsibilities. These significant obligations have been further complicated by the societal class frameworks, both manifest and latent, which profoundly influence the preservation of law and order within Nigerian communities. The Nigerian economy, akin to those of numerous nations worldwide, is primarily dominated by capitalist elements, with the ruling class chiefly comprised of politicians, elites, and substantial business proprietors who dictate, shape, and steer the course of law enforcement strategies. This reality echoes the biblical maxim that it is “easier for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle than for a rich man to enter the kingdom of God”. Consequently, it becomes exceedingly arduous for economically marginalized victims to procure justice for transgressions committed against them by the ruling class, particularly when such incidents are reported to police stations throughout Nigeria. It is within these unfavorable conditions that our inquiry into the implications of class on NPF law enforcement in Nigeria will be undertaken. One interviewee articulated the following:

“Don’t cause any problems, when I am not at home is the popular language of money”, sometimes when you are unfortunate to have any problems with the elites, and the case is reported at the police station, the moment the officers are aware that the lower class have a good case, their next action is to turn the case upside down in favour of the elites by inventing unknown excuses. Peradventure, it is the lower class that is found wanting, he/she spends a long time in detention with torture just to please the elites with a reward from them. In most cases, justice or enforcing laws in Nigeria depends on the class of people involved (IDI, adult male respondent, Modakeke).

Reiterating this perspective, another male respondent in Ile-Ife remarked:

There is no way in this town that you can have an altercation with a ruling class and expect the police to be on the side of justice if such an officer loves his job. It is a common notion that

the elites are always right because they can afford to give bribes to the NPF and also buy their way through, whenever their case gets to law court, except it is within their class, even as that personality and political influence comes to bear (IDI, male adult respondent, Ile-Ife).

Nevertheless, certain police personnel who participated as respondents present contrasting opinions to those gathered from the populace, accentuating the role of policing without succumbing to the influence of the ruling class. However, a majority of the officers concurred and provided instances indicating that such dynamics also manifest within the NPF organization. In the words of one of them:

The NPF is a hierarchical and bureaucratic organization, officers adhere strictly to orders from the superior in rank, and when it comes to enforcing the law the superior officer gives directives on how it should be carried out. It is inconsequential, if enforcing the laws, affects classes of people in different strata of society differently. Order must be obeyed, I was detailed by my superior officer-in-charge to investigate a written petition of malicious damage to cocoa farmland some years back, the petitioner (complainant) was a poor farmer while the encroacher (offender) was a very influential high chief in a first-class Oba palace. The moment my superior officer in charge of the command saw the chief, he called me aside and gave me a standing warning that “it is not every case you investigate” and ordered me to record their statement and let them go that was the end of that case (IDI police officer respondent, Ile-Ife).

Participants in the focus group discussion held in Ile-Ife concurred that NPF law enforcement in Nigeria is predominantly inclined towards serving the interests of the ruling classes, in complete disregard for the rule of law. In the words of one of them:

To save yourselves from untimely death, in the hands of NPF in Nigeria, it is better not to have a problem with members of the ruling classes especially their girlfriends, when it comes to enforcing the laws in this country. In other words, the ruling class can influence NPF in every situation, especially when it comes to protecting their interest, in maintaining law and order in society (FGD, adult female participant, Ile-Ife).

The influence of ethnicity on NPF law enforcement in Nigeria

Within the Nigerian context, a prominent means by which individuals perceive their identity or are categorized pertains to their ethnic affiliations. Ethnic identities are evident across every social institution and its associated activities. Likewise, the processes of recruitment into governmental agencies, as well as the execution of their functions, exhibit marked ethnic biases. Consequently, the prominence of ethnicity has emerged as a significant challenge within Nigeria's diverse societies, wherein criminal acts, regardless of their severity, may be trivialized or exaggerated based on the ethnic backgrounds of the offenders, the law enforcement officers engaged in the investigations, and the ethnicities of the victims. As articulated by one of the female leaders interviewed from Ile-Ife, she submitted thus:

A few years back, she admitted that the wanton killings of humans and destruction of properties between the Yoruba/Hausa community over a minor disagreement, which would ordinarily be settled without involving a second party, snowballed to fully-fledged civil unrest which involved the use of guns, due to ethnic identities attached to the issue. The NPF were complacent with their duties because of ethnicity and the fear of government directives (IDI, female leader respondent, Ile-Ife).

Participants from the focus group discussion session in Modakeke concurred and asserted that their experiences closely mirrored those of the Ife/Modakeke crisis. In the words of one of them:

It seems that NPF neglects the constitutional duties of law enforcement in Nigeria and tend to follow the dictate of the ruling classes. As often been observed that they obeyed the instructions of the elites, whenever, conflicts erupt and in normal situations, cases are almost decided in favour of ethnic affiliations of the victims or offenders depending on the officers in charge or on the order of the superior or political interferences (FGD male leader participant, Modakeke).

Officers of the NPF who participated in the study concurred regarding the implications of ethnic identity on law enforcement practices within Nigeria, as well as the consequent effects on police officers themselves. Nevertheless, as a regimented institution, the Police Act and Regulation 2020 does not allow officers the opportunity to articulate their grievances. To quote one of the respondents:

Ethnicity and religion is a big problem within the force, which outsiders are not aware of or just turn a blind eye to it. Recruitment, promotion, transfer, and posting to some specialized agencies such as EFCC are all skewed in favour of one ethnic/religious group. Hence you discover that arresting and investigating high-profile offenders' cases in Nigeria are almost dead on arrival. Ethnicity, class, and religion created "sacred cows" or "untouchable people or groups" in Nigeria, both within the force and the society, once this group is involved in any crimes the law cannot be enforced, and no superior officers will admit it openly, but it is an unwritten practice in law enforcement in Nigeria (IDI male officer respondent, Modakeke).

The impact of religious affiliation on the NPF's law enforcement practices in Nigeria

Religion significantly influences the fabric of Nigerian society; as noted by the Pew Research Centre (2020), Nigeria is ranked among the most religious countries in the world. The very essence of existence in Nigeria is intricately interwoven with religious beliefs, which infiltrate all social institutions with which individuals interact. Religion functions as a vital marker of identity for individuals, and the political elite are acutely cognizant of its importance; therefore, religious considerations invariably hold substantial sway in the electoral processes throughout Nigeria. Ignoring religious sensitivities can lead to ethno-religious conflict, a phenomenon that is particularly pronounced in various areas of Nigeria, especially in Plateau State. The NPF acknowledges the relevance of religious identity, and in the execution of laws, they frequently demonstrate a susceptibility to the influences exerted by religious and political leaders, who lend their implicit support to numerous law enforcement policies without due regard to the rule of law. It is against this backdrop that an investigation into the impact of religion on the NPF's law enforcement practices will be conducted. An interviewee articulated the following:

I am first and foremost, a Muslim rather than a Nigerian, religion is a way of life that determines my relations with people. It provides a bond that binds me with fellow Muslims. In the same vein, the NPF personnel are also humans and are affected by the religious bond before their offices, religious brothers/sisters must respect what binds us together before applying the laws regardless of the situation. There was a particular situation where I would have been in big trouble, my ethnic and religious affiliation was my savior, as the officers in charge of the case had to find leeway for me and placate the victim (IDI adult male respondent, Ile-Ife).

Reiterating a similar sentiment, another adult female respondent from Modakeke remarked:

Police officers in Nigeria tend to be influenced by religious and ethnic royalty in their law enforcement especially in some parts of the country where certain religious sentiment is high and in other parts, where the head of the police department is from one ethnic/ religious background different from the victims or offenders (IDI Female adult respondent, Modakeke).

Participants in the FGD session held in Ile-Ife affirmed that their experiences largely parallel those of many others, particularly when navigating the ethnic/religious dichotomy that pervades various sectors of Nigerian society and its institutions. In the words of one participant:

Most serious criminal cases such as murder can be settled by the NPF because of ethnic/religious affinity, regardless of what the law says, especially if the superior officers heading the office is of the victim or offender side and above all, a phone call from the Obas, Emirs, or political class will instantly redirect the investigation or prosecution of any cases in favour of either party regardless of the gravity of the offense or proof of evidence that may be available. In order word the way NPF enforces the laws in Nigeria societies is characterized by class, ethnic, and religious attachment (FGD male adult participant, Modakeke).

NPF officers who participated in the discussions in Ile-Ife implicitly acknowledged that religion, social class, and ethnicity adversely influence their law enforcement practices in Nigeria; officers, as constituents of the society, tend to adhere to unwritten directives they are compelled to follow in upholding law and order within the community. In the words of one of them:

There are some people you cannot just arrest, even if they commit heinous crimes and if you do, reprimand a wait for you, with a phone call they are either granted unconditional bail or case shadily investigated to fulfill all righteousness and appease some sectional anger in the country, and you endanger your life and family. All these happen because of religious and ethnic affiliations of parties and political interference in NPF law enforcement (IDI female officer respondent, Ile-Ife).

The community members/leaders and NPF officers who were respondents/participants in the study have resided in their respective communities for a duration of five years or more, and they have also had the opportunity to live in various communities across Nigeria.

Result

The historical development of the NPF elucidates a policing framework profoundly rooted in colonial heritage, socio-political dynamics, and structural inadequacies. The study reveals that while law enforcement in pre-colonial Nigeria was based on indigenous governance frameworks, the advent of British colonial rule institutionalized policing as a mechanism of state control. From the inception of consular guards in Lagos in 1861 to the eventual amalgamation of the Nigeria Police Force in 1930, the focus remained predominantly on centralization and the safeguarding of colonial interests rather than on the provision of public service. Following independence, attempts to equilibrate federal and regional policing authorities were ephemeral, culminating in the enactment of the 1999 Constitution, which centralized policing under federal jurisdiction. The 2020 Nigeria Police Act reaffirmed the mandate of the NPF in the domains of crime prevention and the maintenance of public order. However, enduring challenges, encompassing corruption, inadequate funding, and pervasive public distrust, persistently undermine its operational efficacy.

The research elucidates the inter-sectionality of class, ethnicity, and religion in informing law enforcement practices within Nigeria. Socio-economic stratifications markedly dictate the accessibility of justice, whereby the elite benefit from preferential treatment, while marginalized demographics encounter intensified surveillance and repression. Empirical evidence substantiates that police officials routinely manipulate case outcomes to favor affluent individuals, thereby exacerbating social disparities. The narratives provided by respondents furnish compelling evidence of selective law enforcement practices, wherein financial inducements and political affiliations dictate judicial determinations. Theoretical frameworks, such as Marxist critiques, validate assertions that the NPF has traditionally operated as a mechanism of elite domination, suppressing dissent and perpetuating established power hierarchies.

Ethnic affiliations further complicate the dynamics of law enforcement, significantly influencing police recruitment, deployment, and operational conduct. The enduring presence of ethnic favoritism within the NPF engenders disparities in policing efficacy, as officers display biases when addressing cases involving individuals from their ethnic constituencies. Testimonies from community leaders and police personnel indicate that ethnic loyalty frequently supersedes professional ethics, thereby reinforcing regional distrust and diminishing the legitimacy of the police institution. Scholarly literature suggests that mitigating these biases necessitates reforms that emphasize professionalism, meritocratic recruitment, and equitable representation across ethnic demographics.

Religious factors in law enforcement also emerge as a pivotal element influencing policing practices in Nigeria. The religious orientations of officers frequently inform discretionary decision-making, impacting the administration of justice within religiously diverse communities. Evidence derived from the study indicates that recruitment and promotional mechanisms within the NPF occasionally reflect sectarian biases, mirroring broader patterns of religious fragmentation in Nigeria. Furthermore, police responses to sectarian conflicts often demonstrate bias, undermining public trust in law enforcement and exacerbating communal tensions. Addressing these problematic issues requires the implementation of institutional safeguards that foster secularism and impartiality within police operations.

The socio-demographic composition of study participants, encompassing both law enforcement personnel and community members, provides a nuanced perspective on these dynamics. Testimonies from police personnel reveal structural constraints that inhibit their capacity to enforce the law without bias. The hierarchical and bureaucratic nature of the NPF compels lower-ranking officers to comply with directives from higher authorities, even when such directives perpetuate class, ethnic, or religious prejudices. A recurring theme in the narratives is the external influence exerted by political actors, who frequently intervene in police operations to secure favorable outcomes for their associates. This observation aligns with empirical research indicating that political interference significantly compromises police autonomy and accountability in Nigeria.

Public perceptions regarding the impartiality of law enforcement agencies remain predominantly negative, with a significant portion of the populace articulating doubts concerning the equity of policing practices. Members of the community recount incidents in which officers either disregarded grievances from economically disadvantaged individuals or manipulated investigative processes to favor affluent and politically influential individuals. The diminishing public confidence in policing institutions has compelled numerous citizens to pursue alternative avenues for justice, such as traditional authority figures and vigilante entities, thereby further fragmenting the security framework. This observation aligns with extensive criminological scholarship that posits public trust in law enforcement as a critical factor influencing effective policing outcomes.

The results of the study accentuate the pressing necessity for comprehensive institutional reforms within the Nigeria Police Force. Tackling historical injustices and current predicaments necessitates a multifaceted strategy, which includes enhancing oversight mechanisms, advocating for community-oriented policing, and ensuring equitable representation within the police force. Policy initiatives ought to prioritize accountability, transparency, and professionalism to restore public trust in the Nigeria Police Force. Comparative evaluations of policing frameworks in other multi-ethnic societies may provide valuable insights into best practices that can be adapted to the Nigerian milieu. Ultimately, the establishment of an impartial and effective police force requires a sustained commitment from policymakers, law enforcement agencies, and civil society actors.

Conclusions

The historical evolution of the NPF exemplifies a policing paradigm influenced by colonial legacies, socio-political dynamics, and systemic inefficiencies. Notwithstanding efforts aimed at augmenting

law enforcement capabilities, entrenched challenges such as corruption, ethnic partiality, and political meddling persist, continually undermining public trust in policing institutions. The study elucidates how class, ethnicity, and religious affiliation intersect to shape policing practices, frequently resulting in the selective enforcement of legal statutes. The persistence of these biases has exacerbated social inequalities and diminished the legitimacy of the NPF. Confronting these entrenched issues necessitates institutional reforms that emphasize professionalism, accountability, and equitable representation. Strengthening oversight mechanisms and cultivating community trust are pivotal measures in the quest to establish an impartial and effective law enforcement system in Nigeria.

Recommendations

1. The Nigerian government should undertake substantial institutional reforms that bolster police accountability and curtail political interference.
2. Recruitment and promotion protocols within the NPF ought to be predicated exclusively on merit, eschewing ethnic, religious, or political considerations, while implementing standardized training programs that underscore human rights, impartiality, and conflict resolution will cultivate professionalism and enhance the overall efficacy of the force.
3. Augmenting community-oriented policing initiatives can serve to bridge the trust chasm between law enforcement and the public.

Legislative reforms should fortify the autonomy of the judiciary and law enforcement agencies to obviate undue influence from political elites, while the implementation of stringent anti-corruption measures, including asset declarations and whistleblower protections, will deter misconduct and foster fairness in the administration of justice.

Funding

This study received no specific financial support.

Competing interests

The authors declare that they have no competing interests.

References

- Adegboyega, T. (2021). Policing in Nigeria: Challenges and Prospects. *African Security Review*, 30(2), 45-61.
- Adenuga, G. (2022a). The Indigeneity clause and the mismanagement of ethnic diversity in Nigeria. *Dynamics of Politics and Democracy*, 1(2), 97-107.
- Adenuga, G. A. (2022b). Climate change and the politics of resource control in multi-ethnic states: Nigeria's RUGA policy in perspective. In C. Chereji, A. Pop, & C. Sandu (Eds.). *Conflict and climate*, pp. 23-33. Conference Proceedings, Babes-Bolyai University & University of Port-Harcourt International Conference on Conflict Studies, Dec. 10, 2020.
- Adenuga, G., Olajubu, A., Oyewole, S., & Omotola, J. S. (2023). Ethno-religious conflicts and the challenges of national security in Nigeria's Fourth Republic. *South African Review of Sociology*, 53(2), 1-20.
- Ajayi, O. (2022). Religion and Law Enforcement: A Nigerian Perspective. *Journal of African Studies*, 29(1), 78-92.
- Akinyemi, B. (2022). Elite Influence and Policing in Nigeria: A Structural Analysis. *Nigerian Journal of Social Sciences*, 35(4), 12-28.
- Akinyemi, B. (2020). Ethnic biases in Nigeria's security sector: Challenges and prospects for Reform. *Security Studies Review*, 12(1), 34-50.

- Alemika, E., & Chukwuma, I. (2020). Colonial Legacies and Contemporary Policing in Nigeria. *African Policing Review*, 15(3), 50-67.
- Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 214 (1999).
- Edebor, M. (2021). Ethnicity, Religion, and Law Enforcement Bias in Nigeria. *Journal of Criminology and Security Studies*, 14(2), 102-120.
- Haralambos, & Holborn, (2008). Themes and Perspectives. HarperCollins Publishers Limited 77-85 Fulham Palace Road, Hammersmith, London W6 8JB
- Iheriohanma E.B.J. Opara Oguchialu and Raimi Lasisi. (2020). The Nigeria Police Force and its constitutional responsibility in the present democratic dispensation. *Issues in Business Management and Economics*, 8(4), 84-96.
- Iwara, U., & Abiodun, S. (2022). Ethnic Bias and Police Operations in Nigeria: An Empirical Study. *African Security Studies*, 17(1), 45-59.
- Johnson, I. (2013). Policing in Contemporary Nigeria: Issues and Challenges. *African Journal for the Psychological Study of Social Issues AJPSSI*, 16(1), 71-77.
- Olaniyan, D., & Adebayo, S. (2023). Religious Affiliation and Police Recruitment in Nigeria. *Journal of Law and Society*, 28(3), 33-49.
- Ojiezele, M.O & Ojo, O. T (2024). Ethnicity, Nepotism and National Security: Issues and Prospects in Nigeria. *Sapientia Global Journal of Arts, Humanities and Development Studies (SGOJAHDS)*, Vol.7 No.3 September, 2024; p.g. 91-104; ISSN: 2695-2319 (Print); ISSN: 2695-2327 (Online) www.ijmsspcs.com
- Okedele, A. O. & Adenuga, G. A. (2020a). Ojude Oba festival in Ijebu Ode: Transforming a traditional practice into a vehicle for socio-economic development. In F. A. Omidire, S. Alimi, & A. Adejuwon, (Eds.). *Yoruba arts, culture, entertainment & tourism in the age of globalization & uncertainty (Olojo Series 1)*, pp. 113-128. Ile-Ife: The Institute of Cultural Studies, Obafemi Awolowo University.
- Okedele, A. O. & Adenuga, G. A. (2020b). How secular is Nigeria? A critical appraisal of the impact of the interplay between religion and politics on national unity in Nigeria. In O. Oshin, B. Sogunro, I. Joseph, & O. Aluko (Eds.). *Reinvigorating Nigerian universities for sustainable development (A festschrift for Rt. Revd Prof. Dapo Asaju)*, pp. 449-456. Oyo: Ajayi Crowther University.
- The Nigeria Police Act, 2020., 4 (2020).
- Umeanolua, I. L. (2020). Religious Influences on Politics in Nigeria: Implications for National Development. *Ogirisi: A New Journal of African Studies*, vol.15s.
- Weber, M. (2021). Class, Status, and Power: Sociological Perspectives. *Oxford University Press*.

MANIPULATION STRATEGY IN POLITICAL DISCOURSE WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF ESP TEACHING AT HIGHER MILITARY EDUCATION INSTITUTIONS

Inna Semeniako

PhD in Political Sciences, Associate Professor, Associate Professor of Foreign Languages Department, e-mail: isemeniako@gmail.com,
ORCID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6489-7986>

Yevheniy Berezhnyak Military Academy, Kyiv, Ukraine

Received: June 16, 2025 | **Revised:** June 26, 2025 | **Accepted:** June 30, 2025

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.33445/psssj.2025.6.2.2>

Abstract

The article analyzes the means of verbal persuasion used in modern English political discourse within the framework of ESP teaching at Yevheniy Berezhnyak Military Academy. Current issues of political rhetoric, outlining the main means and strategies of linguistic manipulation in modern English political discourse are also highlighted. It is emphasized, that the strategy of linguistic manipulation is an integral component of political communication, since politicians actively use manipulative means to influence the electorate and shape public opinion. The analysis of political speeches shows that manipulative discourse is characterized by mixed lexical composition, the involvement of colloquial components, and the use of stylistically marked linguistic units that contribute to the expressiveness and persuasiveness of statements.

Key words: English language, political discourse, politician, manipulation, manipulative features, verbal means.

Introduction

Currently, manipulative technologies are extremely important means to carry out political activities at all levels. Their application contributes much to the effective implementation of electoral processes, political campaigns, the adoption of strategically important decisions, etc. Due to the widespread and growing influence of social networks, manipulative technologies are reaching new levels of influence. Nowadays manipulation is also used in everyday management of society. To achieve their goals, manipulators can restrict citizens' access to information, deliberately hide data, present it in a way that makes critical analysis impossible, or use discrediting techniques such as labeling. The application of political manipulation threatens the informational and psychological security both of an individual and society, causing disorientation of the population, social tension, and a distorted perception of reality. The relevance of the article is due to the acuteness of modern English media manipulative potential aimed at changing the behavior of the public in a beneficial for the manipulators way; increased control over information that determines public opinion, political views and beliefs of the audience. Moreover, the problem of linguistic manipulation is associated with the growing role of manipulative strategy within political communication, since the purpose of linguistic manipulation is to form the addressee's attitude towards the object, regardless of his desires and interests.

Good command of English political discourse manipulative features is a necessary requirement for future military professionals in the sphere of diplomacy, as they need to be skillful enough in obtaining necessary information from foreign sources, applying it to solve professional tasks, communicate with native speakers at a professional level in order to resolve arising issues and non-standard situations in the course of their official duties.

Theoretical background

Manipulative strategy is of a particular importance in political discourse, as it is a significant means of linguistic influence. The analysis of research and publications shows that it has been studied by both domestic and foreign scholars, namely: demagogic techniques and manipulative tactics within the framework of a manipulative strategy (O. Parshyna, Y.Sudus, O. Romanovska), strategy of hidden communicative influence depending on the explicit communicative intention of the addressee (P. Kriuchkova, B. McNair), strategies of veiling, mystification, anonymity (Y. Sheihal, R. Perloff, N. Hrebin), features of political discourse manipulative techniques and linguistic means of implementing manipulative strategies based on the material of English-language political interviews and speeches (A. Chashchyna, Y.Fedoriv, J.Boitnott, J.Unger, I.Pulenko, T.Sazykina), political discourse within the framework of ESP teaching for students aspiring to succeed in the political sector (V.Gagarina, I.Baez, A. Siddiqui, K. Hadj Djelloul, M. Melouk).

Despite a large number of scientific and methodological developments on the above-mentioned topic, the issue of studying verbal means of language manipulation within the framework of ESP teaching to military professionals specializing in diplomacy remains unsolved, since there are practically no scientific developments that would take into account the specifics of future diplomatic employees' work features.

Research question

Our studying seeks to analyze available in English media arsenal and aimed at mass manipulation verbal means of English political discourse within the framework of ESP teaching at Yevhenyi Bereznyak Military Academy (hereinafter referred to as the MA).

Research Methods

To reach the goal the following methods were used: analysis of the researched problem; systematization and generalization of the information obtained from the theoretical sources; methods of comparative analysis, classification, abstraction, induction and deduction.

Results and Discussion

Manipulation is a polysemic concept. In the article, it is used to denote a type of psychological influence, the skillful implementation of which leads to the unconscious emergence of human intentions that do not coincide with the available wishes [1, pp. 52-53]. Language manipulation can also be defined as a covert language influence on the addressee with the aim of deliberate misleading him/her regarding the intention or content [2, pp. 107-108].

In political discourse, various types of manipulation are used, which are an integral part of any strategy. Y. Sheihal distinguishes two types of speech manipulation, which are subdivided into referential and argumentative [3, pp. 130-131].

Referential manipulation is a distortion of denotate's/referent's image in the process of illuminating reality:

a) factual manipulation (any changes of real facts: exaggeration, understatement, concealment, falsification, misleading, etc.).

b) focused manipulation (changing the focus of coverage of an event, statement, or behavior associated with the denotation, to make the recipient perceive the situation from a favorable to the manipulator perspective).

Argumentative manipulation is a distortion of communication postulates:

a) violation of the logic or integrity of the text, usually expressed in avoiding a direct answer, specific comments, or deviation from the topic;

b) evasion from providing evidence by intentionally incomplete presentation of available information or expressing a statement in an undeniable form;

c) masking logical actions.

Summarizing the above mentioned, we can suggest the following definition: language manipulation is the purposeful use of language tools and features of phrase constructions that contribute to the emergence of illusions and delusions in the minds of recipients in order to induce them to behave in a beneficial to the manipulator way.

It should be noted that there are both negative and potentially positive aspects of manipulation. On the one hand, manipulative technologies can be used to maintain social stability, build national unity, or prevent panic. On the other hand, they limit freedom of choice, distort information, and can serve as a tool for the abuse of power. Manipulation of public opinion is one of the main mechanisms of information warfare. It is aimed at shaping moods, beliefs and behavioral patterns that are beneficial to the manipulator. Political manipulations use an appeal to basic human needs and motives, which makes them difficult to recognize and counteract.

Within the framework of political manipulation, various methods are used, including: substitution of thesis, manipulative reduction or expansion of statements, creation of false cause-and-effect relationships, incorrect dichotomies, passing off false judgments as true, use of pseudoscientific arguments, etc. [4, p. 187].

Let us analyze some verbal means of implementing the manipulative strategy in English political discourse, which were revealed in the process of analyzing the factual material used within ESP teaching in MA. The headlines of articles deserve special attention, since it is the title of the article that is the decisive factor in making a decision on further familiarization with its content. The headline, which is a compact, limited-volume text, not only conveys the main semantic load, but also brings to the public the first characteristics (labels) of various events, situations and phenomena of reality, the first comments (usually those that are beneficial to the elites controlling this or that media). Thus, the headlines of articles create a certain stereotype, thereby programming a negative or positive attitude of readers. It is necessary to take into account the fact that all words have a connotative meaning, that is, they contain a targeted emotional charge. For example, phrases such as *drone attack*, *new spy ship*, *cyber-geddon*, *jet damage* are used purposefully in headlines [5].

Manipulation by headlines can create the effect of rejection, negative attitude towards the state, event, subject, etc. The main goal of manipulation is to create a picture of the world in people's minds that is favorable to the customer and reduce the recipients' ability to think critically, creating the illusion of free choice.

In modern media, the stylistic technique of playing with precedent phenomena is widely used, designed to evoke the necessary associations of the addressee. Any precedent unit reduces the described situation to a stereotyped image. For example, *"...the problem of describing a government in which officials, magnats and organised crime are bound together in a virtual mafia state – one, moreover, that has just won the World Cup – is how you deal with it"* [6]. Using vocabulary related to the thematic group "Crime" (*organized crime*, *virtual mafia state*), manipulators emphasize the aforementioned analogy, imposing on the reader the image of a virtual mafia state.

Nowadays, words with negative connotations have become common. Modern media language is characterized by such properties as negative expression and aggressiveness: *"Russia is seeking to weaponise information. Deploying its state-run media organisations to plant fake stories and photoshopped images in an attempt to sow discord in the West and undermine our institutions"* [6].

To impose an assessment, manipulators use linguistic means, primarily vocabulary, characterized by a wide range of condensed semantic, emotional, ideological and political connotations: *political dialogue*, *democratic development*, *increased level of confidence*, *the spheres of democratization*, *strengthening the guarantees of citizens' rights*, *the new level of development*

of the electoral system, mutual respect, civic values, sustainable development of the country, maintaining stability, the creative force of power, productive activities, political modernization, American realities, rhetoric of intolerance etc. [5].

Linguistic means used in political speeches create the effect of trust between the speaker and the audience. For this purpose, politicians and state leaders use linguistic means that identify the addressee with them by territorial features, namely: the pronoun “we” with a vague meaning, interrogative-affirmative constructions, rhetorical questions and some other linguistic/speech means. Narrative texts are gaining popularity: a speech accompanied by personal remarks, assessments and impressions captivates more reliably than other types of manipulation: *it to us on the shoulder; this, you will agree, a powerful incentive.*

The British media also actively use the lexical potential of language, but their goals are clearly hidden. The authors of the publications use various words with a pronounced negative connotation: *captors, the president's thuggish cousin*, etc. To implement the implicature “*a large number of victims*”, they use numerals, as well as other parts of speech that express the idea of plurality: *200 people, thousands of protesters, dozens of people, the nation, the others*. This technique makes it possible to discredit indirectly the opponent of the party in question. Almost every article uses gradation, which is also implemented by using lexical means.

Speaking about manipulation in the media, it is necessary to note how the spread of the idea of political correctness has influenced the lexical composition of the English language, in particular, the formation of a new **euphemistic vocabulary**. The use of a special terminological “veil” in the media of English-speaking countries, euphemistic phrases and expressions, and corrected terms, contributes to the creation of the effect of mitigation and masking, blunting negative emotions and forming a loyal public opinion. Euphemisms successfully veil military actions, their consequences, and any hints that it is about death, about the loss of people.

For example, during the Vietnam War, the euphemism *body bags* (containers for transporting the remains of dead soldiers) appeared, the Gulf War gave rise to the euphemism *human remains pouches* (bags for transporting the remains of dead soldiers). The euphemism *transfer tubes* (a container in the form of a tube for transporting the remains of dead soldiers) owes its appearance to the war in Iraq. The euphemism *dignified transfer* is used instead of the expression *transfer case*. The presence of the word *dignified* in the composition of the euphemistic substitute creates the effect of ennobling death [6]. Thus, the use of euphemisms is a type of manipulation, when the replacement of the concept gives the denotate new properties, makes certain changes to its essence and models the perception of reality from a position that is advantageous for the initiator of communication. It should be noted that, due to the targeted efforts of linguists working for the political elite, euphemistic nominations are created with the purpose to conceal partially the true meaning of events and diminish their negative perception by a wide audience.

There has also been a tendency in the language of politicians to use more abstract forms of expression, that has led to the increase of **nominatives**, verbs substantivized into abstract nouns. Some nominatives are formed by combining a verb and an adverb, for example: *build-up* - concentration of military forces; *lay-out* - a person who has lost his job; *take-over* - seizure of power, etc.

Let us consider the features of linguistic manipulation within the framework of political discourse in the speeches of modern English-speaking politicians.

The US Ex-President J. Biden during a joint press conference with V. Zelensky at the White House emphasizes: “*And as I said when Putin rolled his tanks into Ukraine in February: American – American people are prepared to have us stand up to bullies, stand up for freedom*” [7]. The word *bullies* belongs to the colloquial vocabulary. The use of such an expression goes beyond the formal register and adds expressiveness to the speech. In the context of assessing the actions of the Russian troops, this word performs several functions at once: it emphasizes the harshness of Biden's

position, demonstrates his emotional involvement, and enhances the effect of what was said. Thus, Biden not only expresses indignation at the aggression of the Russian Federation, but also manifests support for Ukraine on behalf of the American people. Ex-President Biden also uses the advantages of linguistic manipulation to reduce the distance between himself and his interlocutor. Answering the journalist's question, the American leader notes: *"Let me be straight forward with you here. Look, the fact is that it's important to remember that before Russia invaded, we had dedicated an enormous amount of security assistance to Ukraine"* [7]. The fragment *"Let me be straight forward with you here"*, shows that the journalist can feel as much a full participant in the conversation as the world leaders present at the event.

The similar effect is created by language means in British Ex-Prime Minister B. Johnson's farewell speech, when he addresses the nation with the words: *"Well this is it folks"* [8]. The lexemes *well* and *folks* have a clearly expressed colloquial tone. The word *well* signals about an informal tone of address, while *folks* is used to shorten the distance between the politician and the audience. Thus, Johnson demonstrates openness and tries to position himself as a part of the community which he appeals to.

US President D. Trump's public speeches can be characterized by active use of the manipulative strategy involving partial or complete discrediting of the opponent. This strategy is designed to explicitly or implicitly form a negative recipients' opinion regarding the subject of communication and to destabilize the perception of his political competitors.

"... I watch what's happening with some horrible things, like Obamacare where your health insurance and health care is going up by numbers that are astronomical 68%, 59%, 71% when I look at the Iran deal and how bad a deal it is for us it's a one-sided transaction" [9]. Criticizing the healthcare reform of his predecessor B. Obama, D. Trump implements the manipulative strategy of presenting the activities of his predecessor and political competitor in an extremely negative light. This is evidenced by Trump's use of words and phrases with negative connotations, in particular, such as *"one-sided transaction"*, *"horrible things"* or the hyperbole *"numbers that are astronomical"* and numerals to highlight the incredible percentage of unjustified expenditures as a result of unsuccessful decisions of the former US president's administration.

"Obamacare is a disaster, you know it, we all know it it's going up at numbers that nobody's ever seen worldwide. It's nobody is ever seen numbers like this for health care, it's only getting worse in 17 implodes by itself their method of fixing it is to go back and ask congress for more money, we have right now almost 20 trillion dollars in debt. Obamacare will never work" [9]. Several techniques are used here: hyperbolization (*"disaster"*), rhetorical structures (*"you know it, we all know it"*), which create the illusion of general recognition of statements. Such a linguistic strategy forces the audience to perceive information without critical analysis. Also, an American politician in the analyzed fragment of his speech uses such a technique as clarification: *"It's nobody is ever seen numbers like this for health care"*, emphasizing that the situation will only deteriorate: *"It's only getting worse"*. The above mentioned statement is characterized by significant hyperbolization, as the speaker resorts to a grotesque exaggeration of the shortcomings of the healthcare reform, portraying it as completely unprofitable for the state and the people and as one that exists only by the will of the previous administration.

Conclusions

The analysis of verbal means of English political discourse manipulative strategy implementation into educational process within the phramework of ESP teaching in MA shows that the main part of the resources for manipulating public opinion in modern English media are specially selected lexical means with special connotative semantics, which can turn the recipient into an object of manipulative influence on condition they are used skillfully.

The use of linguistic manipulation in political discourse provides a concise and imaginative transmission of content, attracts the attention of the audience and forms the necessary emotional reactions. Political leaders use manipulative techniques depending on the communicative tasks: to create the effect of proximity, discredit opponents or enhance the emotional impact. The features of such strategies depend on the cultural context and speech traditions of a particular politician.

Profound knowledge of widely used by the English media verbal means, methods and ways of linguistic manipulation, together with linguistic, socio-cultural, scientific and professional competencies, will enable future military professionals to hold a constructive dialogue with their foreign colleagues.

Prospects for Further Research

Further investigation of English political discourse verbal means aimed at manipulating public opinion, within the framework of ESP teaching to future military diplomatic professionals.

Funding

This study received no specific financial support.

Competing interests

The author declares that she has no competing interests.

References

1. Cherniavskaia E. (2006) *Dyskurs vlasty y vlast dyskursa: problemy rechevoho vozdeistviya*. [Discourse of power and the power of discourse: problems of speech influence]. Moskva: Flynta, Nauka, 136. (In Russian).
2. Pulenko I., Sazykina T. (2020) *Ekspresyivni osoblyvosti syntaksychnoho paralelizmu v publichnykh vystupakh politykiv (na materialy anhliiskoi, frantsuzkoi ta ukrainskoi mov)* [Expressive features of syntactic parallelism in public speeches of politicians (based on materials from English, French and Ukrainian languages)]. *Naukovyi visnyk Mizhnarodnoho humanitarnoho universytetu. Seriya: Filolohiia*, 45, 106–110. (In Ukrainian).
3. Sheihal E. (2000) *Semyotyka polytycheskoho dyskursa: monohrafiya* [Semiotics of political discourse: monograph]. Volhohrad: Peremena, 367. (In Russian).
4. Shuhaiev A., Malchenko M. (2025) *Stratehiia manipuliatsii u politychnomu dyskursi: porivnialnyi analiz rytoryky suchasnykh politychnykh lideriv* [Manipulation strategy in political discourse: a comparative analysis of the rhetoric of contemporary political leaders]. *Naukovyi visnyk Mizhnarodnoho humanitarnoho universytetu. Seriya: Filolohiia*, 71, 186–189. (In Ukrainian).
5. Gagarina V., Shelestova O., Sheinina D., Baez I. (2020). Vocabulary of political discourse at the English lessons. *Int. J. Criminol. Sociol*, 9, 1112–1115.
6. Aagaard P., Selma M. (2023) Political microtargeting: towards a pragmatic approach. *Internet Policy Review* 12, 1. <https://doi.org/10.14763/2023.1.1690> (accessed: 21.04.2025).
7. Remarks by President Biden and President Volodymyr Zelenskyy of Ukraine in Joint Press Conference. Available from: <https://ua.usembassy.gov/remarks-by-president-biden-and-president-volodymyr-zelenskyy-of-ukraine-in-joint-press-conference/> (accessed: 23.04.2025).
8. Boris Johnson's final speech as premier minister. Available from: <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/boris-johnsons-final-speech-as-primeminister-6-september-2022> (accessed: 24.04.2025).
9. Donald Trump. X. Available from: <https://x.com/realDonaldTrump> (accessed: 24.04.2025).

THE ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF MILITARY DRONE TECHNOLOGY IN WARFARE EQUIPMENT IN AFRICA

René Ngek Monteh

PhD, History Department, e-mail: montehrene@gmail.com

University of Yaounde 1, Cameroon

Received: May 22, 2025 | **Revised:** June 05, 2025 | **Accepted:** June 30, 2025

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.33445/psssj.2025.6.2.3>

Abstract

The development of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) could potentially revolutionise how military force is used in the future. While early operational experiences with UAVs show that this operation is promising, its full range of capabilities is largely unknown. Over the years, the application of drones has shifted from traditional methods of application to a much more modern one. Despite this evolution, the process of normalising drones throughout Africa has received little scholarly attention. The purpose of this paper is to analyse the historical origin and the evolution of military drones in the theatre of conflicts in Africa. The results arrived at in this paper have been thanks to a consortium of multinational academic literature embodied with the historical methods of analyses. Besides the conceptual framework of the study, this paper examines the historical origin of military drones, their mapping and evolution in Africa, and their humanitarian impacts as well as their limitations. From our findings, state and non-state actors have been actively involved in the usage of modern military drones in Africa during armed conflicts for the last two decades, and this is in an attempt to have a complete mastery over the conflict map.

Key words: UAVs, military drones, Africa, armed conflict, security.

Introduction

Manpower has always been the core element of warfare that contributed to the military success and defeat of the enemy. The classical military textbook manpower ratio of 3:1 against the adversary is believed to guarantee success in an attack against a similarly equipped antagonist. Elementarily, an asymmetry in the equipment (i.e., the technological advantage of one party to the conflict) or the tactic can influence the outcomes, yet it is the manpower that is the most basic element of warfare. Hence, besides winning the battle, the need to maintain the numbers of ranks has always been the utmost aim of military commanders. Without soldiers, even the most sophisticated weaponry remains useless, as there is no one to carry and properly employ it. The way of fighting, the use of protective armour, horses, and chariots, just to name a few, are employed to gain an edge over the enemy and simultaneously limit its own loss on the battlefield, yet it is the removal of the man from the battleground that is the most efficient.

Military jargon refers to drones as “unmanned aerial vehicles” (UAVs) or “unmanned combat air vehicles” (UCAVs), depending on whether the device carries weapons. In the official vocabulary of the U.S. Army, a drone is defined as “a land, sea, or air vehicle that is remotely or automatically controlled”. The drone family is not composed solely of flying objects. There may be as many different kinds as there are families of weapons: terrestrial drones, marine drones, submarine drones, even subterranean drones imagined in the form of fat mechanical moles. Provided there is no longer any human crew aboard, any kind of vehicle or piloted engine can be “droned.” A drone can be controlled either from a distance by human operators (remote control) or autonomously by

robotic means (automatic piloting). In practice, present-day drones combine those two modes of control. Armies do not yet have at their disposal operational autonomous lethal robots, although, as we shall see in drone expeditions, there are already advanced plans for those.

We are living, increasingly, in a drone-saturated world in general and Africa in particular. In recent years, drones have proliferated rapidly around Africa in both military and civilian spheres. Today in Africa, at least 25 nations and non-state groups are known to operate drones, including more than 15 countries with armed drones. An additional more than 10 countries have armed drone programs in development. As this technology continues to proliferate, simple weaponised drones will be increasingly placed within the reach of virtually every state and many non-state actors. The drone campaigns of the past decade and a half in Africa have involved hundreds of strikes against militant organisations, most in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of the Congo Basin, with additional strikes in Eritrea, Somalia, Sudan, Angola, Mali, the Lake Chad areas, and many other parts of Africa. It should also be mentioned that already non-state actors such as Hamas, Hezbollah, Alshabab in West Africa, the Islamic State movement, Boko Haram, and Libyan rebel groups have used drones to conduct tactical surveillance. Individuals also have access to increasingly sophisticated commercial off-the-shelf drones and components that can either be used for surveillance. This large number of attacks over a long period of time provides the opportunity to assess in a systematic way how the sustained use of such weapons influences public support on the use of force. Besides the conceptual framework of the study, this paper will therefore examine the following: categorising air vehicles and military operations, the historical origin of military drones, mapping the evolution of military drones in Africa, and lastly, the humanitarian impact and limitations of military drones.

Results and Discussion

I- Conceptual Framework of the Study

A drone, or an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), according to the definition by the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO), is an aircraft operated without a human pilot on-board. Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) is defined as that which is made up of components such as a drone, the controller (ground-based), and the communication system between the two (the drone and the controller). ICAO defined the term as a Remotely Piloted Aircraft System (RPAS) with its associated remote pilot station, the required command and control links, and any other components as specified in the type design and Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) (Ayamgaa Matthew et al., 2021).

All these terms are referring to a drone that is remotely controlled by an operator on the ground or preprogrammed to fly specific routes (Nelson, J. & Gorichanaz, T., 2019). Hogan and Wallace define two types of drones: a fixed-wing drone, which generates lift as it moves, enabling it to sustain velocity through the air, and the rotor, which is highly manoeuvrable and can hover and rotate with a flight controller (Hogan et al., 2017). These two types of drones have their advantages and disadvantages when it comes to flight range (endurance), battery capacity, and payload (Ayamgaa Matthew et al., 2021).

1- Agricultural Drones

According to Kim and others, the agricultural sector has seen some innovative technologies that support farm management strategies in enhancing efficiency through the precision application of farm inputs in recent years. One of such innovations is the drone technology, which has gained popularity (Kim H.G., et al., 2019) and this has been widely used in precision agriculture (Zhang C., & Kovacs J.M., 2012).

According to Hedley, several optical sensors are linked to a GPS so that the position of the readings is recorded and can be accurately mapped to inform variable rate fertiliser or growth regulation application and are available to farmers to actively monitor the development of growing

crops such as cereals, brassica, maize, and ryegrass. Depending on the crop analysis to be made on a farm, cameras such as red, green, and blue (RGB); multispectral; hyper spectral; thermal cameras; and low-cost, consumer-grade cameras are fitted on a drone to capture near-infrared (NIR) pictures (Hedley C., 2015). Drones use together with other Information Communication Technologies (ICTs) are opening a new phase in the agriculture domain where we have digital agriculture, smart agriculture, e-agriculture, and precision agriculture. From the Internet of Things (IoT), we now have the Internet of Drones (IoD), which provides generic services for various drone applications, such as package delivery, traffic surveillance, search, rescue, and more (Gharibi M. et al., 2016).

2- Medical Drones

Aerial delivery of medical supplies by drones to health facilities in remote communities with bad road infrastructure and undulating topography has been successfully carried out in some African countries like Rwanda and Ghana. Ling and Draghic point out that drones provide faster response times, reduce transportation costs, and improve medical services to remote and /or underserved environments (Ling G. & Draghic N., 2019). In the wake of the Covid-19 pandemic, the United States (US) has approved Zipline and other companies to deliver medical and food supplies in some states, through which the drone delivery market is expected to make substantial gains (NASDAQ OMX's News Release Distribution Channel, 2020). According to Laksham, the success of drones in the fields of ecology and the environment alludes to the belief that they can also be used in the field of public health as medical couriers (Laksham K.B., 2019).

The motivation for medical drones has to do with the fact that they can provide precision delivery with a more efficient cost perspective than conventional delivery systems. In emergency medicine, evidence showed that the use of drones proves to be safe and feasible for delivering an automated external defibrillator (AED) for out-of-hospital cardiac arrests (OHCA) in areas identified using GIS (Geographic Information System) models (Claesson A. et al., 2016).

3- Military Drones

According to Kindervater, the military drone technology history can be traced as far back as the 1930s and was immensely used during World War I and II. However, as time evolved, the development of drones has changed over these past periods to modern Western war machines (Kindervater K.H., 2016). In the military, drones have the potential to reduce costs and risks to personnel as they are or can be used in lethal surveillance and targeted killings compared to using manned aircraft. Drones used in lethal surveillance are directly linked to targeted killings with merging mechanisms for making decisions on life and death (Bousquet A., 2018).

Artificial intelligence (AI) plays a key role in military drones, which has made such drones able to differentiate between civilians and the targets (De Swarte T. et al., 2019). The discourse is on the ability of the AI machines to be able to execute tasks with ethical considerations. Cummings states that "The debate, which has many dimensions and stakeholders, concerns whether artificially intelligent machines should be allowed to execute such military missions, especially if there is a possibility that any human life could be at stake" (Cummings, M., 2017).

Nevertheless, there is a growing interest in drone technology across critical scholarships and security studies that seeks to place the drone within a wider set of practices. In this paper, we shall exclusively be working on the military/armed drone since our area of study (Africa) is constantly backed by a series of armed conflicts.

II- Categorising Air Vehicles and Military Operations

In some cases, autonomous vehicles follow preprogrammed courses and lack the capacity of retargeting, while in other cases, autonomous UAVs will follow preprogrammed courses and can be rerouted or retargeted. In military terminology, vehicles are reusable, while weapons are expendable. In addition, UAVs have shorter life spans than manned aircraft and can suffer attrition in military operations, which means that they will survive for a relatively small number of sorties

until failures, accidents, or hostile action. The loss rate for aircraft and UAVs is important as it influences the cost-effectiveness of UAVs and manned vehicles (David Glade, 2000).

1. Categorising Air Vehicles

One way to understand the nature of unmanned vehicles as a military instrument is to develop a framework that traces the development of manned and unmanned air vehicles, assesses the technological state of the art in aircraft and computer technologies, and extrapolates how these developments may influence their use in military operations.

The simplest approach is to divide aircraft into manned and unmanned vehicles and then to further subdivide unmanned vehicles into those that are remotely operated and autonomous. This framework rests explicitly on the human role in perceiving and influencing events during the operation of air vehicles. If manned aircraft use direct human presence to directly perceive events and conditions around the vehicle, remotely operated vehicles keep the human presence at a distance. The critical factor that distinguishes between aircraft and UAVs is the amount of information that is available to the human flying a UAV. The technological and operational communities have invested considerable resources in using visual and data displays to provide information to the human about conditions in and around the vehicle. The problem is that these technologies have been inadequate because the human operator is deprived of significant information about the vehicle's performance, which includes attitude, vibration, and sound, among others things. In the case of vehicles that are operated only periodically by a human, such as the Global Hawk UAV, the operator must make decisions with significantly less information about the vehicle than an on-board pilot (David Glade, 2000). The concept of the information that is provided to a remote operator has significant implications for UAVs, principally because it directly increases the combat effectiveness, cost, and complexity of these vehicles.

If we turn to the case of autonomous vehicles, the human presence exists at a distance, is confined to receiving information about the vehicle, and does not exercise direct control over the vehicle. By their nature, humans lose control of autonomous vehicles once they are launched, which implies that human operators do not control the operation of autonomous vehicles and that available information about the status of the vehicles is quite limited. Once these limitations are understood, autonomous vehicles may be well suited to attacking targets whose location is precisely and accurately known. The value of this assumption diminishes, however, in the case of searching for mobile targets, of which SCUD missiles and command and control centres are prominent examples. One fundamental reason for the development of these vehicles is the desire of the U.S. military to destroy what is known as time-critical targets, especially when these vehicles are missiles that may be armed with weapons of mass destruction (David Glade, 2000).

Perhaps the best way to differentiate between aerial vehicles is to consider the role of human presence, which can be immediate or distant and can involve large or small amounts of information about the vehicle's operation. However, the information provided to the human operator is not the same for all types of piloted aircraft. For example, while the MiG-23 and F-15 are both manned fighter aircraft, F-15 pilots have greater visual perception than MiG-23 pilots as a result of the larger and less restrictive canopy. In principle, all unmanned vehicles possess some degree of automation. An interesting problem, however, is that completely autonomous operations create unexpected situations, which was reaffirmed during tests of the Global Hawk UAV. Not surprisingly, the price of automation is to significantly increase the cost of engines, hydraulics, electrical systems, and avionics systems to the point where these are more expensive than the less automated counterparts that are controlled by humans (Bill Sweetman, June 1997, pp. 57-61).

2. Categorising Military Operations

The roles of UAVs can vary widely based on the difficulty of the military operation that is to be conducted. The simplest military operations involve attacks against fixed ground targets, while

the more challenging operations involve attacks against mobile ground targets and other air vehicles. As one would expect, an attack against fixed targets is the simplest because it is relatively easy to find targets whose location does not vary and which can be assessed with great accuracy. However, an attack against air targets is more difficult because the target's mobility makes it more difficult to find and destroy the target, and further because, the target's ability to manoeuvre makes it more difficult to prosecute an attack. Even when an air target has been located, the simplest form of attack is the unobserved attack in which the target is not aware that it is under attack (William Wagner, 1982, p.11). By contrast, an observed attack against a highly manoeuvrable target with an experienced pilot is most difficult. Consider, for instance, the case of an unobserved attack from behind a large bomber, which would be simpler to conduct than an attack against an opposing fighter whose experienced and well-trained pilot is aware that an attack is underway and will take active measures to defeat the attack (William Wagner, 1982, p.12).

Another type of attack is those against enemy targets that are out of contact with friendly forces, which are simpler than attacks in which enemy targets are relatively near friendly forces. The principal reason for the difficulty of conducting this type of attack is the high-level of coordination that is necessary if vehicles are to avoid destroying one another, which is known as fratricide. A basic rule of military operations is that the difficulty of combat situations increases as the number of enemy threats increases, and that this rule has important implications in air-to-air and air-to-ground operations when friendly and enemy targets are interspersed throughout the battle space. Ideally, all of the aircraft in one area belong to the enemy, while the aircraft in other areas belong to friendly forces, but the reality is that in modern military operations enemy and friendly aircraft will be mixed in the same area. The problem becomes even more complex in operations other than war when friendly, enemy, and neutral combatants are scattered throughout the battle space (David Glade).

These concepts have several important implications for UAVs. First, human pilots have a vastly greater ability to understand and respond to the conditions in combat around the vehicle than the human who operates the vehicle from a distance. Second, the number and type of threats, the degree of mobility of targets and threats, and the degree of sorting that is necessary to separate and classify threats directly influence the success with which UAVs can be used in military operations. Third, despite these limitations, technology has matured to the point where it will be possible to gradually shift combat functions from piloted to remotely piloted vehicles and eventually to autonomous vehicles in a migration that may transform the nature of war.

The military value of UAVs will depend on the ability to automate many of the functions that have historically been performed by humans, which range from guiding a vehicle to delivering ordnance against military targets. The simplest form of automation is the radio-controlled model aeroplane, while a more complicated autonomous aerial vehicle is the World War II V-1 Buzz Bomb, which performed tasks in a fixed sequence as does a modern cruise missile that is guided by GPS. The most complex example of automation is a UAV that relies on a rule-based or expert system to detect, identify, and attack mobile targets (Stan Gibilisco, 1994).

Fundamentally, the essence of automation is to use rules to guide decision-making, but this is a highly complex problem in war. This complexity is illustrated by the air campaign during the Persian Gulf War, which involved roughly 2,600 allied aircraft of at least 41 different types and 950 opposing enemy aircraft of 17 types, of which at least 6 types of aircraft shared common features with allied aircraft. All of these aircraft could be attacked by various air-to-air weapons, 16,000 surface-to-air missiles in 10 types, and 7,000 anti-aircraft guns. For automation to succeed in military operations, a computer must be able to sort through large numbers of choices and make good decisions about the use of lethal force in a reliable and timely fashion. At present, the problem is that rule-based decision-making has not reached a sufficient level of reliability to permit autonomous vehicles to make the kinds of decisions in war in which humans could have high

confidence, especially when failure can result in the deaths of hundreds or thousands of innocent civilians (James P. Coyne, 1992).

III- The Historical Timeline of Military Drones

Today, when we think of military drones, we tend to think of sleek, advanced planes and quadcopters. However, the world's inventors and militaries first developed drone technology as balloons, torpedoes, and aerial targets, feats of invention and innovation at the time. Since the mid-1800s, militaries around the world have been utilising drone technology for training, target practice, air strikes, bomb detection, surveillance, and hostage negotiation.

The earliest UAV in the history of drones was seen in 1839, when Austrian soldiers attacked the city of Venice with unmanned balloons filled with explosives. In 1849, the Austrian Navy used two hundred incendiary balloons in an effort to capture Venice. By the early 1900s, the United States military began exploring drone technology to build practice targets for training. However, in 1907, the world's first quadcopter was created by inventor brothers Jacques and Louis Bréguet (Palik Matyas & Nagy Máté, 2021).

1. World War I

In 1915, Nikola Tesla wrote about unmanned aerial combat vehicles. The first attempt at a self-propelled drone as an aerial target was completed in 1916 by A.M. Low. It wasn't until World War I that the first pilotless torpedo was invented by the Dayton-Wright Aeroplane Company. But in 1917, the Ruston Proctor Aerial Target became the first pilotless winged aircraft in history. It was a radio-controlled, pilotless aeroplane, based on RC technology from the inventor Nikola Tesla (Paul Fahlstrom & Thomas Gleason, 2012).

In the First World War, drones were just in the experimental phase; their mass use was impossible. As the aeroplane's main task was terror bombing, UAVs were used for this purpose. They had poor automation, so they were inaccurate. The lack of technical-technological development didn't permit making more complicated, more reliable, and more accurate drones.

But after World War I, companies worked to push drone technology forward with inventions like the Hewitt-Sperry Automatic Aeroplane and the Kettering Bug, an unmanned aerial torpedo. Most efforts during this time were completed by the military up until 1935, when actor and model-aeroplane enthusiast Reginald Denny became the first civilian to develop a remotely piloted vehicle (Paul Fahlstrom & Thomas Gleason, 2012).

2. World War II

Between the two wars it turned out that one possible direction of developments is the PTA. Although we have seen some usable prototypes, they were not ready to be widespread. However, in the Second World War, using drones as target aircraft became general because of the necessity of training pilots and air defence units. Another big area where UAVs were used was the aerial torpedo. These assets tried to replace the lost aircraft during the air attacks and reduce their high cost. In addition, the leaders didn't have to count on losing a pilot's life or with captivity.

During World War II, both Allied and German forces used drones to train aircraft gunners and aid in missions. After the end of World War II, drone developers began using jet engines in technologies like the Australian GAF Jindivik and the Model 10001, built for the U.S. Navy by Beechcraft. However, after World War II, technology innovations stalled until the Vietnam War. In 1943, created for use by the German military during World War II, "Fritz X" was the nickname given to the FX1400, the first remote-controlled weapon that was actually put into operational use (Barry R. Posen, 1986).

After the Second World War, in the arms race of the Cold War, UAVs were still useful. Most often they were used as supersonic PTAs to train the air defense units' personnel. Air defense missile units went through rapid development due to the latest jet fighters and nuclear threats. This is why strategic air reconnaissance was extremely important at the time of the Cold War, but after shooting

down the U-2 over the Soviet Union, US leaders found out that it is not desired for a pilot-flown aeroplane to spend as much as 12 hours over enemy territory (Barry R. Posen, 1986). That's how the first reconnaissance UAV was born, after a long series of experiments, and it was given the name Lightning Bug.

3. The Vietnam War

In the early years of the war, the U.S. Air Force began using unmanned aircraft to cut down on pilot deaths over hostile territory. Investment in drone technology continued after the Soviet Union shot down an American spy plane in 1960 (Adam Grissom, 2006).

In the Vietnam War, the next big step was when drones were provided by a live data network, so the pictures taken by them could be analysed instantly. It was possible because of the development of electronics are systems that had been present only on conventional aircraft were mounted on UAVs, but their main purpose was to take aerial pictures. and some of the UAVs carried out electronic warfare tasks. More and more systems that had been present only on conventional aircraft were mounted on UAVs, but their main purpose was to take aerial pictures.

In 1960, a boom in RC plane popularity in the U.S. Mostly coming in kit form, these RC planes offered everything from indoor-flyable models to much larger outdoor models. By the late 1960s, the U.S. government had invested in and used drone technology throughout Vietnam and to aid in naval missions, though most of these missions was classified (Singer, P. W., 2009).

4. The 70s, 80s, and 90s

In the early 70s, Israel began using drones as decoys in the Yom Kippur War. It was during this same time that the United States officially confirmed that they had been using drones in Vietnam. According to the Armed Forces Journal International in 1982, the U.S. stated that they had flown more than 3,435 drone missions during the war for both decoy and surveillance applications (James Igoe Walsh & Marcus Schulzke, 2018).

In the late 1970s and early 1980s, digital technology made it possible to create cheaper and lighter-than-ever UAVs. Modern drone warfare began in 1982, when Israel coordinated the use of battlefield UAVs alongside manned aircraft to wipe out the Syrian fleet with very minimal losses. The leading developing country was Israel, and its drones had multiple roles. They formed the basis of the UAVs that we use today. It wasn't until the 1980s and 90s that the U.S. military began heavily investing in the technology. The U.S. Department of Defense awarded the AAI Corp and Israel-based Malat contracts in the 90s to develop more advanced drone technology, which resulted in more cost-efficient technologies (Igoe J. Walsh & Schulzke, M.).

In the conflicts of the 1990s, the US forces could execute more accurate strikes than ever. It was largely because of the information that was gathered in large quantities and was processed at a rapid pace. It led to the information warfare, where drones have a key role. In this decade it was proven that all branches can use UAVs, and they are very effective in every theatre. In the mid-90s, the U.S. government began the Predator program, which resulted in the MQ-1 Predator, equipped with a Hellfire anti-tank missile on its wings. It paved the way to the MQ-9 Reaper in 2007 (Igoe J. Walsh & Schulzke, M.). The Predator and Reaper drones are what most people today picture when they think of military drones.

5. The 2000-2016 era

In the aftermath of 9/11, the CIA began flying armed drones over Afghanistan as part of the war against the Taliban. The first CIA drone-based kill operation took place in February 2002. The 2006 recognises the potential of nonmilitary, non-consumer drone applications; the FAA issued the first commercial drone permits. In 2010, the French company Parrot released their Parrot AR Drone, the first ready-to-fly drone that can be controlled entirely via Wi-Fi using a smartphone (John D. Sutter, September 7, 2011)

In December 2013, Amazon released a concept video showcasing founder Jeff Bezos' dream for a drone-based delivery system. However, the general use of drones as toys started to be introduced in 2014. While in 2016, DJI's Phantom 4 introduced smart computer vision and machine learning technology in drones. The first passenger drone was introduced at the Consumer Electronics Show (CES) in mid-2016 by Chinese entrepreneurs and was named the Ehang 184 (Scott Shane & Jo Becker, May 29, 2012).

Nowadays each military possesses some kind of UAV, including the Hungarian Defense Forces. Today, over three dozen countries and multiple terrorist groups and non-state actors have weaponised drones in their arsenal. We can see that with the extension of their role, their number will increase in the future. It should be well understood that the military conflicts all over the world were the main motivating factors to develop drones. One of the main reasons for their development is the limitations of human beings. The lack of a person on board has several advantages, like extended manoeuvrability, improved stealth capability, and almost unlimited duration in time. In addition, in most of the cases, they are cheaper than conventional airplanes (Palik Matyas, 2007). So we can say that it has always been some new need, the lack of capability, or change of application in the conventional aviation that motivated people to create UAVs.

IV- Mapping the Presence of Military/Armed Drones in Africa

Africa has seen the proliferation and increasing use of military drones in the last 16 years. A sharp rise in the use of armed and unarmed drones by African and non-African states can be seen, in particular, in North Africa, the Sahel, and the Horn of Africa. A worrisome aspect is that states are not being transparent about the deployment of drones in military operations. This hinders open debates on the military use of drones in Africa, in spite of various African parliamentarians, civil organisations, and other civilians sharing their concerns about the proliferation of drones. African and non-African states increasingly use armed and unarmed drones in North Africa, the Sahel, and the Horn of Africa. In this section, we shall limit ourselves to analysing the use of military drones in Africa by the United States, the United Nations, and non-state actors.

1. The United States of America (USA)

Somalia, Seychelles, Ethiopia, and Djibouti

US drone deployment really took off with the Obama Administration. From 2009 onwards, US drones would steadily buzz over Somalia from a base in the Seychelles to gather intelligence for counter-terrorism missions. Two years later, the drones were armed, and drone strikes were launched in Somalia. Members of Congress wrote in a letter to President Obama that the armed drone campaign had no transparency, accountability, or oversight and that they were "concerned about the legal grounds for such strikes" (Richtsje Kurpershoek, et al., 2021). Nevertheless, the Obama Administration continued to keep details about the drone strikes secret.

In 2011, the US also invested millions of dollars in an airfield in Arba Minch in Ethiopia to build a drone base for MQ-9 Reaper drones (class III) to collect surveillance data on al-Shabaab. As the base steadily turned into a key hub for counter-terrorism operations in Somalia, the US Air Force announced that the drone flights would "continue as long as the government of Ethiopia welcomes our cooperation on these varied security programs" (Whitlock, C., 13 June 2012). In 2015, the base was closed down, but the US was vague about why it had stopped the drone deployments from Arba Minch. The closure of the base in Ethiopia did not stop the drone campaign in Somalia. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) used a drone base in Mogadishu, the capital of Somalia. US military intelligence agents were also sometimes involved in the counter-terrorism programme in Mogadishu, but the CIA led the operations. There are a few reports about how the CIA selects targets in Somalia, but its drone campaigns have been less transparent than the drone campaigns of the US Department of Defence. For example, a New York Times article reported that in 2012, Obama was having weekly meetings called 'Terror Tuesday', in which it was decided who in Somalia

(and in other regions) should be added to the Joint Prioritised Target List, better known as the military's 'kill list' (Kurpershoek, R. et al.).

In 2012, the Obama Administration published a new 'Strategy toward Sub-Saharan Africa', which reversed its strategy in 1995, stating that "Africa is more important than ever to the security and prosperity of the international community and to the United States in particular". The security strategy included countering terrorist groups like al-Qaeda and advancing security cooperation with African countries and regional organisations through low-cost, small-footprint operations. Various programmes were set up in which the US supported African countries in developing approaches for "tracking, apprehending, arresting, prosecuting, and incarcerating terrorists" (Benjamin D., 25 April 2012). The US also started working with non-African countries on the continent through the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF), which was launched in 2011 to address 21st-century terrorism (Benjamin D.). The forum brings together counter-terrorism coordinators, prosecutors, judges, police, border control, and prison officials.

The US Air Force enlarged its drone operations in Djibouti further still in 2013 by building a drone base at Chabelly Airfield. Drones based at the airfield could cover Yemen, south-west Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Ethiopia, and southern Egypt. At the time, the Pentagon stated that the airfield would only be used temporarily, for not more than two years. In 2014, however, the US and Djibouti signed a long-term contract for the base. Within a year, the Department of Defense proposed expanding the base further still (Savage, C. & Schmitt, E., 30 March 2017). In 2017, the US decided to ease the rules aimed at preventing civilian casualties for counterterrorism strikes in Somalia. The new guidelines were similar to war-zone targeting rules, which allowed the US to engage targets easier. Since then, AFRICOM has increased the number of airstrikes. An investigative report by Amnesty International shows that in 2017 and 2018, US drone strikes in Somalia killed and injured several civilians, including children, and might have violated IHL. AFRICOM denied the allegations but did not conduct thorough, transparent investigations into the allegations (Amnesty International, 2019).

Libya and Tunisia

In 2011, the US also sent armed MQ-1 Predator drones to Libya to support the NATO led intervention to implement the UN Security Council Resolution 1973, which consisted of establishing a no-fly zone over Libya to end the violence and attacks on Libyan civilians. The US supported Libyan rebel forces in the intervention with an aggressive air campaign. The US did not engage diplomatically or politically with the rebels, which led to misunderstandings of the internal dynamics among the rebels. This laid the foundation for the post-war power struggle in Libya (Entous, A. & Ryan, M., 26 October 2016). The US continued to deploy drones in Libya after the intervention ended.

In 2016, the Tunisian government allowed the US to base its own unarmed Reaper drones in the country to gather intelligence on the Islamic State in Libya after the US pressed the Tunisian government in secret. In return, the US would share intelligence gathered by the drones with Tunisia to support their counter-terrorism operations within the country and their border security. The negotiations took place behind closed doors as the US was worried that Tunisia would otherwise pull out of the deal if the government was publicly associated with an outside military power (Entous, A. & Ryan, M., 26 October 2016). This was likely as frustration had grown among the Tunisian population with the post-revolutionary governments. Tunisian officials were worried that military cooperation with the US could prompt a public backlash, encourage militants to cross the border into Tunisia, and make it seem as if Tunisia was a party to the US military operations in Libya. The establishment of a base in Tunisia was critical to the US, as drones operated from Niger and Djibouti are further away from populous areas in Libya, and drone flights taking off from Sigonella in Italy are often cancelled due to weather-related issues (Markey, P. & Amara, T., 30 October 2016). Therefore, drones flying from Tunisia have more time to gather intelligence in the region.

In 2017, the government created ambiguity and confusion among American civilians about the military operation in Libya and concealed the magnitude of the operation. At the beginning of the year, President Donald Trump said he did not see a US role in Libya but did see a “role in getting rid of ISIS”. A few months later, the President stated that the US had a “continued commitment” in Libya to defeat jihadists. Furthermore, the US launched at least eight airstrikes in Libya in 2017 and 2018, but the government initially reported just four of these strikes (Kurpershoek, R. et al.).

Cameroon

The US built drone bases near Darak and in the western Sahel as well, as this region was beyond the reach of drones based in East Africa and southern Europe. In Salak in Cameroon, near the northern border region between Nigeria and Chad, the US extended a military base in 2013. By 2015, the US had supplied the Cameroon military with six Scan Eagle surveillance drones (Class I) at Salak and built an additional air base in Garoua in Cameroon as a base for unarmed Predator drones in the effort to counter Boko Haram (Gettinger, D., 21 February 2016). Captain Jennifer Dyrz, spokesperson for AFRICOM, stated that the Salak airfield was an important hub for their security assistance efforts and that they regularly had small numbers of US personnel (military and/or contractors) in the area supporting Cameroonian forces (Trafford, R. & Turse, N.). The base in Salak was used for US security operations and as an illegal prison. Prisoners, mostly men and often Muslim and members of the Kanuri ethnic minority, were tortured and imprisoned by the Cameroonian military. Women and children have also been detained at Salak. The detainees were not Boko Haram fighters but ordinary people arrested on suspicion of supporting Boko Haram (Trafford, R. & Turse, N.).

The US has denied being aware of the illegal torture. Yet various reports have been issued describing the torture practices. In 2007, the US State Department’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labour reported the torture at Salak. Again, in 2016, a widely distributed Human Rights Report by the Department of State declared that people were tortured at the Salak base, citing an Amnesty International report. In 2017, Amnesty International published a new report about the torture at the base, showing that detainees could see Americans from their cells. Amnesty called for thorough, independent, and impartial investigations. Given the wide availability of the reports, AFRICOM still claims that it did not receive reports of human rights violations by Cameroonian forces in Salak, making it difficult to comprehend (Amnesty International, 2017).

Later, after The Intercept and Forensic Architecture carried out additional investigations into the torture practices, AFRICOM said it would “conduct a more informal, fact-gathering inquiry in order to determine whether further investigation is warranted”. AFRICOM failed to declare whether the findings of the investigation would be published (Amnesty International, 2017).

2. United Nations (UN)

Besides the USA, the UN has been using drones in its monitoring operations in Africa since 2006. In 2006, drones were used in the EUFOR RD Congo military operation by Belgian troops in the Democratic Republic of Congo to support the UN peacekeeping mission MONUC and in Sudan after the UN Security Resolution 1706 gave a mandate “to monitor trans-border activities of armed groups along the Sudanese borders with Chad and the Central African Republic”. In 2009, the UN replaced the European Union military operation in Chad and the Central African Republic. Some of the contributors that used surveillance drones in the military operation were also involved in the UN mission. Therefore, the UN took over these drones as well. In 2013, the UN considered deploying drones in the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) after Côte d’Ivoire asked them to. In the end, the drones were not authorised due to an improvement in the security situation (United Nations Security Council).

In 2013, the Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) did get formal approval to use drones to track movements of armed militias and document atrocities, despite general scepticism on the use of drones among UN member states. Member states criticised

the intelligence that drones would generate, as states feared that any intelligence collection powers on the part of the UN could lead to the loss of sovereignty of member states. Nevertheless, the UN did start expanding its use of drones after deploying them during MONUSCO, as they proved to be a useful tool in UN missions (Ramjoué, M., 2011). The Expert Panel on Technology and Innovation in UN Peacekeeping stated, for example, in 2014 that the use of drones constituted “an indispensable source of information” and that “their use should [...] be immediately expanded” and “maximum use” should be made of smaller drones, as the “UN peacekeeping simply cannot afford to cede the information advantage to those actors in a mission area determined to undermine prospects for peace and who use the advantages of modern technology to aid their violent cause” (Ramjoué, M., 2011).

Since then, the UN has deployed drones in other missions as well where it has received the approval of the relevant state. In the Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), the Netherlands deployed Scan Eagle and Raven drones (class I), from 2014 to 2016 from Camp Castor in Mali to gather intelligence. The Scan Eagles flew more than 1,000 hours. In 2015, Sweden complemented the Dutch drones with Shadow (class II), Wasp (class I) and Puma (class I) drones from a base in Timbuktu, Mali. A year later, Germany flew Heron 1 (class III) and LUNA drones (class I) for MINUSMA as well. A drawback in the UN mission was because the UN lacked analysts who could interpret the data gathered by the drones (Kurpershoek, R. et al.).

In 2015, the UN repeatedly asked the South Sudanese government to allow the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) to use drones. The government, however, dismissed all requests because they did not allow their military installations to be photographed. Additionally, they questioned why the UN wanted to use drones in the first place, because there were no ‘terrorists’ in South Sudan (Justin, T., 18 June 2015). In 2017, the government of the Central African Republic did approve the use of drones during the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA). French tactical drones were also used to locate armed groups and monitor their routes (United Nations).

3. Non-State Actors

In Africa, various armed groups make use of COTS drones. Armed groups can obtain these drones relatively easily, as they are cheap and often purchased by ‘hobbyists’. Most of these drones are produced by China, which has refused to restrict drone sales to halt their proliferation. African countries such as Sierra Leone are worried that these drones will fall into the hands of armed groups. They are struggling to regulate the sale of these drones and are enacting legislation. Furthermore, these COTS drones will be harder to combat in the future, as the technology used in these drones is advancing rapidly (Searcey, D., 13 September 2019).

In West Africa, the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), commonly known as Boko Haram, is active in Nigeria, Chad, Niger, and northern Cameroon and has 1,500 to 3,500 fighters. ISWAP has developed its own drones for reconnaissance and surveillance operations. States fear that ISWAP has ambitions to weaponised the drones for attacks. Since 2015, the Islamic State in the Greater Sahel (ISGS) has operated in the West African countries of Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso. ISGS is also known to use COTS drones in Mali for surveillance purposes (United States Department). In North Africa, armed groups are operating drones too. The Egyptian General Command of the Armed Forces announced in 2018 that it captured a drone used by so-called “terrorists” in the Sinai region during a military operation. The drone was said to be used to monitor movements by army troops in central and north Sinai. The Algerian Ministry of Defence published in the ministry’s journal that it had captured 11 drones belonging to “terrorists” in Algeria in 2019. It is possible that more non-state actors in Africa will make use of COTS drones (Bilan des opérations 2018).

The next section handles the humanitarian impact of drones’ activities in the various areas of operations.

V- The Humanitarian Impact and Limitations of Military Drones in Africa

Humanitarian and human rights norms have long sought to restrict the exercise of remote violence. In the last two hundred years, the rapid development of weapons technology has enabled people to kill and maim others at increasing distances, both physical and psychological. Rifles, artillery, landmines, aerial bombing, and missiles function to reduce the potential for human encounter between an assailant and a target or victim. This section discusses some of the humanitarian impacts caused by military drones.

On 29 June 2011, US President Obama's chief counterterrorism advisor, John Brennan, stood in front of a packed room in an academic division of Johns Hopkins University in Washington, D.C., and made a bold assertion. No civilians had been killed in US counterterrorism operations in nearly a year, he said. Brennan was answering a question about "targeted killings", a euphemism for Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) drone strikes. The strikes were raining down on Pakistan at the time, though officially the administration refused to acknowledge the drone campaign even existed, sticking resolutely to the vague "counterterrorism operations" term (Ray Acheson).

1. Environmental Harm

In armed conflict and its aftermath, legal protection for the environment is weak, and systems for accountability and environmental remediation are largely absent. Those protections that do exist have been most clearly articulated in relation to massive levels of environmental harm. They primarily focus on the "natural environment" without articulating the linkages between environmental quality and the enjoyment of fundamental human rights. However, the risks of the generation of toxic remnants of war-conflict pollution that threatens human and ecosystem health should be an important consideration in taking steps and measures to progressively limit harm in the use of force.

During the last decade, there has been a renewed effort to clarify and codify the relationship between environmental obligations stemming from international humanitarian law (IHL), international environmental law, and international human rights law, before, during, and after armed conflicts. The topic is currently under consideration by the International Law Commission, and states have expressed their growing concern over the environmental and derived humanitarian consequences of armed conflict at the UN Environment Assembly (International Law Commission, 2017). Obligations to address the environmental legacy of pollution from armed conflicts and military activities have been proposed by the International Law Commission and have recently been articulated in the treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons, adopted in July 2017. These and other initiatives could support the advancement of both law and practice with respect to addressing toxic remnants of war.

The expansion of the use of armed drones by states to conduct airstrikes both within and outside of armed conflict has coincided with this increased interest in enhancing the protection of the environment in relation to armed conflicts. While not arguing that the environmental impact of armed drones is a central component of the harms that they cause, this short perspective proposes that air strikes conducted from drones could have environmental implications for communities and that these should be considered in any discussions about the further regulation of drones (UN General Assembly, 7 July 2017). However, the lasting environmental impacts and long-term risks to human health from the use of force must, in turn, be curbed through more robust international rules.

Recently, Nigeria became the eighth country to have used armed drones in combat, having announced a successful drone strike in its ongoing war against the militant group Boko Haram. On 25 January 2015, a photo appeared online at Beegeagle's Blog 1 showing a CH-3 UCAV that crashed upside down near Dumge village in the Mafa District of Borno Province. Despite damage to the tricycle landing gear and upper forward fuselage, the CH-3 appeared to have crash-landed due to mechanical or control difficulties, as reported on the news. In the video released of the attack, there

was a large blast, and the Nigerian Air Force claims it hit a logistics base belonging to Boko Haram, possibly an ammunition storehouse (Kelsey D. Atherton, 3 February 2016).

The Nigerian military has asserted a pressing need for counter-insurgency (COIN) equipment and has argued that drones are “necessary” in fighting the insurgency. But a key issue is how appropriate it is to launch such attacks within an area where there are not just insurgents but also civilians. There is also the danger that the targeted population might not be “terrorists” or “insurgents”, but might instead be an individual or a group that fits into a specific “terrorist” profile. The geographical zones of Nigeria (northeast and northwest) where most counterinsurgency operations are taking place are known for their rich supply of farm crops such as grains and vegetables and for animal rearing such as of cattle, sheep, and goats. Drone activities, such as mapping the areas of conflict, in particular their munitions and the munitions used against them, may pose a threat to public health within these regions and their sources of livelihood: the cultivation of crops and rearing of animals (Kelsey D. Atherton, 3 February 2016). In addition, the potential effect of such use on civilians and communities poses dangers that have not yet been addressed.

2. Psychological Harm

The sky in the Yemeni countryside, or the United States (US) drones’ playground, regularly inflicts violence without any warning or reason on people that are already vulnerable to both poverty and conflict. US drone attacks have thus emerged to shape the perceptions, fears, and life choices of a large proportion of the Yemeni population. In turn, this “drone generation” which is inevitably viewing the skies as a medium of death, is suffering tremendously from mental stress that also culminates into physical distress (Ray Acheson).

The repercussions of drone operations on civilians living in areas where the skies are a source of trauma, especially those who have not directly lost a relative or loved one to a drone strike, have not been given due consideration within policy or academic debates. Nevertheless, the concern over the potential psychological impact of drones has been shared by human rights and humanitarian organisations such as the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), which have expressed concern about the lack of measurement of the consequences of the constant presence of drones on mental health (Peter Mauer, 10 May 2013). The combination of unclear legal and policy mechanisms around drone operations and technology closely intersects with the perpetuation of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) among Yemeni civilians living under drones. A complete dearth of institutional mechanisms with regard to regulation, accountability, and retribution has served to perpetuate loss of civilian lives, trauma, and disruption of everyday activities. Strongly addressing these shortcomings will be instrumental, not only for delivering justice to already vulnerable people but also for ameliorating their lives in a country experiencing instances of violence on numerous fronts (Peter Mauer, 10 May 2013).

3. Harm to Global Peace and Security

The primary focus of the debate about the impact of armed drones has been as a result of their use for extrajudicial killing outside of the battlefield: targeted killing, as it has become more widely known. Almost since they were first deployed, armed drones have been used by the United States in particular but also more recently by Israel and the United Kingdom to “find, fix, and finish” those deemed to be a threat to national security (Ray Acheson).

While the policy of using armed drones to carry out targeted killings beyond the battlefield is rightly an issue of serious concern, the wider impact of the technology itself also needs to be addressed. Drones combine various pre-existing technologies to form a new and radically different way of launching armed forces. The impact of this new weapon system, enabling so-called risk-free war, on the political-military decision-making process in times of crisis, as well as on long-term military policy, needs to be carefully examined. It is the advent of the remote-controlled armed drone that has enabled the huge

expansion of targeted killing over the past decade. There is growing evidence that the existence of this new form of war making and its impact on policymakers is lowering the threshold for the use of armed force, transferring the risk of warfare from combatants to civilians, and increasingly disconnecting the public from the human impact of armed combat (Ray Acheson).

Djibouti is a country of less than 900,000 people that would not register significantly in the global consciousness except for its strategic location in East Africa. Tim Mak of the Daily Beast writes that Djibouti is strategic because it is at the mouth of the Red Sea and the rest of the Persian Gulf. A small, hot, dry country with high levels of poverty has made its claim to fame by virtue of its location, attracting the militaries of some of the most powerful countries in the world. The US, China, France, Japan, Saudi Arabia, and Italy have or are constructing military bases in the country. Russia, Spain, Germany, and the United Kingdom also have troops operating out of Djibouti (Ben Ho Wan Beng, 18 March 2016).

The military attraction has in part to do with antipiracy efforts off the coast of Somalia. All ships passing through the Suez Canal to Europe or to the Indian Ocean need to sail through the Bab al-Mandab Strait. Twenty thousand ships and 20% of global exports travel this route every year. Beyond that, Djibouti is critical for geostrategic military operations in the post-9/11 world. Djibouti sits between East Africa and the Arabian Peninsula, allowing aircraft stationed there to reach Somalia or Yemen in minutes. Many of the foreign militaries operating in Djibouti participate in operations against al-Shabaab in Somalia or al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula in Yemen, either directly through drone strikes or by training Djiboutian and other East African militaries. US Special Forces use their base in Djibouti for operations against Boko Haram, the Lord's Resistance Army, and Daesh, and as a launching pad for drone strikes (Katrina Manson, 1 April 2016).

Besides the above, the lack of transparency prevents the victims and their families from obtaining any semblance of accountability and foments anger and fear among communities in targeted regions. It also undermines democratic legitimacy and the rule of law, because still-secret legal justifications for and consequences of this lethal force mean that the public is unable to independently assess the merits and legality of this deeply controversial programme. Greater transparency is critical to ensuring that US policies and practices comport with international and domestic legal standards and that the US government is held accountable when they do not.

Conclusions

The main aim of this paper was to analyse the historical origin and the evolution of military drones in conflict moments in Africa. The proliferation of drone technology across Africa has significantly expanded humanitarian, development, business, and military operations. Drones, also known as unmanned aerial systems, have many positive uses. In the hands of non-state armed groups however, they pose a threat that governments must be prepared for. Drones already form part of the military's arsenal in many African countries and are deployed in peacekeeping missions. Although the adaptation of commercial drones by insurgents into strike platforms in Africa is yet to happen, there's evidence of their use by armed groups for surveillance and precision targeting. In exploiting the benefits of transformative technology, African states should be aware of the potential risks and develop strategies to track and trace drone proliferation. Besides the US, UN, France, Russia, armed groups have recently used drones to locate targets in many conflict areas in Africa. Highly sophisticated military-specific drones, costing millions of dollars, currently require substantial trained experts and adequate infrastructure to operate. Because of that, they are neither accessible to nor affordable for non-state actors and many state militaries. Nonetheless, the increasing number of indigenous producers and growing international market suggest that an increasing number of countries will possess armed drones in the next 5 to 10 years. Given their growing exposure to the spread of this technology African policymakers should play an active role in shaping future drone

policy. This emerging threat demonstrates how conventional militaries no longer have a monopoly on appropriating technological innovation that will shape the battlefield.

Funding

This study received no specific financial support.

Competing interests

The author declares that she has no competing interests.

References

- Acheson Ray, et al., *The Humanitarian Impact of Drones*, Women's International League for Peace and Freedom; International Disarmament Institute, Pace University, 1st edition, 2017.
- Amnesty International, *The hidden US war in Somalia*, London, UK, 2019, p. 65, Available from : <https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/AFR5299522019ENGLISH>, accessed 13 April 2022.
- Atherton Kelsey D., "Watch Nigeria's First Confirmed Drone Strike - Against Boko Haram", Popular Science, 3 February 2016, Available from : <http://www.popsci.com/watchnigerias-first-confirmed-drone-strike>, accessed 15 April 2022.
- Ayamgaa Matthew et al., "Multifaceted applicability of drones: A review", Technological Forecasting & Social Change, Vol. 167, June 2021, 120677.
- Ben Ho Wan Beng, "The Strategic Attractions of Djibouti", The National Interest, 18 March 2016, Available from : <http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/the-strategic-attractions-djibouti-15533>, accessed 15 April 2022.
- Bousquet A., "The Eye of War: Military Perception from the Telescope to the Drone", U of Minnesota Press 2018.
- Claesson A. et al., "Unmanned aerial vehicles (drones) in out-of-hospital-cardiac-arrest Scand", J. Trauma Resusc, Emerg. Med. 24 (1), 1–9, 2016.
- Coyne James P., *Airpower in the Gulf*, Arlington, VA: Air Force Association, 1992, pp.19-35.
- Cummings M., *Artificial Intelligence and the Future of Warfare*, Chatham House for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 2017.
- D. Benjamin, "LRA, Boko Haram, Al-Shabaab, Aqim, and Other Sources of Instability in Africa", U.S. Department of State, 25 April 2012, Available from : <https://2009-2017.state.gov/j/ct/rls/rm/2012/188816.htm>, accessed 13 April 2022.
- De Swarte T. et al., "Artificial intelligence, ethics and human values: the cases of military drones and companion robots", Artif. Life Robot. 24 (3), 291–296, 2019.
- Entous A. & Ryan M., "U.S. has secretly expanded its global network of drone bases to North Africa", The Washington Post, 26 October 2016.
- Fahlstrom Paul & Gleason Thomas, *Introduction to UAV Systems*, Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley, 2012.
- Gettinger D., "The American drone base in Cameroon", 21 February 2016, Available from : <https://dronecenter.bard.edu/drone-base-cameroon>, accessed 13 April 2022.
- Gharibi M. et al., "Internet of drones", IEEE Access 4, 1148–1162, 2016.
- Gibilisco Stan, *The McGraw-Hill Illustrated Encyclopaedia of Robotics & Artificial Intelligence*, New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1994, p.406.
- Glade David, "Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Implications for Military Operations", Occasional Paper No. 16 Centre for Strategy and Technology Air War College, Air University Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112, July 2000.
- Grissom Adam, "The Future of Military Innovation Studies", Journal of Strategic Studies 29:5 905-34, 2006.

- Hedley C., "The role of precision agriculture for improved nutrient management on farms", J. Sci. Food Agric. 95 (1), 12–19, 2015.
- Hogan et al., "Unmanned aerial systems for agriculture and natural resources", Calif. Agric. Berkel. 71 (1), 5-14, 2017.
- International Law Commission, "Analytical Guide to the Work of the International Law Commission, Protection of the environment in relation to armed conflicts", 2017, Available from : http://legal.un.org/ilc/guide/8_7.shtml, accessed 15 April 2022.
- J. Nelson, & T. Gorichanaz, "Trust as an ethical value in emerging technology governance: the case of drone regulation", Technol. Soc. 59, 101131, 2019. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.techsoc.2019.04.007>.
- John D. Sutter, "How 9/11 inspired a New Era of Robotics", CNN, September 7, 2011: Available from : <http://edition.cnn.com/2011/TECH/innovation/09/07/911.robots.disaster.response/>. Accessed 8 April 2022.
- Justin T., "South Sudan: UN Doesn't Need Drones, Attack Helicopters", Voa, 18 June 2015, Available from : <https://www.voanews.com/africa/south-sudan-un-doesnt-need-drones-attack-helicopters>, accessed 14 April 2022.
- Kim H.G., et al., "Potential of unmanned aerial sampling for monitoring insect populations in rice fields", Florida Entomol, 101 (2), 330–334, 2018.
- Kindervater K.H., "The emergence of lethal surveillance: watching and killing in the history of drone technology", Secur. Dialog. 47 (3), 223–238, 2016.
- Kurpershoek Richtsje, et al., *Remote Horizons: Expanding use and Proliferation of Military Drones in Africa*, Pax for Peace, Colophon, 2021.
- Laksham K.B., "Unmanned aerial vehicle (drones) in public health: a SWOT analysis", J. Fam. Med. Prim. Care 8 (2), 342, 2019.
- Ling G. & Draghic N., "Aerial drones for blood delivery", Transfusion 59 (S2), 1608–1611, 2019.
- Manson Katrina, "Jostling for Djibouti", FT Magazine, 1 April 2016, Available from : <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/8c33eefc-f6c1-11e5-803c-d27c7117d132.html>, accessed 15 April 2022.
- Markey P. & Amara T., "Revolution a fading memory, economic frustrations grow in Tunisia", Reuters, 30 October 2016, Available from : <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-tunisia-politics-insight/revolution-a-fading-memory-economic-frustrations-grow-in-tunisia>, accessed 13 April 2022.
- Matyas Palik & Máté Nagy, "Brief History of UAV Development", RTK, pp.155-166, 2021.
- Mauer Peter, "The use of armed drones must comply with laws", International Committee of the Red Cross, 10 May 2013, Available from : <https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/interview/2013/05-10-drone-weapons-ihl.htm>, accessed 15 April 2022.
- Posen Barry R., *The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the World Wars*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986.
- Ramjoué M., "Improving UN Intelligence through Civil–Military Collaboration: Lessons from the Joint Mission Analysis Centres", in International Peacekeeping, 18:4, 468-484, 2011.
- Savage C. & Schmitt E., "Trump Eases Combat Rules in Somalia Intended to Protect Civilians", The New York Times, 30 March 2017, Available from : <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/30/world/africa/trump-is-said-to-ease-combat-rules-in-somalia-designed-to-protect-civilians.htm>, accessed 13 April 2022.
- Searcey D., "Boko Haram is back with better drones", The New York Times, 13 September 2019, Available from : <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/13/world/africa/nigeria-boko-haram.html>, accessed 14 April 2022.

- Shane Scott & Becker Jo, "Secret 'Kill List' Tests Obama's Principles", New York Times, May 29, 2012.
- Singer P. W., *Wired for War: The Robotics Revolution and Conflict in the 21st Century*, New York: Penguin Press, 2009.
- Sweetman Bill, "Pilotless Fighters: Has Their Time Come?", *Janes International Defence Review*, June 1997, pp. 57-61.
- Trafford R. & Turse N., "Cameroonian troops tortured and killed prisoners at base used for U.S. drone surveillance", *The Intercept*, 20 July 2017, Available from : <https://theintercept.com/2017/07/20/cameroonian-troops-tortured-and-killed-prisoners-at-base-used-for-u-s-drone-surveillance>, accessed 13 April 2022.
- UN General Assembly, "Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons", 7 July 2017, Available from : <http://undocs.org/A/CONF.229/2017/8>, accessed 15 April 2022.
- United Nations Security Council, "Côte d'Ivoire Has Entered 'New Phase' in Consolidating Peace, But Still Faces Formidable Threats that Require Continued UN Presence, Security Council Told", 16 April 2013, Available from : <https://www.un.org/press/en/2013/sc10973.doc.htm>, accessed 14 April 2022.
- United Nations, "Module 1- MINUSCA Instructor Notes and Guidance", *Le Figaro*, 24 May 2017, p.16-17, Available from : <http://repository.un.org/bitstream/handle/11176/400575/MINUSCA%20Instructor%20Notes%20and%20Guidances.pdf?sequence=17&isAllowed=y>, accessed 14 April 2022.
- United States Department of State Publication, "Country Reports on Terrorism 2018", 2019, Available from : <https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1215411/download>, accessed 14 April 2022.
- Wagner William, *Lightning Bugs and Other Reconnaissance Drones*, Fallbrook, CA: Aero Publishers, 1982.
- Walsh James Igoe & Schulzke Marcus, *Drones and Support for the Use of Force*, University of Michigan Press, United States of America, 2018.
- Whitlock C., "U.S. expands secret intelligence operations in Africa", *The Washington Post*, 13 June 2012, Available from : <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-expands-secret-intelligence-operations>, accessed 12 April 2022.
- Zhang C., & Kovacs J.M., "The application of small unmanned aerial systems for precision agriculture: a review", *Precis. Agric.* 13 (6), 693–712, 2012.

POLITICS OF SECURITY AND THE ANGLOPHONE CRISIS IN CAMEROON: POLITICIZATION, MILITARIZATION, AND PATHWAYS TO SUSTAINABLE PEACE AND STABILITY IN AFRICA

Gabriel Cyrille Nguijoi ^{1 A}; Wilfred Gabsa Nyogbet ^{2 B}; Saron Obia Messembe ^{3 C}

¹ Research Officer, e-mail: gabrielcyrilnguioi@yahoo.fr

² Wilfred Gabsa Nyogbet, e-mail: sg@minesup.gov.cm

³ Criminologist, e-mail: sirmessembe@gmail.com

^A National Mapping Institute, Cameroon

^B University of Yaounde 1, Cameroon

^C Counter Terrorism and Public Policy Analyst, Cameroon

Received: June 13, 2025 | Revised: June 16, 2025 | Accepted: June 30, 2025

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.33445/psssj.2025.6.2.4>

Abstract

In post-independence Africa, issues of insecurity, identity, and governance critically affect nation-state stability, exemplified by Cameroon's Anglophone crisis. Originating in 2016 with historical background, peaceful protests by lawyers and students against marginalization in the Northwest and Southwest regions, the movement has since 2017 escalated into a prolonged armed conflict. The Cameroonian government's tendency to politicize grievances and emphasize militarized responses has deepened mistrust and heightened tensions. Public discourse remains fragmented, largely ignoring root causes such as governance failures, socio-economic disparities, and cultural marginalization. This analysis examines how Cameroon's security policies, influenced by postcolonial state-building that views dissent as a threat to national unity, inadvertently foster insecurity. Utilizing securitization theory and human security frameworks, the study explores how these strategies intensify, rather than alleviate, conflict. Central questions focus on Cameroon's security culture and potential methods to replace fear-driven governance with sustainable peace strategies. The paper employs an interdisciplinary approach combining political theory, socio-spatial evaluation, and conflict analysis, situating the crisis within broader identity-related insecurities in post-colonial Africa. Advocating inclusive governance, meaningful dialogue, effective decentralization, and prioritization of human security, the study proposes alternatives to militarization. Aligning with frameworks like the African Union's Agenda 2063 and UN Sustainable Development Goals, it provides actionable insights for peacebuilding within postcolonial contexts. Through these measures, Cameroon could pave the way for lasting peace and stability, serving as a model for similar challenges across Africa.

Key words: anglophone crisis, governance, conflict resolution, human security, violent extremism.

Introduction

The Central African region has been dealing with insecurity for the past two decades with the reoccurrence of conflicts and socio-political crisis in about five (5) countries (Burundi, Cameroon, the CAR, Chad and the DRC, the armed conflicts in Cameroon and Chad) out of the 15 witnessed by Sub-Saharan Africa (Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 2024). These conflicts are in many cases, deeply rooted in the nation-building process with historical legacies of colonial rules, ineffective governance frameworks, uneven resource distribution, and fragmented political institutions. The Anglophone crisis in Cameroon represents one of the most enduring and intricate internal conflicts in the Central African region. Since its reemergence in 2016, what initially began as peaceful

demonstrations regarding 'Lawyers and students' peaceful protest has evolved into a violent conflict between governmental forces and non-state entities, particularly separatist militias. This crisis, which is deeply rooted in identity grievances and systemic inequities, underscores significant structural deficiencies in the formulation and execution of security policies within Cameroon and, by extension, throughout much of postcolonial Africa (Konings & Nyamnjoh, 2003; Awasom, 2004).

The political and administrative unification following the 1961 plebiscite left unaddressed discord between the Francophone-dominated central government and the Anglophone minority. This has perpetuated systematic marginalization in terms of political representation, cultural acknowledgment, and equitable access to public resources (Anchimbe, 2010; Fanso, 1999). The state's primary responses have been twofold: politicization, by reinterpreting grievances as threats to national cohesion, and militarization, through oppressive security operations under the 2014 Anti-Terrorism Law. These approaches have largely failed to tackle the underlying causes of the crisis and have, instead, further intensified tensions leading to over 6000 deaths, approximately 638, 000 internally displaced persons, and at least 1.7 million people in urgent need of humanitarian assistance (International Crisis Group, 2017; Human Rights Watch, 2024). At the core of the issue lies the Cameroonian security paradigm, which prioritizes regime preservation and territorial integrity over human security. Drawing on Buzan et al.'s (1998) Securitization Theory, this research contends that the state's framing of protests as a security threat has sanctioned extraordinary measures that inhibit dialogue and perpetuate fear. As Jarvis & Holland (2015) assert, security efforts become counterproductive when they engender the very insecurity they claim to mitigate. The Anglophone conflict also reflects the broader crisis of postcolonial governance in Central Africa, where historical injustices, fragile institutions, and exclusionary nationalism intersect. The region continues to grapple with armed conflicts, institutional degradation, and disparate development, as evidenced in Chad, the Central African Republic, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 2024; Meyer, 2015).

This paper aims to provide a comprehensive analysis of how Cameroon's securitized governance exacerbates identity-driven conflicts. It seeks to address two fundamental questions: (1) *How does the prevailing conceptualization of security perpetuate conditions of fear, mistrust, and violence?* and (2) *What institutional and governance reforms are necessary to cultivate inclusive, sustainable peace?* Through an integration of political theory, empirical data, and comparative regional analysis, this study advocates for a shift from coercive security models to a human security framework predicated on decentralization, justice, and participatory governance. It aligns with the African Union's Agenda 2063 and the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (AU, 2015; UN, 2015), which emphasize the importance of inclusive institutions and peace as essential elements for sustainable development and conflict resolution in Africa.

Results and Discussion

I-The Dilemma of the Politics of Identity, and the Rise of the Anglophone Crisis

Though the contemporary aspects of the Anglophone conflict can be traced back to the grievances against the then governance system, its foundation can also be linked to the 1961 plebiscite. The extended hostility between West and East Cameroon has often been the source of the calls for either constitutional reorganisation of the federal system or secession of the Anglophone regions (Agwanda, Billy and Uğur, Yasin Asal, N.D). These arguments can be classified into the nature and characteristics of identity politics and grievances in Cameroon, (A), that led to the projection of national identity disparities (B).

A- The National Identity Politic Construction and the Anglophone Minority Grievances and Victimisation

Victimisation in pluralistic societies often creates a strong feeling of identity amongst minority groups who may then develop coping mechanisms to facilitate their breakaway from by dominant sociocultural groups. The debate on such circumstances and the transformation of the post-colonial State is at the centre of the emergence of the Anglophone problem in Cameroon. The government attempts to reform the minority identity (Anglophone cultural legacy) in West Cameroon through different systems including the education, and judicial sectors, have been greatly rejected. Minority groups in these sectors, from the Anglophone regions have often decried prejudice and discrimination in being admitted in leading institutions and administrations (Caxton, 2017).

The bureaucratic transformations of the 1960s, aimed at constructing a national identity, intervened as a socio-spatial identity regulation, in a context of political fractures that animated the Cameroon society before the second phase of its independence in October 1961. This wave of transformation seems to be one of the main elements that stimulated the grievances, which find here, a detonator with corporatists effervescence, and a major contributing factor to curb the appearance of socio-spatial identity struggles of the Anglophone crisis. One of the prominent root causes of the Anglophone Crisis in Cameroon lies on the socio-political, cultural and economic grievances. Politically, the centralization of power has developed a feeling of marginalisation of the Anglophones minority, which representation is reduced in government and public administration, and according to the national survey of 2014 (ECAM4, 2014) to only 11%. The dismantling of the federal system in 1972 further eroded regional autonomy, fuelling the perception, or feeling of exclusion and subordination of the Anglophone minority (Konings & Nyamnjoh 1997). Economically, and according to the Anglophones, their regions, despite being resource-rich, faced disproportionate underdevelopment, limited infrastructure, and high unemployment. Socially, cultural and linguistic discrimination has exacerbated tensions, with Francophone legal and educational systems imposed on them. These combined factors have fuelled resentment, and the allegedly subordination of the Anglophone region in a unitary State.

The sociological aspects lie on the generating and organising logics of the 1962 political conflict in the post-colonial Cameroonian state intends to take an interest in a historical-critical and historical-empirical examination of the socio-spatial identity disparities posed by the '*recomposition*' of the political field. To achieve this, it is then necessary to critically identify the logics of production of a crucial conflict of identity through an investigation and a revealing interrogation of the springs of these socio-political dynamics showing the difficult relationship linking to the routinized perspectives of reflection and observation to the historical conditions of its construction. The rise and resurgence of the ambazonian secessionism as a para-terrorist movement, is also as a result of the perception of the existence of social disintegration and identity generative conflicts arising principally from low representation of minorities in the administrative and educational sectors, as mentioned above. This situation leads to the widespread and serial production of structural particularities at more localised levels. As the problem developed from the creation of pro-anglophone movements to the voluntary separation from the French part of the country in search of a sovereign state, there arose a new problem, that of security. Isaiah Munang Ayafor indicates that, the territorial divide shows that any integrative measures would be understood as "*assimilation strategies*" due to the fact that the Anglophone minority frequently make different concerns of cultural or identity harm (Munang AYAFOR, 2005).

It should however be noted that, coined with the idea of reducing socio-spatial disparities and promoting a harmonious national setting (Cameroon Tribune n°5438, 1993:3), President Ahidjo adopted a policy of '*regional balance*' (*équilibre régional*), via the Decree n°75/496 of July 3, 1975, which envisaged the distribution of places in the administration, and other schools, considering the "area of origin" of the citizens. This policy was applied and institutionalised by President Biya, when he came to power in 1982, via the Decree N° 82/407 of September 7, 1982 modifying that of July

1975, and that N° 2000/696/PM of September 13, 2000, fixing the modalities of ethno-regional distribution of places in the administration, and revising at the same time, the quotas between the ethnic groups and old former soldiers (Figure 1): (Center 15%, South 4%, Adamawa 5%, F.N 18%, N 7%, East. 7%, Littoral 12%, N.W 12%, West 13%, S.W 8 %...). The policy of regional balance, appeared to be at the heart of the Unitary State, and determined that access to the socio-political, and/ or, administrative and economic positions should be conditioned by a socio-cultural, or identity equation. This policy was a mechanism to mitigate the complex geo-cultural and geo-spatial nature of the country, with regards to the existence of minorities (autochthones and Anglophones) whose rights were recognised in the January 1996 revised constitution.





Figure 1: Ethno-regional distribution of places in the administration and important schools (PM Decree 2000)

The application of this policy has been catastrophic (Figure 2), a situation that inevitably led to an increase in the demand for societal integration with the result being the socio-spatial identity claims which aggravates the population's resentment against other groups.

With such a feeling, combined with the situation of regional socio-economic and political disparities, as well as poverty, (though the South West region has a poverty rate of 18% against 38% at national level, the North West region figures among the regions with a high level of poverty, 55% in 2014), (GPS-SHaSA, 2014), the problem of securing socio-spatial identity has been aggravating to the Anglophone problem or *dilemma* (Caxton, 2017). However, the reference cases of Anglophone under-representation are also in strategic positions of government and a somewhat exclusion from other administrative positions, like in the case of the judicial corps. There are some issues of representation and the recruitment of legal personnel, with regards to data from the Minister of Justice, Laurent Easo who mentioned that, out of the 1 542 active magistrates at the Ministry, 1 265 magistrates are French-speaking, and 227 are English-speaking, making 3.2% (Republic of Cameroon, 2016). 499 out of the 514 judicial officers in Cameroon are Francophones, and 15 are Anglophones. Of the 128 magistrates practicing in the North West region, 67 (52.3 %) are French speaking with a civil law background. Of the 97 magistrates in the legal services, 64 (65.9%) are Francophones and 33 are Anglophones. Of the 27 magistrates in the legal services in Bamenda, 21 are Francophones (77.8 %), and 6 are Anglophones (Caxton 2017). The same tendency is observed in the South West region, where, of 89 magistrates in the legal department in the SW, 54 are Francophones, ie about 61%. Of the 28 magistrates in the legal department in Buea, 20 are Francophones (71.4 %), and of the 30 new bailiffs appointed in January 2014, 28 are Francophones (93.2 %), and 2 are Anglophones.



Source: *The Authors, build from official sources*

The figure highlights the disparity in administrative representation among the two macro-identities in Cameroon. Specifically, it clearly illustrates the domination of the Francophone community in Cameroon's public administration. Despite being one of the two official languages in the country, Anglophones hold a disproportionately small number of administrative roles. This socio-spatial imbalance contributes to feelings of exclusion and fuels long-standing grievances, which have been at the heart of not only, the Anglophone dilemma, but also, the resurgence of the recent crisis. The figure therefore underscores a key issue in the political and institutional inequality that continues to challenge national unity and stability in Cameroon.

B- Socio-spatial Disparities and the Projection of Identity Politics in Deepening the Crisis

The Anglophone predicament in Cameroon, underpinned by historical grievances and perceptions of systemic marginalization as previously mentioned, has been sharply intensified by the government's security apparatus since 2016. The deployment of security personnel and the consolidation of power have inflamed tensions, resulting in widespread unrest and conflict in the Northwest and Southwest regions. In this context, the state's security strategies have considerably aggravated the Anglophone conflict, considering historical context, specific incidents, and the broader ramifications of such approaches.

The resurgence of the Anglophone struggle in the late 1970s and early 1980s fundamentally shaped perceptions of security practices in Cameroon. This movement, rooted in the Anglophone regions, showcased a genuine desire to secede a part of the national territory and establish a sovereign state (Fonchingong, 2013). Since its independence, Cameroon's security policy, characterized by the state's monopolistic posture, has been articulated through public security initiatives in both conception and execution. The government's response to Anglophone grievances has predominantly entailed militarization and the deployment of security forces. In late 2016, peaceful protests by lawyers and teachers in the Anglophone regions were met with excessive force. The protesters opposed the appointment of Francophone judges and teachers in Anglophone courts and schools, seeing it as an existential threat to their common law system and educational heritage. The state's heavy-handed response, which included the use of live ammunition and mass arrests, substantially escalated tensions. Reports indicate that security forces have engaged in unlawful killings, arbitrary arrests, and the burning of villages. For instance, Amnesty International documented cases where security operations resulted in the destruction of property and civilian fatalities. Such actions have not only violated human rights but also deepened the mistrust between the Anglophone community and the central government (Amnesty International, 2023). The aim is to maximize the political center's domination over the periphery. Consequently, the development

of public security policy has been constructed through the nation-building process, aimed at suppressing what is deemed as ‘rebellion’ (Meyomesse, 2016). Broadly, nation-building in Cameroon involves policies geared towards rapid and effective assimilation of diverse peoples, particularly national minority groups (Boyce, 1999). This situation emerges directly from how Cameroon’s hegemonic security stance has been created and evolved.



Map 1: The Self-Declared Republic of Ambazonia

Source: Martin W. Lewis

A significant factor in expressing this security framework is the socio-spatial identity claims inherent in the Anglophone issue, which led to the creation of the Ambazonian state in 1985 (Map 1), reflecting discourses protesting the marginalization of Anglophones. The establishment of this state introduced specific challenges for national coexistence.

The inception of Ambazonia prompted the Cameroonian government to adopt and legitimize an authoritarian security stance, with a more compelling rationale not only to consider pro-Anglophone movements as ‘domestic enemies’ but also, more prominently, to reinforce legislative and strategic measures to quell the resistance (Piet Konings, 1997). This reflected an explicit concern for cultural homogeneity and socio-spatial uniformity (Fru Awasom, 2004) at the expense of existing cultural diversity and socio-spatial disparity. In 1984, the official name of the country was changed from the “United Republic of Cameroon” to the “Republic of Cameroon,” (the former name of French Cameroon) the former name of French Cameroon. This “performance”¹ aimed to protect and consolidate territorial integrity, given that Anglophone secessionism posed a significant threat to state identity. The state’s emphasis on a centralized national identity, often enforced through security measures, has marginalized Anglophone cultural expressions. Policies promoting the French language and Francophone traditions in official capacities have been perceived as attempts to assimilate or erase Anglophone identity. This cultural suppression, paired with economic neglect, has fuelled feelings of second-class citizenship among Anglophones.

However, the security approach to the Anglophone crisis has had profound implications for civil liberties. The presence of security forces has led to restrictions on movement, assembly, and expression. Educational institutions have been targeted, with schools being closed or destroyed,

¹ ‘Performance’ is a concept that refers, according to Simon Clark, to the conscious effort of individuals to project a given image of them in the society and make people take this image for granted. See Simon CLARKE, “Culture and Identity”, *The Sage handbook of Cultural Analysis*, 2008.

depriving thousands of children of their right to education. Furthermore, the conflict has resulted in significant internal displacement, with many fleeing their homes to escape violence.

Globally, the spread of the Anglophone protest since the 2016 episode has elevated identity claims to a major security issue in Cameroon, alongside Boko Haram's aggression in the northern part of the country. The Anglophone problem is among the priority issues in national politics as reported by official discourses, indicating that the situation has become one of the country's leading hotspots. Incidents reported include administrative authorities being kidnapped, convoys attacked by gunmen, and the increasing use of improvised explosive devices. This transformation of the socio-spatial identity struggle into semi-terrorism has become a major concern for the central government, significantly impacting socio-political and security domains.

II- The Security Approach as a Catalyst in Intensifying Conflict: Conflicting Political Objectives, Violence, and Routes to Sustainable Peace and Security

In changing from a Federal to a Unitary State in 1972, the Cameroonian leaders have endeavoured to culturally integrate and construct a national identity from the states inherited English and French identities at the onset of political independence (Eyoh, 2007). This process, characterized as the evolving socio-historical endeavour whereby, the Cameroonian authorities' cultivation and/or promotion of national consciousness, identity, unity, integration, and sovereignty, has fundamentally been seen by the Anglophones as a minority and its own identity project, and as a way undermine its authority within its resource rich region (Konings, and Nyamnjoh, 1999). This was marked by the 2015 All Anglophone Lawyers Conference, themed around preserving Anglophone identity, making the crisis to take a turning point in 2016 with the emergence of violent extremist clashes between separatist groups and the Cameroon government.

A- The Politicization of Security and Its Role on Conflict Escalation

The move from a crisis to an opened conflict is marked by the use of direct armed confrontation and *para-terrorist*² actions by both the state and the Ambazonian fighters stem from the inherent characteristics of nationalism. The conflict has resulted in a death of over 6,500 people, and the displacement of 584,000 others, with an additional 73,000 seeking refuge in Nigeria (International Crisis Group, 2024). As reported by the United Nations, 1.8 million inhabitants of the Anglophone regions' population of four million necessitate humanitarian assistance, while approximately 250,000 children are impacted by the cessation of schools due to the ongoing strife. This escalation into conflict was exacerbated by some key events. In effect, it was students, academics, and lawyers who propelled the nation into a novel stage of the Anglophone crisis in 2016, culminating in numerous Anglophone activists perceiving secession as the sole resolution. During the autumn of the same year, outbreaks advocating for bilingual reforms in the legal and educational frameworks of Cameroon encountered violent governmental reprisals. Military forces were dispatched to university campuses, where students fell victim to sexual assault, brutalization, and incarceration. Anglophone political entities and organizations faced prohibition, with their leaders massively detained. As Operation Ghost Town Resistance commenced, President Biya instigated an internet shutdown in the Anglophone territories. The nation's Rapid Intervention Battalions (BIR), notorious for their excessive force and substantiated human rights violations, were mobilized to the region, accompanied by army and gendarmerie units. Separatist militias emerged, ultimately proclaiming the establishment of a new Anglophone state by October 2017.


Essentially, this implies that there must be a singular nation within defined borders. This proclaimed Anglophone States endeavour, aims to homogenize and essentialize the Anglophone identity, making any other identities a potential threat to this standardized identity. Consequently,

² Activities that are not explicitly labeled as terrorism or directly classified as such, yet in practice serve the function of instilling fear or terror in the population.

citizenship status, along with its associated privileges and rights, is exclusive to individuals who conform to the conceptualized national identity, thereby laying the groundwork for nation-building and national identity policy.

Given this turbulent situation, the political and security implications at the national level increases, with the development of a variety of measures aiming at keeping a socio-political stable, secured, and saved environment. This objective has then appeared to be vital not only for the survival of the state, but also of the 'national unity', allowing the government to enhance its socio-political and security architecture. On January 23, 2017, a *National Commission on the Promotion of Bilingualism and Multiculturalism* was created, with the principal mission of managing the identity complexity in Cameroon, beside the detention of some pro-anglophone leaders and activists.

The government also reformed the judiciary and educational sectors, which aim was to increase inclusion of the Anglophone Cameroonians in those institutions. At the time when the Anglophone crisis appears to be a serious threat to the national security³, the President of the republic decided to sign a decree on February 21, 2018, to reorganize the territorial military command of the defense and security forces. The aim of this measure was to create a fifth (5th) joint military region, with the headquarters in Bamenda, the regional capital of the North-west region which appears to be the epicenter of the Anglophone crisis (*map 2*). The territorial competence of this new military region covers the North-west and West regions. The region has then been flooded by defence and security forces. Their presence however, created an atmosphere of fear and uncertainty on the population.



Map 2: The (Re)Organization of the territorial military command posts

Source: The Authors

The map illustrates the new territorial military command designed to reorganize the combat and training of the defense and security forces. This includes the establishment of the 21st and 51st Motorized Infantry Brigades, the creation and organization of external military health services, the air force, regional firefighting units, and the national gendarmerie's traffic management division. The strategic objective is to bring the command post closer to the operational field in the fight against radical activism led by pro-secessionist groups advocating for the independence of

³ During his inauguration speech, delivered at the National Assembly Palace on 6 November 2018, the re-elected Cameroonian Head of State, President Paul Biya, issued an ultimatum to the separatists who have been carrying out violence in the northwest and southwest, the two Anglophone regions, for more than a year. "To these war entrepreneurs, who are undermining our national unity and advocating secession, they must know that they will face not only the rigor of the law, but also the determination of our defence and security forces."

Cameroon's English-speaking regions. Notably, Bamenda now hosts a joint military and gendarmerie regional command post. As a reminder, the last reorganization of the territorial military command occurred in 2014, establishing a fourth joint military region in the Far North to efficiently combat and eradicate Boko Haram's terrorist threat.

The resurgence of the Anglophone issue in 2016 swiftly made this region appear hazardous, posing a potential threat to national unity. Since 2016, the state's endeavour to protect *territorial integrity* has intensified, beyond community and identity clashes or Anglophone secessionism. President Paul BIYA emphasized in his 2016 end-of-year speech that Cameroonian citizens have the right to express their opinions on any national life aspect, including peaceful protests declared in accordance with the law, a fundamental right as enshrined in the Constitution. However, he noted that some individuals misuse this freedom to commit violent acts and challenge national unity. The Minister of Communication, Issa TCHIROMA, labeled this struggle as "*terrorism*" and further highlighted that the state was under attack by a terrorist organization. This concept of 'securitization' arises not as an objective reality but as a result of a particular political process, including 'discourse,' where threats are framed and recognized. From a critical geopolitical perspective, politics involves generating images, symbols, and values of the place, which has led to the politicization of the Anglophone issue and its portrayal as a threat to national security, unity, or territorial integrity. Rather than prioritizing and highlighting diplomatic solutions to address the crisis, central authorities frequently resort to coercive tactics to suppress protests (Pommerolle and Heungoup 2017:532). In 2017, arbitrary arrests of activists led to incarcerations, undermining dialogue efforts to resolve the conflict.

However, the situation seems more influenced by the special security measures deployed by the Cameroonian government, which are contested, rather than an outright rejection of the nation-building project itself. This security-focused approach may have encouraged the emergence of groups advocating for Anglophone rights through various radical means, possibly intensifying demands for secession or exacerbating the issue, with violence becoming more pronounced. Reports indicate that several armed separatist groups, like the Ambazonia Recognition Collaboration Council (ARCC), have formed umbrella organizations, claiming thousands of fighters (Matfess, 2018). Actions by armed separatist groups have continued to escalate.

B- Rethinking Security Policy in Cameroon: Toward Inclusive and Sustainable Peacebuilding Approaches

The security approach mobilised to addressing the Anglophone crisis in Cameroon is revealing a larger regional security policy issue, where efforts at constructing postcolonial African nation-states have constantly been crisis-ridden with identity-based claims, marginalization, and governance shortcomings. Most countries in the Africa have witnessed either intra or inter-state conflicts, perversity of mutual distrust and lack of confidence, poor political coordination and even dependence syndrome. Using survival analysis, Sanghamitra, and Elliott Green (2013) show evidence of a significant relationship between the proximity of the implementation of nation-building policies and the onset of civil war in modern Africa. The transformation of the Anglophone conflict into a low-intensity insurgency with para-terrorist characteristics highlights a correlation between the nation-building policy, ranging from the changing the name and nature of the state to the politicization and the introduction of enforced military mobilisation and the rise of the Anglophone conflict in Cameroon. The securitization of identity-based demands has resulted in a vicious cycle where coercion exacerbates resistance and erodes trust in state institutions. Central to this crisis is a deeply entrenched security culture rooted in postcolonial governance traditions. The prevailing security culture in Cameroon derives significant influence from the national unity doctrine embedded in the 1996 Constitution (art 1 (2)), asserting that ("*Cameroon shall be one and indivisible...*"). While this constitutional disposition, used as a political slogan serves as a symbolically

cohesive purpose, it simultaneously operates as an ideological limitation that interprets any expressions of regional or identity-focused autonomy as a menace to the integrity of the State. Within this framework, security aligns more closely with the preservation of the regime than with the safeguarding of citizens or the strengthening of societal resilience (Fanso, 1999; Achankeng, 2014).

This security model reflects what Barry Buzan et al., (1998) describe as a state-centric model of securitization, where the survival of the state takes precedence over societal well-being. In Cameroon, the extensive reliance on the political, and military aspects of security, with little corresponding investments in socio-economic inclusion, or equity, has contributed in exacerbating the crisis. As Smouts and Badie (1992) explain, culture, especially security culture, functions as a set of shared representations and norms. Here, the dominant ideology equates unity with uniformity and dissent with disloyalty. As posited by the Securitization Theory of Barry Buzan et al. (1998), the characterization of an issue as an existential threat justifies the employment of extraordinary measures. In the case of Cameroon, the deployment of specialized units such as the BIR (Bataillon d'Intervention Rapide) in the Anglophone regions (notably in Bamenda and Buea) since 2017, along with the increased arrests under anti-terrorism Law (Law No. 2014/028), illustrates a trend of repression rather than engagement. Civil society organizations, including International Crisis Group (2024) and Amnesty International (2019), have consistently documented incidents of arbitrary detentions, widespread displacement, and extrajudicial executions.

Cameroon's security policy is thus, characterized by centralised and reinforced security-oriented approach. Academics such as Mbembe (2001) and Yenshu Vubo (2006) emphasize that the centralized authority, rooted in the French administrative tradition results in systemic marginalization of outlying areas. The Anglophone regions, shaped historically by British colonial influences have persistently raised issues regarding inadequate representation, linguistic exclusion, and economic neglect (Anchimbe, 2013; Awasom, 2004).

The incomplete execution of decentralization reforms, as pledged in the 1996 Constitution and reiterated in Law No. 2019/024 of 24 December 2019 on the General Code of Decentralized Territorial Communities, exacerbates dissatisfaction. The special status conferred upon the North West and South West regions under this legislation remains largely symbolic, lacking the financial independence or administrative flexibility required to address local needs (Konings & Nyamnjoh, 2003).

The current predominant perspective of security, which is centred around the state, must evolve into one where human security is the focal point, as suggested by the UNDP in 1994 and expanded upon by Jarvis & Holland in 2015. This notion redefines the subject of security, moving from protecting the state to safeguarding individuals, emphasizing liberation from fear and want, and the preservation of human dignity. Empirical evidence from successful peacebuilding scenarios, such as Sierra Leone's post-conflict reintegration initiatives and Rwanda's community-driven justice approach (Gacaca) accompanied by decentralization efforts, underscores the significance of integrating inclusive governance with the stabilization of security (Autesserre, 2010). These instances provide instructive comparative insights for Cameroon.

However, a reconceptualized security strategy must be comprehensive and rooted in good governance, devolution, and development equity. This strategy encompasses (1) effective Decentralization Execution, that consist of delegating significant powers to local councils and regional authorities, including financial independence and local law enforcement jurisdiction (Fombad, C. & Steytler, Nico , 2019; Ngoh, 1996). It also includes (2) dialogue-oriented conflict resolution approach, which consist of institutionalising inclusive and sustainable dialogue platforms beyond elite-level discussions, engaging civil society, traditional leaders, and the diaspora (International Crisis Group, 2017). Aspects of (3) Security Sector Reformation (SSR) consisting at transition from coercive measures to protective roles, and incorporating community policing, human rights education, and conflict sensitivity into the operational practices of police,

gendarmerie, and military units (Amnesty International, 2021) are needed. (4) Addressing socio-spatial inequities, that confront underlying causes of dissatisfaction by ensuring equitable investment in infrastructure, access to education, and employment opportunities in perceived marginalized areas (Eyoh, 1998; Konnings, 2004). (5) Institutionalizing Human Security principles by integrating preventive diplomacy, early warning measures, and inclusive development agendas into the national security framework. This needs to shift the focus from managing threats to reducing risks and enhancing resilience.

The Anglophone crisis, and other implicit identity tensions like the “*Bamileke problem*,” “*North problem*,” and “*Pygmy issue*”, highlight the limitations of the security policy in Cameroon. The state should embrace pluralism, viewing identity not as a threat but as an asset for deepening democracy and fostering social harmony. Charles Ateba Eyene (2006) cautioned in “*Les paradoxes du pays organisateur*”⁴ that failing to accept diverse voices within the national conversation will lead to alienation. Only through institutional reforms that validate differences and a security culture respectful of human rights can Cameroon pave the way for sustainable peace and stability in Cameroon.

Conclusions

The Anglophone problem in Cameroon appears to be an indispensable tool for describing and identifying the security dimension of the socio-spatial identity struggles in the country, and the dynamics of para-terrorists movements on the African continent. The security policy related to these struggles is coined on the one hand by the geo-historical and socio-historical processes, inherent to the production of commonly shared ideologies of identity. It is also derived from the (re)production of a militaristic strategic security related to the global doctrine of the fight against terrorism and para-terrorism. The critical reading of the security culture with regards to the Anglophone problem allows us to see not only the role of values, ideas and representations in the habit of the government within the national identity project, but also, to better acknowledge the particularity of its security paradigm. This study is not preoccupied with the social cleavages of various kinds, but on the explicit assessment of socio-spatial identity claims, and cleavages, and the policy responses, as well as its implications on the security macrocosm of the country, as a para-terrorist movement. However, territorial identity is at the center of cleavages, which shows that the national identity is a far-fetch outcome, though socio-spatial integration is not an unlikely scenario in Cameroon. But it has been going hand to hand with the formation of an identity ruling class that includes representations from ethnic parts of the country, creating discontentment and feelings of disintegration, or the “self vs. the other”. This situation clearly indicates that, Cameroon, just like other Sub-Saharan African states have not sufficiently integrated the new paradigm of security, making it to still focus on the dominant discourse. If since its independence, the government has adopted a security culture that permits to ensure the resilience and stability of the political regime, it is urgent to think about a new security culture that will less expose the population to insecurity and will contribute to remove fear among them. The recent years have seen the creation of *ad hoc* security mechanisms, designed to suppress the contextual threat, rather than long term human security measures. Our approach thus proposes to develop actions capable of reconciling the interests of the government and that of the population, in terms of security. This will pass through the establishment of institutions needed by the state to manage developmental problems and the public security action. The aim is to better manage socio-spatial identity disparities, which, via the spectre of the Anglophone problem, have proven to be potent threats to the Westphalian system,

⁴ In his book published in 2008, it shows how the populations found in the region of the president of the Republic (South) face problems and mistakes of the political elites and stagnate, like other Cameroonians on poverty; a situation unfortunately badly perceived by other citizens who think that they are being favoured and protected by the regime. See Charles ATEBA EYENE, *Les paradoxes du pays organisateur, élites productrices ou prédatrices : le cas de la province du Sud à l'ère Biya (1982-2007)*, Yaounde, Saint-Paul, 2008.

with regards to the self-reliant development of para-terrorism. Some have executed remarkable projects such as the rehabilitation of roads, pipe-borne water supply, community halls, support to health centres, scholarship schemes etc. The Cameroonian government, however, could use the different identity struggles as an opportunity to rethink the paradigm guiding the nation-building security policy.

Funding

This study received no specific financial support.

Competing interests

The author declares that she has no competing interests.

References

- Achankeng, F. (2014). Conflict and Conflict Resolution in Africa: Engaging the Colonial Factor. *African Journal on Conflict Resolution*.
- Africa Center for Strategic Studies. (2024, December 17). *Africa's 2024 Security Trends in 10 Graphics*. Washington, DC.
- Agwanda, B. (2021). The Anglophone problem in Cameroon. The change from crisis to conflict, and a possible way forward to resolution. *African Journal on Conflict Resolution*, 21(1).
- Agwanda, Billy and Uğur, Yasin Asal. (N.D). *The Anglophone problem in Cameroon: The change from crisis to conflict, and a possible way forward to resolution*. Available from: <https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://www.humiliationstudies.org/documents/AgwandaTheAnglophoneproblemInCameroon.pdf&ved=2ahUKEwidptXgqpGMAxU1wvACHXomJTOQFnoECEwQAQ&usg=AOvVaw3JT1wFatqgvRNArN1FV8AS>
- Amnesty International. (2019). *Human Rights Violations in the Anglophone Regions of Cameroon*.
- Amnesty International. (2023). *Human Rights Violations in Cameroon's Anglophone North-West Region*. Amnesty International.
- Amnesty International. (s.d.). Available from: https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/research/2023/06/human-rights-violations-in-camerouns-anglophone-north-west-region/?utm_source=chatgpt.com.
- Anchimbe, Eric A. (2010). "The place of the English language in the construction of a Cameroon Anglophone identity". *TRANS*.
- Anchimbe, E. A. (2005). "Multilingual backgrounds and the identity issues in Cameroon". *ASJU*, pp.33-48. Available from: <http://www.ehu.es/ojs/index.php/asju>
- Anchimbe, E. A. (2013). *Language Policy and Identity Construction: The dynamics of Cameroon's multilingualism*. Amsterdam, John Benjamins Publishing Company. <https://doi.org/10.1075/impact.32>
- AU. (2015). *Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want*. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: AU Commission.
- Autesserre, S. (2010). *The Trouble with the Congo. Local Violence and the Failure of International Peacebuilding*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, (Cambridge Studies in International Relations).
- Awasom, N. F. (2004). "Autochthonization Politics and the Invention of the Crisis of Citizenship in Cameroon", *The Leadership Challenge in Africa*.
- Ayafor, I. M. (2005). "Official Bilingualism in Cameroon: Instrumental or Integrative Policy?". *Proceedi of the 4th International Symposium on Bilingualism*, pp.123-142.
- Baneth-Nouailhetas, E. (2010). "Anglophonie-francophonie:un rapport postcolonial?". *Langue francaise*, 167, pp.73-94.

- Bang, Henry Ngenyam and Balgah, Roland Azibo. (2022). The ramification of Cameroon's Anglophone crisis: conceptual analysis of a looming "Complex Disaster Emergency". *Journal of International Humanitarian Action*, pp.1-25. <https://doi.org/10.1186/s41018-022-00114-1>
- Bayart, J. F. (1997). *L'Etat au Cameroun*. Paris: Presses de la fondation national des sciences politiques.
- Berman, B. D. (2004). *Ethnicity and Democracy in Africa*, Oxford: Oxford: James Currey and Athens: Ohio University Press.
- Buzan, B., Wæver, O., & de Wilde, J. (1998). *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*. Lynne Rienner.
- Caxton, A. S. (2017). The Anglophone dilemma in Cameroon: The need for comprehensive dialogue and reform. *Conflict Trends*, 2, pp. 18–26.
- Collier, P., & Gunning, J. W. (1999). Why Has Africa Grown Slowly? *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 13(3), pp.3–22.
- Dinka, F. G. (1985, March 20). *The New Social Order*.
- Dmitry Zamyatin. (2014). "Co-spatiality, Territorial Identity and Place: To the Comprehension of Postmodern Politics". *Institute of Geopolitics, Czestochowa*, pp.37-66.
- Ebolo, E. E. (2012). "Sovereignty in the Making: The Case of the Anglophone Cameroon", *Conference Paper*, (p. 28p).
- Ekpebisong, E. T. (s.d.). "The Federal Solution versus nationalist consciousness: A neo-fundamental national question in Cameroon". pp.1-27.
- Eyoh, B. B. (2004). *Ethnicity and Democracy in Africa*. Ohio: Ohio University Press.
- Eyoh, D. (2007). "Conflicting Narratives of Anglophone Protest and the Politics of Identity in Cameroon". *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 16(2), 108, 109.
- Fabio Pollice. (s.d.). "The role of territorial identity in local development processes". *University of Naples*, pp.107-117.
- Fanso, V. G. (1999, April). "Anglophone and Francophone Nationalisms in Cameroon". *The Round Table*, pp. 281-296. Available from : https://www.africabib.org/query_a.php?pe=!831445963!&SR=3
- Fombad, C. & Steytler, Nico. (2019). *Decentralization and Constitutionalism in Africa*. Oxford: Stellenbosch Handbooks in African Constitutional Law.
- Fonchingong, T. (August 2013). "The quest for autonomy: The case of Anglophone Cameroon". *African Journal of Political Science and International Relations*, pp. 224-236.
- Forje, J. (1981). "The One and Indivisible Cameroon: Political Integration Socio-economic Development in a Fragmented Society". *Lund Political Studies*, 35.
- Gemandze, B. J. (2008). "Public discourse, governance and prospects for the nation-state project in Cameroon". *CODESRIA*, 1-21.
- Green, S. B. (2013). "Nation-Building and Conflict in Modern Africa". *Elsevier, the World Development*, 45.
- Herbst, J. (2000). *States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Human Rights Watch. (2024). *World Report. Cameroon Events of 2023*. New York: Human Right Watch.
- International Crisis Group. (2024). "Arrest of Separatist Leader Puts Spotlight on Cameroon's Anglophone Conflict". *International Crisis Group*.
- Jarvis, L., & Holland, J. (2015). *Security: A Critical Introduction*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Johnson, W. R. (1970). *The Cameroon Federation: political integration in a fragmentary society*. Princeton: Princeton Press.
- Kofele-Kale. (1980). *An African Experiment in Nation-Building: The Bilingual Cameroon Republic since Reunification*. Oxford: Westview Press, Ndiva, ed.

- Konnings P.J.J & Nyamnjoh F. B. (1997). The Anglophone Problem in Cameroon. *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 35(02), pp.207-229.
- Kymlicka, W. (2004). "Nation-Building & Minority Rights: Comparing Africa & the West". *Ohio University Press*, pp.54-71.
- Martin W. Lewis. (s.d.). "The Self-Declared Republic of Ambazonia". [Geocurrents.info/geopolitics/the-self-declared-republic-of-ambazonia](https://geocurrents.info/geopolitics/the-self-declared-republic-of-ambazonia).
- Mawhood, P. (1993). "Applying the French model in Cameroon". *African Institute of South Africa*, pp.189-210.
- Mbaku, J. a. (2004). *The Leadership Challenge in Africa: Cameroon under Paul Biya*. Trenton: Africa World Press.
- Mbembe, A. (2001). *On the Postcolony*. California: University of California Press.
- Meyer, A. (2015). *Preventing conflict in Central Africa ECCAS caught between ambitions, challenges and reality*. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies.
- Ndille, R. (2016). "English and French as official languages in Cameroon: The intentionality of colonial representations and the failure of a Cameroon-centric identity; 1884 and after". *European Journal of Language Studies*, 3(2), pp.17-34.
- Nfi, J. (2014). *The Reunification Debate in British Southern Cameroons: The Role of French Cameroon Immigrants*. Bamenda: Langaa, RPCIG.
- Ngoh, V. (1996). *History of Cameroon Since 1800*. Limbe: Limbe: Pressbook.
- Nyamnjoh, F. B. (1996). *The Cameroon G. C. E. Crisis: a test of anglophone solidarity*. Limbe: Limbe, Nooremac.
- Nyamnjoh, P. K. (2000). "Construction and Deconstruction: Anglophones or Autochtones?". *The African Anthropologist*, 7(1), pp. 1-34.
- Nyamnjoh, P. K. (1995). "President Paul Biya and the Anglophone problem in Cameroon". *The Journal of Modern Africa Studies*, 25, 207-229.
- Philip, M. (1993). ed) *Local Government in the Third World, Experience of Decentralization in tropical Africa*. Africa Institute of South Africa.
- Piet Konings, and Francis B. Nyamnjoh. (1999). *Negotiating an Anglophone Identity*. (Leiden: Koninklijke Brill, 2003), 109; Verkijika G. Faso, "Anglophone and Francophone Nationalisms in Cameroon." *The Round Table* 88, no. 350, 284.
- Post, T. G. (2014, May 17). N° 0109, *Messa Presse, Monday 17-23 May, May 2014, first published in 2001. Anglophone problem*. Yaounde.
- Sanghamitra Bandyopadhyay & Elliott Green. (2013). "Nation-Building and Conflict in Modern Africa". *ELSEVIER, World Development*, 45.
- Sechet R., V. V. (s.d.). *Penser et faire la géographie sociale. Contribution à une épistémologie de la géographie sociale*. Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes.
- Sindjoun, L. (1996). "Rente identitaire, politique d'affectation et crise de l'équilibre des tensions au Cameroun". *Politique Africaine*, 12.
- (s.d.). *The Local Government System in Cameroon, Country Profile 2017-18*. Available from : www.clgf.org.uk/cameroon.
- UN. (2015). *Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development*. New York, NY: UN Publications.
- Waever, O. (s.d.). "Securitization and Desecuritization". Ronnie D. Lipschutz.
- Yenshu Vubo, E. (2006). "Management of Ethnic Diversity in Cameroon against the Backdrop of Social Crises". *Cahiers d'études africaines*, pp.135-156.

EXPERIENCE OF US INTELLIGENCE SERVICES IN ASSESSING NATIONAL SECURITY THREATS TO IMPROVE THE EFFICIENCY OF THE NATIONAL THREAT AND RISK ASSESSMENT SYSTEM OF UKRAINE

Andrii Stroiev

PhD student, e-mail: andriyvolf683@gmail.com

Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, Kyiv, Ukraine

Received: June 10, 2025 | **Revised:** June 19, 2025 | **Accepted:** June 30, 2025

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.33445/psssj.2025.6.2.5>

Abstract

This article examines the experience of US intelligence services in the field of assessing national security threats and the possibility of its use in Ukraine. The place and role of US intelligence agencies in the system of detection and analysis of current threats are determined. It is clarified that in modern conditions, given Russia's armed aggression against Ukraine, the implementation of the best world approaches to threat assessment is extremely relevant. The normative documents, strategic approaches, and practical measures applied by the US intelligence community for the identification of dangers and assessment of national security risks are analyzed. Directions for the implementation of American experience to improve the efficiency of the national system of threat and risk assessment in Ukraine are proposed.

Key words: national security, threats, risk assessment, intelligence, special services, USA, experience, national resilience.

Introduction

An effective threat assessment system is a key factor in ensuring the national security of the state. The evolution of approaches to identification and analysis of security threats demonstrates that earlier efforts were focused on developing security strategies and concepts that recorded a list of current dangers. This state of affairs was explained by both objective and subjective factors, in particular, the periodic change of the geopolitical situation and the priorities of states' security policy. As a result, over the past decades, there has been a reassessment of threats and a revision of strategic documents in the USA, NATO, and European countries in order to take into account new challenges (terrorism after 2001, aggressive actions of the Russian Federation after 2014, cyber and information attacks, etc.). For example, the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland of 2020 comprehensively reflects the security environment, lists military, economic, energy, social, and climatic threats, and defines appropriate measures of state policy.

Today's security situation is characterized by the emergence of qualitatively new threats, which necessitates improving approaches to their assessment. As US President Joe Biden has repeatedly noted, the world has entered a period of acute strategic rivalry, comparable in scale to the beginning of the Cold War or the period after the September 11 attacks. The strengthening of China and the revanchism of Russia create serious geopolitical challenges, existential threats are growing (climate change, pandemics, etc.). At the same time, the technological revolution (microchips, artificial intelligence, quantum computing) is changing the nature of confrontation, providing opponents with new tools for conducting hybrid warfare. In such conditions, for effective counteraction to dangers, states must quickly adapt their national security and intelligence systems.

This is especially relevant for Ukraine, which, as a result of the military aggression of the Russian Federation, faces an unprecedented range of threats. Therefore, the relevance of the topic is determined by the need to implement the principles of proactive assessment of threats and risks, developed by leading special services of the world, as well as awareness of the urgency of strengthening the national system of early detection of dangers.

Research question

The problem of identifying and assessing national security threats has been considered in the works of both domestic and foreign researchers. The Strategy of National Security of Ukraine of 2015 and the Law of Ukraine “On National Security” of 2018 defined the basic terminology and general approaches to the formation of the national security system, including a list of the main threats. At the same time, experts noted the shortcomings of the previous regulatory approach – in particular, the fixation in legislation of a static list of threats, which does not correspond to the practice of NATO/EU and complicates timely response to changes in the situation. Certain aspects of countering threats are studied in the works of Ukrainian scientists: V. Lipkan analyzed the concept of the system of ensuring national security of Ukraine and the structure of security entities; O. Kuropyatnyk considered the nuclear factor in the confrontation between the USA and Russia in the context of the war in Ukraine; O. Novikova and O. Pankova compared the strategic security priorities of Ukraine and Poland. The Strategic Concept of NATO 2010 p. (Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of NATO, 2010) and the new National Security Strategy of Poland 2020 p. (Strategia Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej) emphasized the change in the nature of threats and the importance of resilience in the face of hybrid challenges. Some publications of the National Institute for Strategic Studies highlight the issue of risk assessment: in particular, an analytical report by O. Reznikova et al. (2020) summarizes the best world practices of national risk and threat assessment systems and proposes new opportunities for Ukraine (Reznikova, O.O., Voitovskyi, K.Ye., & Lepikhov, A.V., 2020). An important source is also the White Book of the Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine (2021), which contains an assessment of current external threats to the security of Ukraine and emphasizes the need to implement the experience of leading special services of the world in domestic intelligence activities.

An analysis of scientific sources shows that although many works have been devoted to the problems of national security and strategic planning (Abramov, V.I., Sytnyk, H.P., Smolianiuk, V.F., et al., 2016; Horbulin, V.P., & Kachynskyi, A.B., 2010), the issue of forming a holistic system of threat assessment remains unresolved. In particular, there are no comprehensive studies that would detail the practical experience of US intelligence services in assessing threats and the possibilities of its application for reforming the Ukrainian security system. Only in some publications, they need to adopt the best intelligence practices of the USA (Burns, V. Dzh., 2024; Reznikova, O.O., Voitovskyi, K.Ye., & Lepikhov, A.V., 2020) is mentioned indirectly. Thus, the unresolved part of the general problem, which this article is called upon to answer, is the consideration of the experience of the American intelligence community in building an effective national system of threat assessment in Ukraine.

The purpose of the article is to determine the place and role of the experience of the US intelligence services in the process of assessing national security threats, as well as to substantiate the expediency and ways of using this experience in the formation of a modern national security system of Ukraine. In accordance with the goal set in the article, the following tasks are solved: 1) to analyze the approaches, mechanisms and instruments used by US intelligence agencies to identify and assess threats; 2) to outline the practical results of the implementation of American experience in threat assessment (on the examples of the activities of the US intelligence community); 3) to offer

recommendations for the adaptation of US experience in domestic practice of ensuring national security.

Results and Discussion

Practice of threat assessment in the US national security system. The United States of America has a wide-ranging intelligence community (the so-called Intelligence Community, IC), which includes 18 departments and organizations responsible for collecting and analyzing information about threats to national security. The activities of the intelligence community are coordinated by the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), a position that was introduced in 2004 as part of reforms after the September 11 attacks. One of the key tasks of the DNI is to combine data from all special services and prepare integrated threat assessments for the country's leadership. Starting in 2006, the DNI office annually presents to the US Congress the National Threat Assessment (Annual Threat Assessment) – a declassified report that contains an overview of the most important risks and threats to the United States for the current period. In this high-level document, American intelligence reflects its assessment of priority threats – from enemy states and terrorist organizations to cyber-attacks, the spread of weapons of mass destruction, transnational crime, and, more recently, global challenges such as pandemics and climate change. Thus, the United States has introduced a regular mechanism for strategic monitoring of threats, which allows timely informing legislators and the public about the dynamics of the security environment and developing sound policy solutions.

An important feature of the American approach is the combination of long-term strategic analysis of threats with an operational response to current risks. In addition to annual assessments, National Intelligence Estimates are prepared in the US on key security issues, as well as quarterly and situational reports for senior management. Intelligence agencies use advanced methodologies of analysis, including structured analytical methods, scenario modeling, “red teaming” methods, etc., to reduce the likelihood of miscalculations and ensure comprehensive assessments. To determine intelligence priorities, the National Intelligence Program and the National Intelligence Priorities Framework are used, which are regularly updated to reflect changes in threats. Thus, the American system is built on a flexible response – threats are not fixed once and for all in regulatory acts but are constantly monitored and reviewed in the course of interagency cooperation.

Particular attention is paid by the United States to the creation of institutional mechanisms for integrated threat assessment. Along with the DNI office, an important role is played by interagency centers and structures, such as the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), the Cyber Threat Center, the Cyber Threat Intelligence Integration Center (CTIIC), and others. They are designed to combine data from various departments in specific areas and produce a unified assessment of threats in the relevant field. For example, the NCTC, established in 2004, provides a joint analysis of terrorist threats, combining the efforts of the CIA, FBI, NSA, and other agencies. Similarly, cyber security integration centers collect information about cyber-attacks and intelligence in the digital space to prevent large-scale cyber aggressions. The presence of such coordination structures is an important element of the US experience, which has proven its effectiveness in preventing terrorist attacks and cyber-attacks.

In addition to purely intelligence assessments, the “all-hazards” approach operates in the US, which covers the assessment of all types of dangers - both hostile actions and natural disasters or man-made disasters. In particular, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), together with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), has implemented the THIRA (Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment) methodology for systematically identifying threats and hazards and assessing risks at the national and local levels. The THIRA process is carried out according to a standardized methodology and includes the identification of a list of the most

complex threats, the assessment of their impact, and the available capacities for response. For example, as part of the national THIRA 2019 assessment, 59 possible threats and hazards were analyzed, targets were set for the necessary state capacities to respond to the worst-case scenarios, and gaps that need to be addressed were identified. THIRA results are used to plan emergency preparedness and resource allocation, i.e., they actually integrate threat assessment into the national security management process. This practice is interesting for Ukraine because it allows involving a wide range of actors in the assessment of threats – from federal agencies to local communities and the private sector – and obtaining a coordinated picture of national risks.

Thus, the US experience in the field of national security threat assessment can be summarized in several key points. First, this is institutional development and coordination: the presence of a central coordination body (DNI) and specialized interagency centers that ensure the exchange of information and joint analysis. Secondly, regularity and systematic assessment: the production of annual and periodic threat reports covering the entire range of challenges, with constant data updates. Third, methodological diversity and a scientific approach: the use of advanced analytical methods (including the use of large amounts of open data, the use of artificial intelligence for information processing), which increases the validity of forecasts. Fourth, proactivity and flexibility: American intelligence tries not only to respond to existing threats, but also to predict their appearance, carries out strategic warning. A vivid example is the introduction of the practice of “strategic declassification” – the targeted public disclosure of certain intelligence data to undermine the plans of the enemy and mobilize allies. This step, applied on the eve of a full-scale invasion of the Russian Federation in Ukraine in 2022, demonstrated the innovativeness of the thinking of the US intelligence community. Fifth, the complexity of the approach: threat assessment is considered an integral part of the formation of national security and defense policy. Intelligence reports directly influence the development of strategic documents (such as the National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy, etc.), which ensures the unity of threat analysis and practical actions of the state. The new US National Security Strategy of 2022, for example, emphasizes the concept of “integrated deterrence” and the need for interagency coordination to counter the entire spectrum of threats – from military to economic and climate.

Significance of US Experience for Ukraine and Recommendations for Implementation.

Given the current challenges facing Ukraine, the experience of American special services in assessing threats is extremely valuable. First, Ukraine should develop an integrated threat analysis system based on the US model. This involves creating a permanent interagency body (or improving existing structures of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine) to coordinate the activities of all intelligence entities for the detection and assessment of threats. In this context, it is useful to take into account the DNI model, which ensures the synthesis of information from military intelligence, external and internal (counterintelligence) intelligence in a single analytical center. Steps have already been taken in this direction in Ukrainian legislation: the Law “On Intelligence” (2020) has been adopted and a system of situational centers is being created under the National Security and Defense Council. However, it is necessary to move further – to the formation of a full-fledged national system of risk and threat assessment, which would function on a permanent basis, include all key departments of the security and defense sector, and also use the capabilities of scientific institutions and the expert community.

Secondly, it is worth introducing the regular practice of public reports on threats, following the example of the DNI’s Annual Threat Assessment. There is already a positive precedent in Ukraine – the White Paper of the Foreign Intelligence Service, which presents an assessment of external threats and challenges to the security of the state. It is advisable to institutionalize such a practice and expand it: to prepare an agreed National Report (report) on threats to national security with open and closed parts, to present it annually to the parliament and the public. This will increase the

transparency of the security sector, public trust and the quality of public administration, because decisions will be made on the basis of clear analytical assessments.

Thirdly, Ukraine should adopt US methodological approaches to risk assessment, adapting them to its own conditions. In particular, it is worth testing the THIRA methodology at the national level: to identify a list of probable threats (military, terrorist, cyber, natural and man-made), to assess their potential consequences for the country and the state's ability to counter each threat. Such a comprehensive review would allow identifying the most critical gaps in preparedness (for example, insufficient air defense against missile threats, vulnerability of the energy system, lack of cyber specialists, etc.) and would contribute to prioritizing resources for their elimination. In addition, the application of the methodology at the level of regions and communities (with the support of the State Emergency Service and other services) would increase the overall resilience of the country to emergencies.

Fourth, it is necessary to invest in the development of the analytical potential of the intelligence agencies of Ukraine. US experience shows that the quality of threat assessment depends on the professionalism of analysts and access to modern data processing technologies. Therefore, it is advisable to introduce into the training programs for security sector specialists the best Western practices of intelligence analysis, to develop specialized courses (on intelligence analysis, forecasting, work with big data, etc.). In parallel – to equip analytical units with software products for data analysis, artificial intelligence systems, platforms for information exchange between departments. As CIA Director V. Burns notes, for the successful work of intelligence in the XXI century. It is necessary to combine traditional skills with new technologies, in particular, to provide analysts with tools based on artificial intelligence for processing colossal amounts of open and secret information. Ukrainian special services should adopt this approach, especially since the amount of intelligence data in modern warfare (satellite images, interceptions, OSINT, etc.) is extremely large.

Fifth, it is critically important to strengthen international intelligence cooperation and information sharing. The United States actively practices "intelligence diplomacy", that is, the interaction of intelligence services with allies for a common understanding of threats. Ukraine is already experiencing the benefits of such cooperation in the form of the exchange of intelligence data with partners in NATO in the course of countering Russian aggression. It is advisable to develop this cooperation further, to participate in joint projects on threat assessment (for example, regional security reviews of the Black Sea region, cyber exercises, anti-terrorism data centers, etc.). This will allow not only to obtain current information, but also to adopt methods and standards of threat assessment adopted in NATO countries.

In general, the implementation of US experience will require complex changes in the national security system – from normative-legal improvement (consolidation of strategic threat assessment procedures in doctrinal documents) to organizational reform of intelligence structures and training of personnel. However, such changes are necessary, given the unprecedented challenges facing Ukraine. As noted in the analytical report of the NISS (2020), the integration of the best world practices of risk assessment opens up new opportunities for enhancing the national security of Ukraine. Therefore, the experience of the US intelligence services should become one of the cornerstones in building a modern effective system of threat assessment and early warning in our state.

Conclusions

Based on the analysis, a number of conclusions can be drawn. First, the experience of the US special services in assessing national security threats demonstrates the high efficiency of an integrated, proactive, and scientifically sound approach to identifying dangers. The US intelligence community has developed a holistic system of strategic threat assessment, which includes regular analytical

products (annual assessments, thematic reports), interagency coordination, and the use of modern data analysis technologies. Secondly, for Ukraine, which is resisting military aggression and hybrid threats from the Russian Federation, the implementation of this experience is a necessary and important component of strengthening national security. The formation of an effective system of threat and risk assessment is one of the priority directions for increasing the defense capability and resilience of the state. Thirdly, the adaptation of the American experience should take into account domestic realities: political will and interagency cooperation are needed to create a unified platform for threat analysis, to improve the legislative framework, to develop the personnel potential of intelligence and to establish closer cooperation with partners. The implementation of these steps will ensure Ukraine's ability to respond in a timely and adequate manner to the entire spectrum of modern challenges, prevent crises, and effectively neutralize threats to national security.

Prospects for Further Research. Prospects for further intelligence in this direction include a deeper study of the practical aspects of implementing Western methods of threat assessment in the activities of Ukrainian special services. In particular, the issue of adapting the THIRA methodology and other risk assessment approaches to the national regulatory framework and the structure of the security sector needs to be studied. An interesting direction is also the analysis of the experience of other states (for example, members of NATO, Israel) in building early threat detection systems – in order to identify universal solutions and potential challenges in their implementation in Ukraine. Further research may be aimed at developing practical recommendations for creating an interagency center for threat assessment in Ukraine, developing a national system of indicators and markers of dangers, as well as integrating intelligence and analytical tools with partners for collective security. All these areas will be important for increasing the preparedness and resilience of Ukraine in the face of dynamic security challenges.

Funding

This study received no specific financial support.

Competing interests

The author declares that she has no competing interests.

References

- Abramov, V.I., Sytnyk, H.P., Smolianiuk, V.F., et al. (2016). *Hlobalna ta natsionalna bezpeka* [Global and national security] / Edited by H.P. Sytnyk. Kyiv, NADU. 784 p.
- Aleksandrov, O. (2015). Nova Stratehiia natsionalnoi bezpeky Polshchi – vidpovid na yevropeiski vyklyky ta zahrozy s'ьогодення [New National Security Strategy of Poland – a response to European challenges and threats of today]. *Stratehichni priorityty*, 1(34), 131–138.
- Bila knyha. Sluzhba zovnishnoi rozvidky Ukrainy* [White Paper. Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine]. (2021). Kyiv, SZRU. 72 p. Available at: <https://szru.gov.ua/download/white-book/WB-2021.pdf>.
- Burns, V. Dzh. (2024). Shpyhunstvo ta derzhavne upravlinnia: transformatsiia TsRU v epokhu konkurentsii [Espionage and Public Administration: The Transformation of the CIA in an Era of Competition]. National Institute for Strategic Studies, 27.02.2024. Available at: <https://niss.gov.ua/news/statti/shpyhunstvo-ta-derzhavne-upravlinnya-transformatsiya-tsru-v-epokhu-konkurentsii>.
- Horbulin, V.P., & Kachynskiy, A.B. (2010). *Stratehichne planuvannia: vyrishennia problem natsionalnoi bezpeky* [Strategic planning: solving national security problems]. Kyiv, NISS. 288 p.

- Kachynskiy, A.B. (2013). *Indykatory natsionalnoi bezpeky: vyznachennia ta zastosuvannia yikh hranychnykh znachen* [Indicators of national security: definition and application of their limit values]: monograph. Kyiv, NISS. 232 p.
- Kolodii, A. (2004). Natsionalna yednist i patriotism yak chynnyky natsionalnoi bezpeky [National unity and patriotism as factors of national security]. *Natsionalna bezpeka Ukrainy: Zbirnyk materialiv konferentsii ukrainskykh vypusknikov prohram naukovoho stazhuvannia u SSHA*, 25–30.
- Kormych, L.I. (2021). *Harantii natsionalnoi bezpeky Ukrainy v yevropeiskomu konteksti* [Guarantees of national security of Ukraine in the European context]. National Institute for Strategic Studies. Available at: <https://niss.gov.ua/doslidzhennya/mizhnarodni-vidnosyny/garantiyi-natsionalnoi-bezpeki-ukrainy-v-ievropejskomu-konteksti>.
- Kuropiatnyk, O. (2015). Eskalatsiia yadernoho protystoiannia SSHA ta Rosii u konteksti rosiisko-ukrainskoi viiny: dopovid [Escalation of nuclear confrontation between the USA and Russia in the context of the Russian-Ukrainian war: report]. Kyiv, Maidan of Foreign Affairs, June 2015. 41 p.
- On Intelligence: Law of Ukraine of 17.09.2020 No. 912-IX. *Vidomosti Verkhovnoi Rady*, 5 (2021).
- On National Security of Ukraine: Law of Ukraine of 21.06.2018 No. 2469-VIII (as amended by Law No. 2849-IX of 13.12.2022). Available at: <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2469-19#Text>.
- Lipkan, V.A. (2003). Poniattya systemy zabezpechennia natsionalnoi bezpeky Ukrainy [The concept of the national security system of Ukraine]. *Pravo i Bezpeka*, 2(4), 84–89. Available at: http://nbuv.gov.ua/UJRN/Pib_2003_2_4_14.
- Mizhnarodni vidnosyny ta polityka Ukrainy* [International relations and politics of Ukraine] (collection of materials of NUOU named after I. Chernyakhovsky). (2020). Kyiv. 256 p.
- National Security Strategy of Ukraine, approved by Decree of the President of Ukraine No. 287/2015 of May 26, 2015. Available at: <https://www.president.gov.ua/documents/2872015-19070>.
- Natsionalna systema identyfikatsii zahroz i nebezpek ta otsinky ryzykiv (THIRA): ohliad ta metodolohiia [National Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment (THIRA): overview and methodology]. NISS, 25.07.2019. Available at: <https://cip.gov.ua/services/cm/api/attachment/download?id=60358> (pdf).
- Novikova, O., & Pankova, O. (2021). Osoblyvosti formuvannia ta realizatsii stratehichnykh priorytetiv zabezpechennia bezpeky ta rozvytku Ukrainy i Respubliky Polshcha [Features of the Formation and Implementation of Strategic Priorities for Ensuring the Security and Development of Ukraine and the Republic of Poland]. *Ekonomika – Upravlinnia – Innovatsii*, 2, 127–136. Available at: <https://dspace.uni.lodz.pl/xmlui/handle/11089/41922>.
- Reznikova, O.O. (2013). Mizhnarodne bezpekove seredovyshe: vyklyky i zahrozy natsionalnii bezpetsi Ukrainy [International Security Environment: Challenges and Threats to National Security of Ukraine]. Kyiv, NUOU. 56 p.
- Reznikova, O.O. (2018). Zabezpechennia natsionalnoi bezpeky i natsionalnoi stiikosti: spilni rysy i vidminnosti [Ensuring national security and national resilience: common features and differences]. *Visnyk Lvivskoho universytetu. Serii filosofsko-politolohichni studii*, 19, 170–175.
- Reznikova, O.O. (2022). *Stratehichniy analiz bezpekovoho seredovyscha Ukrainy* [Strategic analysis of the security environment of Ukraine]. National Institute for Strategic Studies, 14.01.2022. Available at: <https://niss.gov.ua/news/statti/stratehichnyy-analiz-bezpekovoho-seredovyscha-ukrayiny>.
- Reznikova, O.O., Voitovskiy, K.Ye., & Lepikhov, A.V. (2020). *Natsionalni systemy otsiniuvannia ryzykiv i zahroz: krashchi svitovi praktyky, novi mozhlyvosti dlia Ukrainy: analitychna*

- dopovid* [National systems for assessing risks and threats: best world practices, new opportunities for Ukraine: analytical report]. Kyiv, NISS. 84 p.
- Stan ta perspektyvy stratehichnoho partnerstva Polshchi ta Ukrainy: analitychna dopovid* [State and prospects of the strategic partnership between Poland and Ukraine: analytical report] (№ MEiN/2021). (2021). Warsaw–Kyiv. 112 p.
- Strategia Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej [National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland] of May 12, 2020 / President of Poland A. Duda. Warsaw, 2020. Available at: <http://www.bbn.gov.pl/ftp/SBN%20RP.pdf>.
- Strategia Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej [National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland]. (2014). Warszawa, Biuro Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego. 135 p. Available at: <http://www.bbn.gov.pl/ftp/SBN%20RP.pdf> (in Polish).
- Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of NATO*. (2010). Available at: http://www.nato.int/cps/uk/natohq/topics_56626.htm.
- Strategy of Development of the National Security System of the Republic of Poland – 2022*. (2022). Warsaw: National Security Bureau. 48 p.
- U.S. National Security Strategy and Defense Strategy of October 27, 2022. Available at: <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/trecms/pdf/AD1183514> (accessed: 12.06.2025).
- Vorona, O.I. (2019). *Systema analizu ryzykiv u sferi natsionalnoi bezpeky: teoriia i praktyka* [Risk analysis system in the field of national security: theory and practice]. Kyiv, NISS. 92 p.
- Yatsiuk, P.F. (2021). *Systema otsiniuvannia zahroz natsionalnii bezpetsi* [System for assessing threats to national security]: materials of a scientific seminar. Kyiv, NUOU.

INDIA'S EXPERIENCE IN ATTRACTING FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN MILITARY EQUIPMENT AND WEAPONS MANUFACTURING: LESSONS FOR UKRAINE

Mykola Khomik ^{1 A}; Mykola Tkach ^{2 A}

¹ Dr of Technical Sciences, Professor, e-mail: nkhomik@ukr.net, ORCID: 0000-0002-1201-7702

² Dr of Economics, Associate Professor, e-mail: nyck1985@ukr.net, ORCID: 0000-0002-8832-1268

^A National Defence University of Ukraine, Kyiv, Ukraine

Received: June 12, 2025 | Revised: June 25, 2025 | Accepted: June 30, 2025

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.33445/psssj.2025.6.2.6>

Abstract

This article examines India's experience in attracting foreign investment into its military equipment and weapons manufacturing sector, highlighting key strategies and policies that have contributed to its success. It analyzes the "Make in India" initiative, liberalization of investment policies, and strategic partnerships with foreign companies. The study identifies key steps taken by India to attract investment in military production, including market liberalization, government incentives, and simplified access to defense tenders. Ultimately, the article aims to provide valuable lessons and recommendations for Ukraine on how to enhance its investment attractiveness in the defense industry, drawing parallels with India's successful approach.

Key words: Ukraine, military equipment and weapons, India.

Introduction

In light of escalating global security concerns, an increasing number of countries, including Ukraine, are seeking to modernize their defense industries through collaboration with international companies. There are numerous successful examples worldwide of attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) into the defense industry; let us consider some of them.

India serves as a prime example of how the private sector, government support, and foreign partners can create a new ecosystem for weapons manufacturing. Traditionally, India has been predominantly an arms importer, but it is now increasingly building its capacity for weapons production and even export. Its experience with international cooperation in weapons manufacturing, attracting FDI to the military-industrial complex, and increasing the localization of weapons systems production is extremely valuable for Ukraine.

One of the successful policies of the Indian government has been the "Make in India" initiative, launched in 2014 under the leadership of Prime Minister Narendra Modi. This initiative has become a strategic program of national scale, aimed at transforming India into a global manufacturing hub. Special emphasis within this program is placed on the development of the defense industry as one of the 25 key sectors of the economy.

Results

Key steps taken by India to attract investment in military production include:

Market liberalization: Since 2020, India has allowed foreign companies to invest in the military-industrial complex without special permission and has increased the investment limit from 49% to 74%, creating a favorable environment for FDI.

The government-launched **“Make in India” initiative** encourages private conglomerates to create domestic production facilities in the defense sector.

Simplified access for private companies to participate in government defense tenders.

Introduction of the **“Defence Procurement Policy” (DPP)**, which prioritizes “Make in India”. Priority is given to the procurement of weapons manufactured in India with local components (Indian Designed, Developed, and Manufactured).

The Indian government’s “Make in India” program has enabled the expansion of weapons production in India, which is crucial for ensuring national security by reducing dependence on arms imports. Furthermore, India has attracted foreign capital and foreign defense companies to manufacture weapons on its territory, allowing it to enter the international arms market and gain access to the latest defense technologies.

One successful international cooperation project is the experience of the Indian company Adani Defense & Aerospace with the Israeli company Elbit, which is extremely valuable for countries transforming their defense capabilities. Adani Defense & Aerospace has formed a joint venture with Elbit Systems for the localized production of the Hermes 900 reconnaissance and surveillance UAV, adapted to the needs of the Indian army. The results of the cooperation include:

The first strategic reconnaissance UAV of foreign design assembled in India at local facilities. Supply of drones to the Indian Navy and Land Forces as part of the national defense modernization program.

Export of Hermes 900 aerostructures and subsystems from India to Israel, Southeast Asia, and Africa.

Creation of over 2,000 jobs in the defense aviation sector (directly and through contractors). Integration of Indian technological requirements into the existing Elbit platform, adaptation to the climate and operational needs of the region.

In addition to the positive results listed above, India is gradually reducing its dependence on arms imports, increasing technological sovereignty, and developing the private defense sector.

Another interesting example of cooperation is the collaboration between Tata Group (India) and Lockheed Martin / Sikorsky (USA) for the production of components for S-92 helicopters and F-16 fighters.

The cooperation between Tata Advanced Systems Limited (TASL) and the American defense giants Lockheed Martin and its subsidiary Sikorsky began under the “Make in India” initiative back in 2009-2010.

The Indian government actively encouraged strategic partnerships with foreign companies to localize production, create export-oriented industries, and develop the national aviation sector.

In 2010, TASL and Sikorsky opened a joint venture in Hyderabad (Telangana), with the main task of producing fuselages for the S-92 helicopter, which are subsequently exported to the United States for final assembly. In 2018, TASL became the sole global manufacturer of S-92 fuselages, having supplied over 150 kits for export.

In 2018, Lockheed Martin and TASL signed an agreement to transfer the production line of F-16 wings to India. The goal was not only to meet Indian needs but also to export components to global markets. India became the only country besides the United States where wings for the F-16 are manufactured.

In 2017, L&T (Larsen & Toubro, India) and MBDA (France) formed a joint venture, L&T MBDA Missile Systems Ltd., based in India. Its tasks include the production of tactical missile systems for the Indian Armed Forces, localization of components, assembly of missiles under European licenses, and gradual technology transfer to the Indian side.

The positive strategic consequences for India from such cooperation include:

Access to modern missile technologies, including complex guidance electronics, sensors, and control systems.

Reduced dependence on arms imports and increased domestic production.

Opportunity to export products manufactured in India to third countries under the MBDA brand, where permitted by EU regulations.

Development of engineering personnel, technical training, and R&D in a strategically important sector.

Analyzing India's experience, it can be concluded that the stimulus for the development of India's military-industrial complex was its state policy, namely the "Make in India" program. The government's initiatives, which simplified the permitting system, increased the ownership share in defense enterprises for foreign investors, simplified the regulatory system, and more, became the drivers that allowed India to gain a number of strategic benefits.

Based on the analysis, the following recommendations can be formulated for the Government of Ukraine, which should improve the investment attractiveness of our military-industrial complex:

Liberalize investment policy in the military-industrial complex, introduce an automatic system of permits for foreign direct investment in the military-industrial complex (similar to the Indian 74% without special permission).

Develop a state program to stimulate localized production of defense products by foreign companies in Ukrainian facilities, identifying priority areas for localization: unmanned technologies, artillery systems, ammunition, and air defense systems.

Create special defense-industrial clusters/parks (with tax incentives, logistics infrastructure, and government support).

Ensure rapid access to land, licensing, and electricity.

Introduce transparent, fast procedures for joint production and export of defense products, taking into account control from partner countries (USA, EU, Israel, South Korea, Japan, Australia).

Establish a unified state center to support export credit financing for Ukrainian/joint military-industrial complex projects.

To develop the investment attractiveness of private enterprises, the following initiatives can be implemented:

Initiate voluntary association of manufacturers (consortia, holdings) to ensure scalability and trust from foreign partners.

Launch transparent audits and certification of enterprises to increase investment attractiveness.

Offer foreign companies localized assembly of products with further cooperation in R&D.

Invite cooperation in the supply of components, as Tata does for Lockheed Martin (production of S-92 helicopter cabins, F-16 wings).

Focus on the development of drones, sensor systems, autonomous control, and cybersecurity: areas where it is easiest to establish interaction and quickly adapt.

Conclusions

India's transformation from a major arms importer to a growing weapons manufacturer provides valuable insights for countries like Ukraine seeking to strengthen their defense industries. The "Make in India" program, coupled with liberalized investment policies and strategic partnerships, has been instrumental in attracting foreign investment and fostering domestic production. Key takeaways for Ukraine include the need to:

Create a business-friendly environment with transparent regulations and streamlined approval processes.

Prioritize the localization of defense production through incentives and support for foreign companies.

Encourage strategic alliances with international partners to facilitate technology transfer and access to global markets.

Focus on developing expertise in key areas such as drone technology, sensor systems, and cybersecurity.

By adopting similar strategies and addressing specific challenges, Ukraine can enhance its investment attractiveness, strengthen its defense capabilities, and reduce its reliance on arms imports.

Funding

This study received no specific financial support.

Competing interests

The author declares that she has no competing interests.

References

1. Financial Times. India turns to private groups like Adani to build arms industry. Financial Times, 2024. [Access date 03/03/2025] Available from : https://www.ft.com/content/b7fb79de-9bcb-4ba9-b0bb-2c1b6fe088d9?utm_source=chatgpt.com
2. AP News. Airbus and Tata Group to build C-295 transport aircraft in India. Associated Press, 2023. [Access date 03/03/2025] Available from : https://apnews.com/article/c2fa7e510dcfd5d4c4249b56e333e593?utm_source=chatgpt.com
3. SIPRI. Transformation of Ukraine's arms industry amid war with Russia. SIPRI.org, 2024. [Access date 03/03/2025] Available from : https://www.sipri.org/commentary/topical-background/2025/transformation-ukraines-arms-industry-amid-war-russia?utm_source=chatgpt.com
4. The Kyiv Independent. Lithuania invests €20.1 million in Ukraine's defense industry, agrees to joint production. The Kyiv Independent, 2024. [Access date 03/03/2025] Available from : https://kyivindependent.com/lithuania-invests-21-million-in-ukraines-arms-industry-agrees-to-joint-production/?utm_source=chatgpt.com
5. Atlantic Council. Ukraine needs international investors to maintain defense tech momentum. Atlantic Council, 2024. [Access date 03/03/2025] Available from : https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/ukraine-needs-international-investors-to-maintain-defense-tech-momentum/?utm_source=chatgpt.com
6. Reuters. Adani, Elbit launch India's first locally made armed drone. Reuters, 2024. [Access date 03/03/2025] Available from : https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/adani-elbit-india-drone-launch-2024-03-19/?utm_source=chatgpt.com
7. Leonardo. Leonardo and Rheinmetall sign a strategic partnership for the development of the next land defense systems. Leonardo Press Release, 2024. [Access date 03/03/2025] Available from : https://www.leonardo.com/en/press-release-detail/-/detail/03-07-2024-leonardo-and-rheinmetall-sign-a-strategic-partnership-for-the-development-of-the-next-land-defense-systems?utm_source=chatgpt.com
8. CSIS. How Ukraine Rebuilt Its Military Acquisition System Around Commercial Technology. Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2024. [Access date 03/03/2025] Available from : https://www.csis.org/analysis/how-ukraine-rebuilt-its-military-acquisition-system-around-commercial-technology?utm_source=chatgpt.com

PECULIARITIES OF THE MODERN MIGRATION POLICY OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ON ADAPTATION AND INTEGRATION OF MIGRANTS AS COMPONENTS OF MIGRATION SECURITY

Olha Parkhomchuk

PhD student, e-mail: par.nik02@ukr.net, ORCID: 0009-0001-3263-832X

Yevhenii Bereznia Military Academy, Kyiv, Ukraine

Received: June 18, 2025 | Revised: June 27, 2025 | Accepted: June 30, 2025

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.33445/psssj.2025.6.2.7>

Abstract

The article conceptualizes the scientific phenomenon of “integration policy”, which is one of the key factors in the formation and implementation of the migration policy of the Russian Federation as a mechanism for ensuring national security. It is noted that the policy of integration is the reaction of the political system to the spontaneous social process of migrants joining a new community, the essential characteristics of this phenomenon are analyzed, and it is emphasized that integration is a two-stage process consisting of the adaptation of a migrant and his/her further integration into a new community. Considering the acceptance of a migrant into a new community as an integral part of the migration process, the author argues that the incorporation of a migrant, along with the relations arising in this regard, are the objects of integration policy as a component of migration policy. Accordingly, the public interests related to the inclusion of migrants in the host community constitute its subject field.

Key words: migration policy of the Russian Federation, migration security, policy of adaptation and integration of migrants, national security, challenges and threats of migration processes, state, national diaspora.

Introduction

Global migration processes play a significant role in the evolution of social relations: the influx of labor migrants and immigrants arriving in the country complicates the stratification of Russian society. The formation of new social groups for the recipient country's society, characterized by ethno-national, confessional, socio-cultural, socio-economic, and psychological types of social differences, creates preconditions for the emergence of intergroup socio-political conflict. This is the source of socio-political transformation in the area of migrants' incorporation into Russian society. The policy of migrant integration is designed to fulfill a number of functions inherent in politics in general, including harmonizing intergroup relations and ensuring the stability of the political system of society.

Taking into account the fact that the policy of integration is a reaction of the political system to the spontaneous social process of migrants joining a new community, it is advisable to analyze the essential characteristics of this phenomenon in the context of the implementation of the current migration policy of the Russian Federation, with an emphasis on ensuring migration security as a component of the national security of the Russian Federation.

It should be noted that integration is a two-stage process consisting of adaptation of a migrant and his/her further integration into a new community.

Results

The main political actor in modern society is the state, which, acting as the main subject of social

management, controls and regulates social relations in the field of migration. Political management in the migration sphere or migration management implies the relations between the subjects and objects of migration policy, the distribution of power and resources between its subjects, including the functions of strategic and operational control.

Migration management at the policy-making stage includes analyzing the situation, setting goals, developing a forecast, planning the necessary measures, obtaining the necessary information about the managed object, and setting specific tasks.

The results of political management at the stage of formulating the policy of adaptation and integration of migrants are reflected in the Concept of the State Migration Policy of the Russian Federation for the period up to 2025 and the Action Plan for its implementation.

It has been established that new generations of migrants arriving in the Russian Federation from the member states of the Commonwealth of Independent States have a lower level of education, insufficient knowledge of the Russian language and poor professional qualifications compared to their predecessors. At the same time, it is worth noting that no program has been developed to attract migrants with professional, educational, economic, demographic, socio-cultural and other characteristics in demand in the country, who are able to successfully adapt and integrate into Russian society. The direct consequence of the lack of such programs is the isolation of migrants from the host society and the growing negative attitude towards migrants on the part of the population.

The block of goals of the state migration policy of the Russian Federation, formulated in the Concept, contains the goals of the policy of adaptation and integration of migrants, namely: "maximum security, comfort and well-being of the population of the Russian Federation".

In the area of harmonization of relations between migrants and the host community, the goals of the state migration policy of the Russian Federation aimed at meeting the needs of economic, social and demographic development of the country and the state national policy aimed at ensuring civil unity in the context of cultural and religious diversity coincide. The only formula acceptable to a multiethnic Russian state is "unity in diversity", which is naturally consistent with the expected outcome of integration policy.

A successful integration policy should promote the formation of a model of interaction between migrants and the host community, where migrants retain their identity in the private sphere of life and at the same time acquire national parameters of social adequacy and cultural competence.

The contours of the integration policy were outlined by V. Mukomel, a researcher of socio-political processes of adaptation and integration of foreign citizens in the Russian Federation. Mukomel. The integration policy should ensure the realization of the task of eliminating the separation of migrants from the host society. The main principles of the integration policy are to ensure legitimate human rights and freedoms, which includes, in particular, objective and impartial consideration of cases of foreign citizens, transparency of adaptation and integration procedures. The following approaches are used for this purpose:

- a selective approach based on taking into account the interests of society, the state, individual territories, and individual opportunities for adaptation and integration;

- personalized approach, which provides for individual adaptation and integration of foreign citizens;

- abolition of preferences for foreign citizens;

- restrictions on compact residence, dispersed settlement of foreign nationals who do not have a residence permit;

- ethno-cultural and ethno-religious diversity of the migrant flow;

- linking the procedure for granting Russian citizenship to the completion of integration;

close interaction of state and local authorities with civil society institutions, including diasporas.

Thus, the main task of migration policy in the context of ensuring the national security of the state is to facilitate the adaptation and integration of migrants, and to form constructive interaction between migrants and the host community. The main directions of solving this issue are as follows:

- promoting the development of a culture of interethnic and interreligious relations in society, developing intercultural communication skills among migrants and the host community, combating xenophobia, national and racial intolerance;

- creating conditions for the adaptation and integration of migrants, including teaching them Russian, legal education, informing them about cultural traditions and norms of behavior through the formation of appropriate infrastructure in their countries of origin and in the regions of the Russian Federation experiencing the largest influx of migrants, as well as active use of the potential of the media and the capabilities of cultural adaptation centers in the countries of origin of migrants;

- ensuring access of foreign citizens and their families to social, medical and educational services depending on their legal status;

- promoting the spread of the Russian language and Russian culture abroad;

- counteracting the social isolation of migrants, spatial segregation and the formation of ethnic enclaves, which causes radicalization and leads to manifestations of migration extremism and terrorism;

- development, introduction and implementation of programs for adaptation and integration of migrants and their families in the Russian Federation based on the interaction of federal government agencies, government agencies of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation and local governments, civil society institutions and business structures;

- creation of an infrastructure to facilitate adaptation and integration, including centers for information and legal support for migrants, courses in the language, history and culture of the Russian Federation, as well as the creation of a specialized channel and series of television programs focused on the socio-cultural and linguistic adaptation of migrants;

- creating programs to foster constructive interaction between migrants and the host community;

- improving the interaction of federal government agencies, government agencies of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation, and local governments with public associations, including diasporas, that promote the adaptation and integration of migrants.

Modern migration processes have a multi-vector impact on the political and socio-economic situation in Russia. On the one hand, immigration is able to optimize demographic processes in the country, provide an influx of labor and solve the problem of population density in sparsely populated areas of the Russian Federation. In particular, in 2020, the migration increase in the population over the age of 14 amounted to 88 thousand people, of whom 19.5 thousand had higher professional education. In total, migration growth compensated for 17.7 % of the natural population decline. In the first 11 months of 2023, migration growth made it possible to compensate for 39.9% of the natural population decline.

On the other hand, we cannot ignore the negative consequences of the impact of migration processes on the socio-economic and socio-cultural situation in Russia (growth of illegal immigration, spread of social practices of deviant behavior of migrants, interethnic conflicts, etc.), for example, from January to December 2023 alone, migrants committed almost three thousand crimes. The number of law violations by migrants is increasing: In 2023, this figure increased by 5.9 % compared to 2021. As a result, certain areas of the socio-economic development of the Russian Federation are largely dependent on the peculiarities of migration processes, the regulation of which is now strategically important.

An analysis of the regulatory framework shows that the regulation of migration processes in Russia is characterized by a direct, mechanical response to emerging problems and is by no means systematic. The bodies responsible for regulating these processes do not set specific long-term goals and do not use scientifically sound design and planning methods. Under the current conditions, it is of great importance to create an effective basis for the state implementation of migration policy, which will help to form a system of fundamental principles, methods and means of its implementation in accordance with modern achievements in the field of political and legal knowledge, taking into account globalization threats and challenges to the national security of the state.

The level of complexity of the study of the peculiarities of Russia's migration policy is also determined by the problem of its analysis through the prism of ensuring the migration security of the state as a component of national security on the basis of interagency cooperation between state authorities and non-state actors, in particular national diasporas, which are one of the key non-state institutions of the migration process.

National diasporas are one of the main intermediaries in relations between the state and immigrants. Due to manifestations of extremism and terrorism, the problem of adaptation and integration of migrants is becoming increasingly acute for the leadership of the Russian Federation, and the use of the institution of diasporas in the system of public administration does not produce the desired results.

National diasporas in Russia are a very complex phenomenon in terms of their structure. Any diaspora of representatives of the titular peoples of the CIS countries can be divided into three groups:

The first group is the "old diaspora" - people who moved to Russia during the Soviet era, whose descendants were born in the Russian Federation and are fully integrated citizens;

the second group is the "new diaspora" - immigrants who migrated to the Russian Federation after the collapse of the USSR and have obtained its citizenship or intend to do so. A large percentage of representatives of this group do not want to return to their country of origin and seek to integrate into Russian society, but a certain part of these representatives is considering the option of returning in case of improvement of the socio-economic situation in the country of origin;

the third group is the "supposedly temporary diaspora" - migrants who have been living in the Russian Federation for many years but avoid integration into Russian society, as they plan to return to their country of origin in the future. Representatives of the third group usually live separately and do not actively participate in the activities of the diaspora or Russian society. Among them, there are groups of entrepreneurs who act as intermediaries between migrants and employers, the latter often being representatives of the second group, the "new diaspora".

Thus, diasporas are not only one of the parties with which the state has to interact in order to fulfill the functions of public administration of migration policy. They are also the main intermediary in the relations between the Russian Federation and migrants, which is why their role in managing migration processes should not be underestimated.

In general, the role of diasporas in the domestic political life of the state depends on a number of circumstances, among which the potential of established diaspora associations and their ability to influence the state's policy towards both diasporas and the country of origin are of key importance. Since the possibilities of diasporas are not unlimited, it is important to clearly outline the range of their responsibilities, i.e. to determine what potential they have to influence the implementation of migration security policy in the Russian Federation. In the exercise of such functions, public administration bodies rely primarily on the following groups of public administration interests:

political interests – using the potential of national diasporas in the territory of the Russian Federation to develop political, economic and cultural relations with the donor state;

economic interests – utilizing the potential of national diasporas in the territory of the Russian Federation to attract investments and labor of various qualifications to the country in order to improve the infrastructure of the regions;

socio-cultural interests – utilization of the potential of national diasporas in the territory of the Russian Federation for successful adaptation of immigrants in Russia.

At present, the greatest interest of the Russian state in managing migration processes is the successful social and cultural adaptation of migrants on its territory. The fulfillment of this task can positively affect the improvement of the demographic situation in the Russian Federation.

The state declares that the current migration policy is aimed at compensating for the shortage of skilled workers, as well as at strengthening the image of the Russian Federation in the international arena and supporting the country's economic development. In recent years, the actual results of this policy have not coincided with the expected results: the flow of labor migration to Russia is rather homogeneous, satisfying the demand for low-skilled personnel only; illegal business is widely developed, characterized by low quality of goods and services produced, as well as tax evasion, which cannot but harm the country's economy. These trends make strategies to attract highly skilled labor migrants ineffective.

According to Russian scholars, the reason for this state of affairs is the state's non-interference in the processes of migrants' socio-cultural adaptation, while diasporas' influence on them is growing and feedback is inadequate. This results in successful economic adaptation of migrants (through both legal and shadow employment), less successful social adaptation, and virtually no system of cultural adaptation.

Conclusions

Thus, when highlighting the managerial potential of the diaspora in the implementation of Russia's migration policy, the following key points should be clarified. The diaspora is a community of people of the same nationality who live outside their country of origin, who seek to preserve their national identity and form cohesive and stable groups in the country of residence, within which these people provide each other with assistance in various spheres of life. This definition includes both migrant communities that use NGOs as a tool to protect their rights, promote their interests, and help each other, and communities without formal structures in which such functions are performed by the community itself, including individual migrants who form a distributed network through informal personal connections, each node in which (a migrant) can perform a wide range of functions depending on the situation. The strength of the informal component varies from diaspora to diaspora.

The role of diasporas functioning in the territory of the Russian Federation in the lives of migrants is significant, but problematic aspects should be identified:

there are stable mechanisms in migrant communities that allow them to help each other without turning to the recipient state;

unfortunately, these spontaneous mechanisms do not lead to socio-cultural integration of migrants, which makes it closed and contributes to the formation of a kind of enclave in its place, which can become a center of migration extremism and terrorism.

The diaspora in the Russian Federation confirms its status as a social institution, the internal structure of which should be associated not primarily with a formal organization, but with a set of actual informal personal relationships between migrants. This understanding is very important in the context of state interaction with diasporas: it turns out that it is not enough to establish contact with existing formal organizations, but to influence informal adaptation mechanisms directly.

Prospects for further research

It is found that diasporas are able to assist the recipient state in realizing its political and economic interests, but at the same time, their activities impede the cultural adaptation of migrants

to the host society, contribute to the radicalization of migration relations, which increases the threat of migration extremism and terrorism. Radicalism in migration relations and its manifestations in the extremist activities of migration actors is one of the characteristic features of modern migration processes in the Russian Federation. In the Russian Federation, there are stable prerequisites for the manifestations of this type of extremism in the short and long term. The study found that the phenomenon of radicalization of relations between individuals, groups and organizations is poorly covered in the scientific literature and is practically not reflected in the state policy of Russia on countering extremism. Therefore, scientific research on this issue will expand the range of sources for studying the current migration policy of the Russian Federation in terms of socio-cultural adaptation of migrants in its territory. The fulfillment of this task, as noted by foreign experts, can improve the crisis state of the demographic situation in the Russian Federation, which has worsened in the context of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by Russia.

Funding

This study received no specific financial support.

Competing interests

The author declares that she has no competing interests.

References

- Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of 31 October 2018 No. 622 (rev. of 12 May 2023) "On the Concept of the State Migration Policy of the Russian Federation for 2019–2025". Consultant Plus. Retrieved June 11, 2025, Retrieved from : https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW
- Denisenko, M. B., & Mukomel, V. I. (2023). Foreign workers in Russia: Employers' opinions. *Sociological Studies*, (1), 26–37.
- How to raise migrant children as true Russians. *Business Newspaper Vzglyad*. Retrieved June 5, 2025, from <https://vz.ru/society/2023/6/7/1215586.html>
- Immigrants in Russia: Pros and cons. *VTSIOM*. Retrieved June 9, 2025, Retrieved from : <https://wciom.ru/analytical-reviews/analiticheskii-obzor/immigranty-v-rossii-za-i-protiv?ysclid=lon9qru3b2961429560>
- Kashepov, A. V. (2023). Forecasts of the population of Russia. *Demographic Studies*, 3(2), 10–27.
- Kozyreva, P. M., & Smirnov, A. I. (2023). Psychological aspects of social adaptation. In *Reforming Russia: Yearbook* (Issue 21, pp. 325–349). Fnisz Ran.
- Mukomel, V. I. (2023). Interethnic situation and ethno-national processes in the context of demographic and migration policy of Russia. In *INAB*, 1, 4–12.
- On the need for migration policy in Russia. *Information Portal about Elections*. Retrieved June 5, 2025, Retrieved from : <http://vybor-naroda.org/stovyborah/podrobnosti/240934-oneobhodimosti-migracionnoj-politiki-v-rossii.html>
- Round table "Social and cultural adaptation and integration of foreign citizens in the Russian Federation" was held in the State Duma. *Moscow Legal Center*. Retrieved from : <https://moscowlegalcenter.ru/>
- Volokh, V. A., & Shorokhova, S. P. (2023). Modern Russia: Problems and priorities of the state policy in the sphere of population migration. In *Russia and the World: Development of Civilizations. Scientific heritage and views of V. V. Zhirinovskiy on the emerging world order*. (pp. 170–178).
- Xenophobes and their antipodes: Who are they? *The World of Russia*, 26(1), 32–57.